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ABSTRACT
JOHN BANKHEAD MAGRUDER AND THE DEFENSE OF
THE VIRGINIA PENINSULA 1861-1862
Leonard W. Riedel, Jr.
Old Dominion University
Director: Dr. Harold Wilson
The v ia b ility of the Confederacy depended on its a b ility to
organize a government and m ilita ry defense force.

Two early concerns

were the operation of Gosport Naval Shipyard and protection of the
Confederate capital at Richmond.

Poised between them was Fortress

Monroe.
With undisputed Union mastery of the Chesapeake Bay, Fortress
Monroe was a constant reminder of the tentative security of these
c ritic a l points.

The man chosen to protect the Peninsula was Virginian,

John Bankhead Magruder.

Less than one year la te r, his efforts were

denigrated by Commanding General Joseph E. Johnston who wanted to pursue
his own strategic plan.
Under constant stress, Magruder performed with a la c rity .

Although

the Peninsula was evacuated in May 1862, Magruder did an admirable job
of defense.

Magruder’ s place in history has been discolored by

perceived b a ttle fie ld failures at Savage’ s Station and Malvern H ill.
These are an unfortunate footnote to an otherwise solid m ilitary career.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

DEDICATION
To Pamela without whom I would not have had the strength.
Deo Gratias.
To my parents, Janet and B ill Riedel, who believed enough and
sacrificed to send me to one of the nation’ s best undergraduate schools,
Virginia M ilita ry In stitu te.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper culminates over four years of graduate study and would
not have been possible without the help of some special people. F irst,
I would lik e to thank my Chairperson, Dr. Harold Wilson fo r his valuable
counsel and constructive criticism . I also appreciate the intellectual
challenges from my other two committee members, Dr. W ill Frank and Dr.
Peter Stewart. The classes I took with them were invaluable to my
preparations.
I would also lik e to thank my Air Force colleagues for th e ir
support and encouragement. When the chips were down, they gave me the
latitu d e to do what needed to be done, so to Colonel Rader, Charles
Grube, Gerald Garrett, Rick Aiken, Wayne Smith, Joe Schwartzott and
Tommy Fulfer my heartfelt thanks.
I am indebted to Mary Dix of the Jefferson Davis Papers project at
R1ce University, for leads on Magruder’ s correspondence at the
University of Texas and University of Miami in Ohio. Thanks are also
due to M1ke Meir at the National Archives for his assistance in locating
the Chilton Court of Inquiry. I would also lik e to thank the following
people for opening th e ir resources to me: Guy Swanson at the Museum of
the Confederacy, Mike Cobb at the Hampton Fine Arts Society, David
Johnson at Fort Monroe, Jim Haskett at Yorktown National Park, and
Arthur LaBonte at the War Memorial Museum. To countless other staffers
at various locations, thanks.
In the end i t boiled down to pen and paper, lots of la te nights,
and many weekends. I gratefully acknowledge my wife Dr. Pamela Buckner
Riedel for her c ritic a l eye and constructive comments. We’ ve done it !
For Nancy Ransome, my friend and typ ist, words are inadequate.
Nan slugged through horrid penmanship and countless revisions to make
this the best i t could be. Nan responded to panicky phone calls and
unreasonable deadlines with evangelical zeal and got i t right the fir s t
time! Any imperfections in this document are due to my own
inadequacies. Nan—thanks so very much.

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................

v

Chapter
1. SETTING THE STAGE

..........................................................

1

2. BASKING IN THE LIMELIGHT ...............................................

25

3. THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM...........................................

67

4. CENTER STAGE

99

.................................................................

5. DEPORTED?.........................................................................

130

6. SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT

.......................................

149

WORKS CITED...................................................................................

163

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

PAGE

Map of V icin ity of Big Bethel from The O fficial
M ilita ry Atlas of the C ivil War Map 2, Plate 18

. . .

Map of the B attlefield of Big Bethel from The
O ffic ia l M ilita ry Atlas of the Civ! War Map 4,
Plate 6 1 .............................................................................

19

22

Map of Virginia Peninsula from The O fficial
M ilita ry Atlas of the Civil War. Plate 16 ...................

29

James River Environment Adapted from Mu!berrv
Island During the C ivil War .............................................

31

Map of Lower Peninsula from "Civil War Times
Illu strated " Magazine, Feb 79, page 8 ..........................

64

Map of Northeastern North Carolina from "Blue and
Gray" Magazine, May 88, pp 12-13 ......................................

101

Map of Yorktown Fortifications from The O fficial
M ilita ry Atlas of the Civil War. Map 1, plate 15 . . .

156

v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 1
SETTING THE STAGE
The American C ivil War helped establish a national identity
uniquely American.

The internal struggle had international

ramifications and when i t was over the American way of l i f e was
enhanced.
Some populists have presented the war as a good versus bad
confrontation with heroes and v illa in s .

The war is frequently

represented as having been fought by amateurs; this was a misleading
representation.
The leaders and senior officers in the C ivil War were generally
graduates of m ilitary institutions.

Many officers had fought in the

Mexican War and some had over 30 years m ilitary service.

When the

country began to fragment the old Union army was in turmoil.

One of the

"career" officers caught in limbo was Virginian, Lieutenant Colonel John
Bankhead Magruder.
Magruder was born in 1807 in Front Royal, Virginia and was one of
eight children.

He pursued a college education for one year as a member

of the f ir s t class to attend the University of Virginia but transferred
to the United States M ilitary Academy at West Point.1
Cadet Magruder achieved academic success in the class of 1830.

A

1Thomas M. Settles, "The M ilitary Career of John Bankhead Magruder"
(Ph.D. diss., Texas Christian University, 1972), 2-5.
1
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cadet captain, he ranked 15th In academics but near the bottom In
discipline.

I t may have been this la te r distinction which raised his

v is ib ility with some prominent members of the class of 1829, lik e
Robert E. Lee, who graduated 2d without a demerit and Joseph E.
Johnston, who graduated 13th.

Two years senior to Magruder In the class

of 1828 was Jefferson F. Davis.
One year a fte r graduation in 1831, Magruder married a prominent
Baltimore so cialite, Henrietta Von Kapff.

He fathered three children

but frequent remote assignments estranged him from his family and in
1850 Henrietta moved to Europe with th e ir children.

Magruder visited

infrequently, once going fiv e years without seeing them; consequently,
he lived his own l i f e and many people believed he was unmarried.2
Magruder’ s m ilita ry career was a progression of unmemorable
assignments with a single promotion to f ir s t lieutenant in 1836.

At the

start of the Mexican War in 1846, he was the senior lieutenant in the
army.
Since he lived alone, he frequently courted society and earned a
reputation as a bon vivant.

Regular attendance at parties, flashy

dress, and an engaging personality earned him the fla tte rin g sobriquet
"Prince John."
Magruder was a typical member of the southern gentry; he
entertained frequently and often drank to excess.

Many people told

exaggerated stories concerning Magruder’ s supposed bouts with alcohol.
Some stories originated with Magruder himself and seemed to feed a
2Ib id ., 22.
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legend that he was not adverse to accepting.3 Magruder had a
pronounced lisp and his fractured speech could have easily been mistaken
as a sign of intoxication.4
Magruder’ s strong performance as an a r tille r y o ffic e r in the
Mexican War earned him two brevet promotions beyond the captaincy which
he received in 1846.

He rose to major at Cerro Gordo and attained a

lieutenant colonelcy afte r the capture of Mexico C ity.

His sparkling

performance resulted in the State of Virginia presenting him a gold
sword.5
Magruder’ s career remained positive until the start of the C ivil
War and he occupied numerous command positions from San Diego,
C alifornia to Newport, Rhode Island.

His social grace and flamboyant

dress earned him entrance to high social circles.

The start of the

C ivil War found him in Washington, D.C., debriefing the results of a
sabbatical to Ita ly where he studied Garibaldi’ s siege of Naples.
3Magruder’ s reputation as a drinker is adequately documented and
w ill not be repeated here. However, the issue of alcohol followed him
throughout the Civil War. I t is unreasonable to believe Magruder
practiced abstinence during the war as there were a number of social
opportunities to drink, but there is only one, hearsay, declaration of
Magruder taking a drink during the war and i t is related by Colonel
Benjamin Ewell in a post-war reminiscence. Benjamin S. Ewell,
"Reminiscences of John Bankhead Magruder and the War," D, Benjamin S.
Ewell Papers, Special Collections, College of William and Mary,
Williamsburg.
4The classic lis p , "thir" for s ir could easily be mistaken as the
slurred speech which characterizes intoxication. Mary B. Chesnut, A
Diarv From D ixie, ed. Ben Ames Williams (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1980), 230; Settles, 5.
5Settles, 140.
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On 20 A p ril, he resigned his Federal commission6 and on 25 April
was commissioned a colonel of Virginia forces ranking third behind
Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston.

The same day he joined Johnston,

Richard S. Ewell, Samuel Barron, and Sydney Smith Lee, a ll prominent
Virginians, in a jo in t commission of army and naval officers to
recommend "efficie n t and worthy" citizens fo r commissions In the state
forces.7
General Lee faced immediate problems.

Union held Fortress Monroe

at the tip of the Virginia Peninsula was less than 100 miles from
Richmond.

I t was a strong position even when inadequately manned.

moat surrounded casemates which bristled with guns.

A

Lee had worked on

the construction of the fo rt and understood that i t could not be overrun
by the Virginia m ilitia .
The Union command structure also understood Fortress Monroe’ s
importance and before rebels seized Gosport Naval Yard, Union generalin-chief Winfield Scott warned Colonel Justin Dimick to take covert
actions to protect the fo rt from seizure.8 Fortress Monroe’ s location
at Old Point Comfort meant i t could easily be supplied and reinforced by
sea, especially in the absence of a rebel naval challenge.

Thus, Lee’ s

6After the war, Northern newspapers published reports that Magruder
promised Lincoln that he would not leave the U.S. Army. However,
Magruder refuted the statement. Magruder said he attempted to v is it
Lincoln to render his resignation in person but was unable to see him.
Settles, 174-75.
7U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the O fficial Records nf the Union and Confederate Armies 128 vols.
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880-1901; reprint,
Harrisburg: Historical Times, Inc., 1985), series 1, vol. 51, part 2,
35. Hereafter referred to as OR.
80R, series 1, vol. 51, part 1, 326.
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challenges 1n eastern Virginia were:
1. To hold Norfolk and the shipyard for the use of Confederate
Navy,
2. Protect Richmond from a land or sea assault by the Federal s.
Lee understood that Virginia was at a material disadvantage and needed
to husband as much manufacturing capability as possible.

He also

understood the p o litic a l and m ilitary significance of V irginia.
Confederate envoys throughout Richmond were visible confirmation of that
r e a lity .9 Thus, fo rtific atio n s were under construction around Norfolk
before the survey of the James River was in itia te d .

This action

inspired a contemporary historian’ s assertion that "Norfolk was the most
important point in the s tate."10
State m ilitary o ffic ia ls emphasized the point.

Lee’ s adjutant,

Richard Garnett, asked General Gwynn to devise ways to prevent a rear
door attack on Norfolk.”

Three days la te r Richmond o ffic ia ls told

Gwynn that due to the threat to Norfolk, strategic materials such as
copper, lead, and zinc had been evacuated to a place of safety.12
Letcher wrote Lee from Norfolk on both 4 and 5 May and asked him to
9Virginia was not yet a member of the Confederacy and did not
become so u n til a statewide referendum on 23 May 1861. S t i l l , there
were numerous envoys in Richmond reporting every action the state took.
The most prominent of these men was Confederate Vice President Alexander
Stephens of Georgia. These representatives had only one purpose, ensure
Virginia joined the Confederacy.
10Louis H. Manarin, "Lee in Command: Strategical and Tactical
Policies" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1964), 66.
110R, series 1, vol. 2, part 2, 791.
12Ib id ., 795.
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divert newly arriving Georgia and Alabama troops to Norfolk.13
Richmond’ s vulnerability was manifest on 21 April when the Yankee
gunboat Pawnee was allegedly discovered sailing up the James River to
shell the c ity .

The trauma of that event created a demand 1n Richmond

to secure V irg in ia’ s waterways immediately.14 Talcott was again
dispatched this time to survey the James River.15 A coalition of
engineers and naval officers accompanied him to complete his
recommendations without delay.16
The James River was not the only threat to Richmond via water
routes.

As early as January 1861, Virginia engineer Andrew Talcott

surveyed vulnerable positions in the state and identified the York
River.

Talcott followed this up with a tr ip on 18-20 April in which he

determined Gloucester Point could mount up to 34 guns and was a suitable
position for a land defense.17
The disorganization of the Peninsula m ilitia and the sophistication
130R, series 1, 2:801, 804.
uJohn B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk’ s Diarv. ed. Howard Swiggett, 2
vols. (New York: Old Hickory Bookshop, 1935), 10; Clement A. Evans,
ed., Confederate M ilita ry History (Confederate Publishing Co., 1899;
reprint, Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot, 1987), vol. IV, V irg in ia, by Jed.
Hotchkiss, 126.
150B, series 1, 2:788-89.
16During the in it ia l preparations on the James River, Lieutenant
Catesby ap R. Jones was placed in command of Jamestown Island. Major
James Patton was tasked to provide infantry support. U. S. War
Department, O ffic ial Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the
War of the Rebellion (31 vo ls., Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing O ffice, 1894-1927; reprint, Harrisburg: Historical Times,
In c., 1987), series 1, 6:697-702. Hereafter referred to as 0RN; QR,
series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 70.
170R, series 1, 2:781-82.
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of the naval armament captured from Gosport Shipyard led Governor
Letcher and General Lee to conclude as a matter of p ra c tic a lity ,
Virginia naval officers should build and manage riv e r defense batteries.
Assignments were made quickly and by the end of April prominent naval
officers were 1n command at Jamestown Island, Gloucester Point and West
Point.

Naval captains received complete command of the James and York

River defenses.18 Those officers not only had to mount the Gosport
guns, but establish control of the rivers by determining the status of
the vessels operating on them.

A few vessels such as the Jamestown.

Yorktown. Teaser and Logan la te r became part of the Peninsula
transportation network.
The need to harness in it ia l war enthusiasm was c ritic a l to Lee’ s
plan to organize a viable force.

In itia l commissions issued to men lik e

Major Harrison Ball Tomlin, Professor Benjamin Stoddard Ewell, Major
John Baytop Cary, Major Edgar Burwell Montague and Colonel William Booth
Taliaferro were l i t t l e more than recruiting commissions and early
reports from them focused on the status of recruiting.
Many counties had prewar m ilitia s ; in Gloucester fiv e companies
regularly assembled for d r i l l .

In Hampton Cary formed four companies,

one a r tille r y , one calvary and two in fan try.19 Ewell was able to raise
six companies;

however, none of the volunteers could be considered an

18The following naval
Cocke, Commander of James
Jamestown Island; Captain
Defenses; Commander P. R.

officers commanded as indicated: Captain H.
River Defenses; Lieutenant Catesby Jones,
William W hittle, Commander of York River
Page, Gloucester Point.

19Donald Ransone Taylor, Out of the Past—The Future. A History of
Hampton. Virginia (Hampton:
Prestige Press, 1960), 23.
Ludwell Lee
Montague, Gloucester Countv in the C ivil War (Gloucester, VA:
The
Dehardit Press, 1965), 5.
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effective m ilitary fighting force.
In fac t, the state of discipline was so poor and the equipage so
limited that Ewell was unable to support Catesby Jones’ s request for
infantry protection.

Cary wrote after the war, " [ I] had 4 volunteer

companies, 200 men, 1 a r tille r y [battery] had no guns, [ I was] poorly
equipped, almost without ammunition . . . My orders were to avoid
h o s tilitie s ." 20
Not every area of Virginia was imbued with martial s p irit and some
areas such as Poquoson were reluctant to support the Virginia
government.

In Gloucester General Lee was compelled to send Thomas

Lewis Preston as a personal envoy to assist in recruitment.21
Considering the volume and complexity of his organizational
problems, Lee did not contemplate offensive actions; however, some
a r tille r y exchanges in the York River did occur.

On 7 May, a battery

under command of Captain J. Thompson Brown of the Richmond Howitzers
arrived from West Point on the steamer Logan and at approximately 2:00
P.M. opened fir e on the Federal steamer Yankee.

After a short exchange

of shots in which none h it, the Yankee retired back to the v ic in ity of
Old Point Comfort.22
20Benjamin F. Butler, Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of
Maior General Beniamin Butler. Butler’ s Book (Boston: A. M. Thayer and
Co., 1892), 262-63.
2t0R, series 1, 2:876-77.
22Many of the f ir s t encounters of the war were dramatically
documented, far in excess of th eir m ilitary importance. The incident
with the Union vessel Yankee is an excellent example. Defenses at
Gloucester Point were in the earliest stages of development with l i t t l e
a r tille r y or support personnel. A detachment of the Richmond Howitzers
were enroute on the transport steamer Logan to man i t . The best
eyewitness description of the encounter is by Private James Peter
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Brown’ s f ir e created concern 1n the naval hierarchy and resulted 1n
accusations that he violated Lee’ s orders to act only on the defensive.
The report of Colonel Taliaferro stated that Brown, acting under
authority from Captain W hittle, opened fir e ; a charge Whittle vehemently
denied.23 Faced with these paralytic reactions, Lee provided guidance
for future engagements.

Lee advised that the defenders should f ir s t

shoot across the bow of the approaching ship, then over the ship’ s head
and fin a lly into the ship.24
Hany well to do and p atriotic citizens recognized the state’ s needs
and they eith er commenced building th eir own fo rtific a tio n s with th eir
own slaves or they generously offered th e ir advice.

On 22 A p ril, A.

Bisbee wrote a le tte r to chief engineer, Andrew Talcott, and suggested
they immediately organize a workforce to build earthworks in Norfolk.
The workforce would consist of white men w illin g to protect th e ir homes,
slaves volunteered by th eir masters, organized laborers, such as those
constructing the Covington and Ohio railroad, criminals secured by ball
and chain and free Negroes impressed from th e ir peacetime pursuits.
Bisbee suggested that 20,000 laborers could be delivered within a
week.25 C. M. Hubbard in James City County recommended to Governor
Williams, Gloucester Point, to his sister, 8 Hay 1861, THs in the James
Peter Williams Papers, Archives, Virginia State Library, Richmond.
^This note is only of interest in demonstrating the rig id ity of
the existing m ilitary structure. Colonel T a life rro ’ s seemingly innocent
report of the action threatened the Navy hierarchy commanding the York
River. Instead of working to protect a point the Federals coveted,
there was a rush to apportion the blame. ORN, series 1, 4:374-82.
240R, series 1, 2:815-16.
25A. Bisbee, Norfolk, to Andrew Talcott, Norfolk, 22 April 1861,
ALS in Andrew Talcott Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond.
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Letcher in a le tte r of 26 April the use of free Negroes to build
entrenchments and complete other public projects.

Hubbard strongly

believed the slaves should stay on the farms to help raise food.

This

way they would be less lik e ly to be Involved 1n insurrections.26
Hubbard’ s attitude was particularly Instructive In view of subsequent
challenges to the Impressment of slave labor for m ilita ry purposes.
The progress on the defensive works was remarkable considering the
organizational problems that the various rebel commanders faced.

The

shortage of laborers, tools and transportation a ll caused significant
problems.

The experiences of Catesby Jones at Jamestown Island were

ty p ic a l.
Jones took over the protection of Jamestown Island from William
Allen a local resident.

Allen had begun construction of a private gun

battery before Andrew Talcott decided to place a m ilita ry position
there.

When Jones took command, Allen coordinated slave labor support;

however, Jones soon found himself confounded by his superior o ffic e r,
Captain H. H. Cocke.

Cocke aggressively pursued the development of Fort

Powhatan which was much farther up the James River and fa r less
important.

Cocke refused to send materials to Jones and even seized

c r itic a l block and tackles needed to l i f t guns into place at
Jamestown.27
The heavy responsibilities of command pressed on General Lee; the
m ilitia and volunteers were l i t t l e better than mobs.

Camps of

260R, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 47.
270RN. series 1, 6:700-703.
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instruction needed to be established.

Commanders from a ll points sent

requests and Inquiries directly to Richmond.
replaced by organization.
harmonized.

Lee knew chaos had to be

Naval and land force commanders had to be

Lee needed professional soldiers to guide men lik e Ewell,

recently president of William and Mary, and Cary, who had run Hampton
Hale and Female Academy.28 Into this cauldron Lee inserted Bankhead
Magruder.
Colonel Magruder had been busy since his 25 April commission and on
29 A p ril, he was placed in command of a ll the a r tille r y in and about
Richmond.

Just a week la te r, he dispatched a portion of a local

a r tille r y organization, organized by George Wythe Randolph called the
Richmond Howitzers, to Gloucester Point to support m ilitia Colonel
William T a life rro , who was constructing a defensive battery.

This

detachment immediately engaged the U.S.S. Yankee on both 7 and 9 May.
Captain Henry Coal te r Cabell wrote to Magruder and explained the nature
of the engagements and the te rrain .

No apparent damage had been done

and the position seemed to be well suited fo r defensive purposes.
Cabell also noted the fragmented command relationships and asked
Magruder fo r reporting instructions.29 However, Magruder had been
elevated on 8 May to command a ll forces in and around Richmond.30
Command of forces in and around Richmond was one of the most
significant posts in state service and was certainly an appropriate job
28Les Jensen, 32d Virginia Infantry (Lynchburg, Virginia:
Howard, In c., 1990), 1, 13.

H.E.

^Cabell’ s correspondence is in ORN, series 1, 4:406-7; OR, series
1, 2:830-81; OR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 79-81, 83.
30OR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 817.
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for the state’ s third ranking o ffic e r.

Therefore, the significance of

Magruder’ s 21 May assignment to the new Department of the Peninsula at
Yorktown reflected the state’ s view of the position and was a clear
statement of Richmond’ s defensive strategy.
Lee understood that Federal forces could not be permitted to
operate on the upper Peninsula.

Such a concession would render both

Norfolk and the shipyard untenable since Union forces could cross to the
south side of the James River and cut railroad lines between Norfolk and
the rest of the South.

Penetration by a Federal fle e t towards Richmond

on either the York or James River would stretch Lee’ s ground forces to a
breaking point.

Since the York River was constricted to three quarters

of a mile at Yorktown i t was a logical place to defend.
Magruder was assigned to the Peninsula by Special Orders number 95,
dated 21 May 1861.
Hampton.

He was placed in command of a line from Yorktown to

His headquarters were at Yorktown.

Detailed orders required

him to provide manpower to protect the workers constructing batteries
under Catesby Jones at Jamestown Island, on the York River presumably at
Gloucester Point and Yorktown.

He was expected to expedite completion

of a short defensive line between College and Queen Creeks in front of
Williamsburg.

When combined with the James and York River batteries,

Richmond would be secure from land or water attack.

Lieutenant Colonel

Benjamin Ewell and Major John Cary were placed under his command.

Three

regiments of infantry, Colonel L. G. DeRussy’ s Louisiana volunteers,
Colonel Daniel H. H i l l ’ s 800 North Carolinians and Colonel Thomas P.
August’ s Virginians, were also placed under Magruder’ s charge.

Finally,

General Lee tasked the commanding officer to send "authentic information
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o f what occurs at Fort Honroe, and the operations of U. S. Forces, i f
important . . .

to headquarters.”31 These orders modified as

circumstances changed, were the essence of Magruder’ s command charter
and he immediately pursued th e ir implementation.
Colonel Magruder arrived in a command that was active with
intrigue.

His forward outpost commanded by Major Cary was actively

conversing with General Butler at Fort Monroe.

On 23 May, Butler sent a

force of approximately 800 men into Hampton.

This created an indignant

controversy.

invasion of Virginia soiland

he sought to

Cary viewed the action as an

c la rify Butler’ s intentions. Of greater consequence in the

meeting scheduled for 3:30 P.M. between Butler and Cary on 24 May, was
the status of several slaves belonging to Colonel Mallory that escaped
while working on the fo rtific a tio n s at Sewell’ s Point and presented
themselves at Fort Monroe.
slaves.

Cary sought but failed to win custody of the

Butler advised that since the slaves were m aterially aiding the

Virginians’ treasonous effo rts, they represented a tangible asset and
were "contraband" of war.32
The commanding o ffic er immediately oriented himself with the
geography by

hiring the local sh eriff as a

impressed by

what he saw.

guide.33 He was not

He advised Richmond on 25 May that the

work

310R, series 1, 2:865.
32The contraband issue was one of General Butler’ s best moments.
He recognized the material value of slave labor and lobbied the
Washington government for guidance which permitted retention and
employment of defer+ing slaves. Butler, 256-59, 262-63; Tinsley
Spraggins, "Mobiliz. tion of Negro Labor for the Department of Virginia
and North Carolina, 1861-1865," North Carolina Historical Review 24
(April 1947): 160.
330R, series 1, 9:38.
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on the Yorktown battery was slow.

He planned to select the In te rio r

Yorktown defensive positions on the 26th.

He then planned a meeting

with Ewell to discuss the Williamsburg works.

Magruder also advised of

another problem that would hamper his efforts to construct
fo rtific a tio n s and build a fighting force.

Negro workers having

completed th e ir agreed upon time of service had been returned to th e ir
masters; to prevent a lapse In the work, Magruder tasked 400 soldiers in
th e ir place.34
Even as Magruder was completing his f i r s t day on the lin e , Lee
wrote him several le tte rs , one of which emphasized the importance of the
Williamsburg lin e .

Lee sent Magruder two 12 pound Napoleons and two 8

inch Columbiads to use as Magruder saw f i t .

The anxious Lee also

assigned two engineers, Captains Alfred Rives and Richard K. Meade.35
Less than a week after receiving command on 21 May, Magruder
encountered the f i r s t movement of the enemy.

A force of 2,500 Federal

troops marched from Hampton to Newport News on 26 May to establish Camp
Butler.

This generated a flood of refugees moving toward Confederate

lines at Yorktown and Williamsburg and the advance guard under Cary fe ll
back in disorder.

Although Cary had nearly 200 men on his roster, about

65 moved as an organized m ilitary force; the rest helped refugees.
Cary’ s troops abandoned th e ir a r tille r y and Magruder had to retrieve i t .
Magruder candidly advised Richmond that he had less than 1,000 men in
and about Williamsburg and breastworks which were fa r from complete.

He

“ OR, series 1, 2:878.
35Ib id ., 876.
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advised he could attack the Yankees on th eir flank and then f a ll back
while burning wharves to hamper Union amphibious operations.

He wrote,

"I know troops are needed on every lin e ,

cannotoverrate

but I believe I

the importance of preserving a

numerical superiority.*36Since

Magruder believed the Federals

had 5,000 men and his defenses were

inadequate, he asked for 8,000

to 10,000 men.37

Magruder faced a direct challenge.

The movement of Union troops to

Newport News and th e ir subsequent forays into the countryside suggested
contempt fo r Magruder’ s force.

Even worse, Magruder believed fa ilu re to

stand up to the invaders would demoralize the c iv ilia n community.

I f he

were to execute his mission, then he needed the support of the populace;
therefore, he decided to move toward Hampton to stop the marauding.

He

believed that a check to the Federals combined with modest
reinforcements would permit him to hold his lin e .
I am satisfied that i t [Yorktown] cannot be taken by any
number of men that can be brought against i t , i f i t is properly
entrenched and defended by a sufficient number of men; that is , as
long as the mouth of the riv e r is secured by batteries on this side
and on Gloucester Point.38
Magruder had inherited a rudimentary defensive scheme.

Although he

believed Yorktown could be made a citadel, he noted that the positioning
of the Williamsburg and Jamestown defenses were such that a Federal
force could cut o ff Yorktown from the in terio r by landing on the James
“ ib id ., 885-87.
37This perspective reflected the maturity of Magruder’ s thinking.
He understood the need to maintain a superior force in an open fie ld
fig h t. His request for another 4,000 to 6,000 troops was a modest
request, and i t was couched with acceptance of Lee’ s overall manpower
demands.
“ OR, series 1, 2:893.
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River at Grove Wharf, without crossing either the Williamsburg or
Jamestown lines.

I f Yorktown were captured, the York River would be

open and the Peninsula would become untenable.39
As the commanding o ffic e r worked through the in it ia l challenges of
his command, his authority was challenged by one of his chief
subordinates.

Colonel Daniel Harvey H ill, Commanding the First

Regiment, North Carolina volunteers near Yorktown, was in a unique
situation.

North Carolina had agreed to a m ilitary alliance with

Virginia preparatory to both states’ formal alliance with the
Confederacy.

Magruder held a Virginia commission and although General

Lee was dual-hatted as Commander of Virginia forces and Chief of
Confederate Operations in V irginia, H ill was not convinced of the
legitimacy of his subordination to Magruder.
D. H. H ill vented his dissatisfaction in a le tte r of 30 May to his
wife, Isabella, "Colonel Magruder in command is always drunk and giving
foolish and absurd orders."40 Three days la te r, Magruder advised
Richmond that he believed H ill had problems with th e ir dates of rank, "I
think I rank him, but am of the impression that i t is a subject of some
feeling on his p art."41
Despite H i l l ’ s dissatisfaction Magruder moved decisively to control
his command.

On 31 May, he issued seven General Orders of which five

39After Yorktown was evacuated on 3 May 1862, McClellan attempted
to organize an amphibious expedition up the York River to get ahead of
the retreating General Johnston.
40Hal Bridges, Lee’ s Maverick General Daniel Harvey H ill (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1961), 28.
410R, series 1, 2:900-901.
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are mentioned here: unnumbered, 4, 5, 6, and 9.

The f i r s t three

established controls around Yorktown, Stafford Cook became chief of the
c iv il police; c iv ilia n movements were restricted within m ilita ry areas
and civilian s were ordered to destroy spirituous liquors.

General

Orders number 6 placed Major John Bell Hood in command of the
Department’ s cavalry.

General Orders number 9 established a mandatory

four d r ill a day schedule fo r everyone; skulkers were to be arrested.42
After Magruder was named commander, he discovered that no formal
s ta ff had been provided.

Between 24 May and 1 June, he accomplished

what he could with volunteers.

He formed a s ta ff during the f ir s t week

of June and issued another nine general orders.

In General Orders

number 10, Major Hood was ordered to establish permanent picket posts to
watch for Federal movements at Wormley’ s Creek, Upper Grafton Court
House, McCauley’ s Creek, Warwick Road, Lebanon Church, and Williamsburg.
General Orders number 14 delegated limited authority to commanders to
grant furloughs and authorized the impressment of slaves, free Negroes
and horses.

General Orders number 15 established a quarantine hospital

for measles; General Orders number 16 placed Captain J. Thompson Brown
in charge of the a r tille r y ; and General Orders number 18 established
furlough procedures for the army.43 The pace of organization in just
two weeks by any reasonable standard was outstanding.
Magruder had advised Richmond that he intended to strike the
Federals when he could.

He performed personal reconnaissances to survey

42U.S. War Department, Rebel Records, "Correspondence of the
Department of the Peninsula," Record Group (RG) 109, chapter 2, vol.
229, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
43Ibid.
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the country and his intent was clear.

Refugee Benjamin West wrote of an

encounter with Magruder in early June:
He stopped and inquired as to the number and position of
the Yankees, whether they had thrown up entrenchments, and
intimating he would attack them. He seemed to feel very
sorry fo r father and told him to go to Yorktown, and he
would supply a ll our wants as long as he had anything to eat
himself . . . In fac t, he was kind to a ll the refugees and
did a ll in his power to help them.
On 3 June, Magruder wrote Richmond that he had b u ilt an integrated
lin e of defense from Grove Landing to Yorktown.

At Yorktown Magruder

reported a small, enclosed work nearly completed with three guns mounted
in the naval battery.

He declared his intent to strengthen the fo rt so

to make i t impassible by water.

"When once strongly fo r tifie d , I shall

always be able to defend this work at least until an army from the
in te rio r can raise the siege by beating the besiegers."45 Magruder
further cemented the defensive scheme by obstructing and closing a ll
roads with abatis to the lower Peninsula except two public use roads.
In pressing his requirement for an additional 4,000 troops to support
his 3,400, he noted the small m ilitia (no more than 150) and the lack of
enthusiasm for the Confederacy in Elizabeth City County and in lower
York County.46 He was now ready to strike.
Magruder had previously decided to anchor his forward defenses near
Bethel Church.

Its location behind a branch of the Back River made

i t defensible.

On6 June, he ordered D. H. H ill and his 800 North

^George Benjamin West, When the Yankees Came. C ivil War and
Reconstruction on the Virginia Peninsula, ed. Parke Rouse, Jr.
(Richmond: Dietz Press, 1977), 64.
450E, series 1, 2:902-3.
“ Ibid.
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Fig. 1. Map of V i c i n i t y of Big Bethel from The O f f i c i a l M i l i t a r y Atlas
of the C i v i l War Map 2, Plate 18.
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Carolinians to move with Hajor George Wythe Randolph’ s Richmond
Howitzers to Bethel and fo r tify i t .

To prevent a turning movement on

his right from Newport News, he sent a cavalry unit to destroy bridges
and block roads.
Magruder had deployed with 1,200 of his 3,400 men.

A shortage of

wagons forced him to delegate the entrenchment of Bethel to D. H. H ill
while he sought to establish a supply lin e from the Poquoson River to
Bethel.
After two days of work, H ill sent word to the commander that the
Federal army was moving.

Magruder immediately proceeded to Bethel to

take command in person.47 When the Federals did not appear, Magruder
decided to seek them and he moved toward L ittle Bethel three miles
distant.

Late in the evening of 9 June, Magruder and H ill were blindly

moving forward unaware that Union forces were also seeking to attack.

A

local resident arrived to advise them that the Yankees were near and in
large force.48 Based on that intelligence, Magruder instructed his
1,200 man force to return to Big Bethel and await th e ir appearance.
They did not have to wait long.
Despite bold intentions, the Federal force under the command of
Brigadier General Ebenezer Pierce moved tentatively.

They did not know

47Major Edward J. Hale, "The Bethel Regiment, The First North
Carolina Volunteers," Histories of Several Regiments and Battalion from
North Carolina in the Great War 1861-65. ed. Walter Clark, vol. 1
(Raleigh: E. M. Uzzell, 1901; reprint, Wendell, NC: Broadfoot, 1982),
1:83-87.
^ Ib id ., 86. The lady who warned Magruder and H ill of the presence
of the enemy force was Hannah Tunnell, a local resident. After the
battle, the officers and men of the Bethel Regiment collected a $225
reward to thank her for her gallantry.
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where the Confederates were or with what force they would be opposed.
To make matters worse, two Federal columns had Inadvertently stumbled
Into each other and opened f ir e k illin g several comrades.

This caused

leading elements of the bluecoats to rush back to th e ir supporting
columns.

When the Union columns did arrive at 9:00 A.M. on 10 June and

emerged from a tree lin e , they were ripped by f ir e from Major Randolph’ s
howitzers.
Magruder was a useful commander, making decisions when they were
required and moving units from one sector of the works to the other.

A

contemporary biographer of D. H. H ill said disparagingly that Magruder
gave few overall orders and allowed H ill to control the b a ttle .49
However, testimony to the contrary was presented by a participant, Major
Edward Hale of the North Carolina "Bethel" Regiment in his 1901 history
of the North Carolinians.
Major Hale described three instances where Magruder observed
conditions deteriorating and where he made dispositions to check the
danger.

The f ir s t occurred when forces of 5th New York and 1st Vermont

approached a picket of 40 men on H i l l ’ s le f t .

Magruder dispatched

Captain William H. Werth’ s company of Montague’ s Battalion to support
them.

Werth drove the Yankees back with one shot.

The second instance

occurred when Lieutenant Colonel William D. Stuart reported the threat
of a flanking movement on his right; Magruder immediately ordered Stuart
to withdraw to Montague’ s position behind the church.

Finally, in

response to a serious move on Magruder’ s le f t led by Major Theodore
"Bridges, 29.
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Fig. 2. Map of the B a t t l e f i e l d of Big Bethel from The O f f i c i a l M i l i t a r y
Atlas of the Ci v i l War Map 4, Plate 61.
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Winthrop, commanding a column of Vermont and Massachusetts troops,
Magruder ordered three companies of the North Carolinians to support the
two companies facing the assault.

The combined forces promptly checked

Winthrop’ s assault and Winthrop was k ille d .

Hale claimed that this last

e ffo rt was a key to the b a ttle .50
The encounter lasted approximately four hours and ended at one
o’ clock in the afternoon of 10 June.

The Confederate losses were one

dead and several wounded, the Yankees had 18 dead and 53 wounded.

The

Union retreat was disorganized.
The Confederates handled themselves well under f ir e .

Just 400 of

Magruder’ s force of 1,200 actually got to fight and they fought well for
th eir f i r s t time under fir e .

H ill ju s tifia b ly lavished praise on his

North Carolinians and the supporting troops.

Magruder was no less

laudatory,
I cannot omit to again bring to the notice of the general
commanding the valuably services and gallant conduct of the
First North Carolina Regiment and Major Randolph of the
howitzer batteries. These officers were not only prompt and
daring in the execution of th e ir duties, but most industrious
and energetic in the preparations for the co n flict."
In Richmond, d ia ris t S allie Putnam recorded, "Colonel Magruder
occasionally excited and impetuous as is his custom to be, calmly smoked
his cigar and gave orders with coolness and deliberation."52
Just 17 days before on 24 May, Magruder had arrived to take command
50Hale, 93, 94, 96, 98.
51Ib id ., 95.
52S allie Putnam, Richmond Purina the War. Four Years of Personal
Observation by a Richmond Lady (New York: G. W. Carleton and Co., 1867;
reprint, Time-Life Book, Inc., 1983), 53.
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of a newly created department.

He had formed a s ta ff, promulgated

organizational directives and thrashed the Federals who lost nearly nine
k ille d , wounded, or captured for every one the Confederates lo st.

A new

Southern fo lk hero was born.
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CHAPTER 2
BASKING IN THE LIMELIGHT
The 13 June 1861 Richmond Dispatch proclaimed Big Bethel, "The
greatest victory in the annals of modern warfare."

The New York Times

harshly c ritic iz e d the ineptitude of the Union generals.1 The small
skirmish at Bethel seemed to prove conclusively that one southerner
could beat twenty Yankees.

Jubilation in the South sharply contrasted

to anger and despondency in the North.
Magruder was placed center stage to receive the accolades due a
conquering hero.

A b a ttle fie ld correspondent called him a "brave and

daring o ffic e r." 2 Richmond d ia ris t, Mary Chesnut wrote from Camden,
South Carolina, "Colonel Magruder has done something splendid on the
Peninsula."3 His laurel was be a general’ s wreath.4 However,
As might be expected the e a rlie r encounters received extensive
coverage. The Southern papers were exultant, representative articles
are referenced in Douglas S. Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. A Study in
Command. 3 vols. (New York: Scribners, 1943), 1:18-19 and are fu lly
presented in the "The F irst North Carolina Volunteers and the Battle of
Bethel," Southern Historical Society Papers (Richmond: William E llis
Jones, 1891), 19:212-46. Hereafter referred as SHSP. Union accounts
are represented by extended criticism of General Butler and the
administration in The New York Times between 13 June and 20 June 1861.
2SHSP. 19:228.
3Chesnut, 58.
4Magruder was commissioned Brigadier General on 17 June 1861.
Joseph H. Crute, J r ., Confederate Staff Officers. 1861-1865 (Powhatan,
VA: Derwent Books, 1982), 128.
25
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Magruder’ s actions after the battle reflected his concern with Issues
more significant than this skirmish.

While General Butler apologized

for General Pierce’ s mismanagement of the expedition, Magruder wrote a
short, Incomplete summary of the b attle.

He did not overstate Its

value, nor did he claim credit for the victory.

Instead, he strongly

praised the performance of Colonel H ill, the F irst North Carolina and
Major Randolph of the Richmond Howitzers.5 Without the summaries of
Union Colonel Carr in Battles and Leaders and Confederate Major Hale in
North Carolina Regiments 1861-65. there would not be a detailed account
of the action.
The Commanding General had successfully met his f ir s t challenge.
He had perceived a deteriorating condition on the lower Peninsula.

In

response, he acted decisively to check the Federal army and stabilize
the morale of the c iv ilia n populace.
Consequently Magruder’ s legend began to grow.

The few combined

casualties, 19 k ille d and 60 wounded, allowed Magruder to clear the
fie ld before Butler’ s 11 June request for a truce.6

In response,

Magruder c ritic ize d Butler fo r imprisoning civilian s who defended their
homes and the Union troops whom he accused of looting.7
Butler retreated before this moral assault.

He defended the

actions of his troops, agreed to exchange one soldier, advised he would
sThe sum of Federal and Confederate reports is contained in OR,
series 1, 2:77-104.
^ a r Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. M ilitary
Departments and Command 1861-65. vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: War
Department Printing Office, 1877), 8.
7Ib id ., 9-11.
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punish marauders and assured Hagruder that "loyal citizens" rights would
be protected.

Magruder refused to accept Butler’ s assurances and he

closed the correspondence calling the Federal troops "bushwhackers,"
praising the civilian s who defended th eir homes and ridiculing the
Yankees’ capture of a sleeping vidette saying that he was one of four
men opposing the advance of 5,000 Federals, "Had Private Carter been
awake perhaps a retreat would not have been necessary."8
Richmond papers gleefully reported Magruder’ s and Butler’ s
correspondence9 and rumors spread that Magruder had challenged Butler
to a duel.10 These reports b u ilt Magruder’ s legend; one newspaper said
he looked "every inch a king."11
The greatest impact of Magruder’ s high principled response was
reflected by Private J. M. Drake of Company A, Fourth Massachusetts
Volunteers.

Private Drake participated in a truce to recover personal

effects of the Union dead.

A 25 June le tte r to his father said in part,

I t is a fact that much injury and wrong has been committed
by our soldiers. Just contrast our course with theirs. Our
wounded that were le f t in that murderous and disgraceful a ffa ir
at Bethel were by the enemy sent to Yorktown and well cared
for. Our dead they decently buried not even so much as taking
from th e ir persons the least thing, I know this to be true
because we went there with a flag of truce . . . we dug them
up. One man had in his pocket quite a sum of gold.12
aIb id ., 11.
9Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:19.
10Henry Carter, Denbigh, to William Carter, 3 July 1861, TD in
Carter Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond.
11Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:19.
12J.M. Drake, Camp Butler, Newport News, to his father, 25 June
1861, ALS in Federal Soldiers Letters in the Southern Historical
Collection of the Manuscripts Department, University of North Carolina,
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Drake continued by reporting his personal encounter with Magruder,
Colonel Magruder, the Secession Commander of Bethel Forces
gave us a good dinner, the best I have seen since I le f t Boston
and sent by us word to our Commander that he was ready fo r us
1f we desired to attack him and that he should send as many of
us to bloody graves as he was able to do.
The high p ro file aftermath of Bethel obscured Magruder’ s continuing
actions to consolidate and organize his department.

On 10 June Richmond

ordered Lieutenant Colonel George A. G. Coppens’ s Louisiana Zouave
battalion and eight more companies of Alabama volunteers to Yorktown.14
These Deep South volunteers established disreputable records enroute and
caused disciplinary problems almost Immediately a fte r a r r iv a l.15
Lee responded to Magruder’ s request for central control and by the
end of June expanded his command to Include Gloucester Point, Jamestown,
and West Point, in effect the entire Peninsula.16 H ill continued to
bicker over his rank and Magruder again addressed the problem to General
Samuel Cooper, the Adjutant General, in Richmond,17 but more important
Chapel H i l l, North Carolina.
13Ibid.
14QB, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 137.
15A ctivities of the Louisiana Zouaves are detailed in Terry L.
Jones, Lee’ s Tigers. The Louisiana Infantry in the Armv of Northern
Virginia (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1987), 18-19. The train rides from
Louisiana were wild, raucous, and violent. I t was not surprising that
these ruffians were some of the toughest fighters in the Confederacy.
16Manarin, 87.
17H ill had argued that his rank in the North Carolina Volunteers
was 24 April while Magruder’ s in the Virginia Volunteers was 27 A pril.
Magruder noted that he understood his provisional army rank was of
higher precedence than volunteer ranks. Magruder asked Richmond to
clearly state the seniorities. However, H ill remained disaffected
during the entire period of his subordination to Magruder. War
Department, Rebel Records, "Letters Sent Confederate Army of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Fig. 3. Map of V i r g i ni a Peninsula from The O f f i c i a l M i l i t a r y Atlas of the
Ci vi l War. Plate 16.
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Issues pressed the commanding general.
The Virginia Peninsula was bordered on the north by the York River
and Chesapeake Bay and the south by the James River and Hampton Roads.
The coastal areas were cut by numerous estuaries and finger rivers.
Dense underbrush was occasionally blazed by a main d ir t road and
numerous secondary lanes.

Bethel Church, site of the 10 June skirmish,

was on the road from Hampton to Yorktown approximately 8 miles from
Hampton and 16 miles from Yorktown.
Magruder had previously ordered Major John Cary to re tire to the
v ic in ity of Bethel Church.

The commander knew that the northwest branch

of the Back River was navigable and he feared a Union amphibious
movement would cut o ff his troops from Yorktown.

After the success at

Bethel Church, he selected i t as his forward entrenched position and on
13 June instructed Major Cary to strengthen the existing fo rtific a tio n s .
Cary’ s task included building traverses to protect entrenched troops
from enfilading f ir e , a dam to control the water flow and a flood ravine
to enhance the defensive character of the ground.

Magruder instructed

Lieutenant Colonel Coppens’ s newly arrived Louisiana troops to provide
manpower.

He encouraged Cary to establish outposts at New Market

Bridge, Poquoson and any other place where his position might be
turned.18
Magruder’ s concern over a passing movement caused him on 14 June to
Peninsula," Record Group (RG) 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, 13 June 1861,
National Archives, Washington, D.C..
18John B. Magruder to Major John Cary at Bethel, 13 June 1861, John
Cary Letterbook, Eleanor S. Brockenbough Library, Museum of the
Confederacy, Richmond, Virginia.
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recommend establishment of a water battery at Day’ s Point on the south
bank of the James River south of Land’ s End.

Magruder claimed

this action would prevent Union ships from passing up the James
River.19 Although not stated, Magruder implied such an action would
prevent Federal operations on the south bank of the James River. Lee
quickly grasped the essence of Magruder’ s suggestion and within two days
advised him that the battery, la te r to be known as Fort Boykins, would
be b u ilt.20
The encounter at Bethel convinced Magruder that he needed more men.
Meager reinforcements brought the Army of the Peninsula up to 5,500 men
or 55 percent of the force he thought necessary.21 To augment his
force Magruder decided to "mobilize1' the local m ilitia .
Magruder’ s 15 June proclamation invoked the Governor’ s authority
and called Colonel Charles Mallory’ s 68th and 115th regiments to
assemble at Yorktown on 24 June.22

This action, which would be repeated

several times over the next year, was apparently sensitive to the
Governor and gentry of the Tidewater region because i t infringed on the
state government’ s prerogatives and the landowners’ freedom of choice
concerning m ilitary service.
Although Letcher legitimized Magruder’ s de facto action, he
19QB, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 139.
20OB, series 1, 2:930.
21Ib id ., 927.
22QE, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 140.
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c ritic iz e d i t . 23 S t ill the action appeared ju s tifie d since recruitment
on the lower Peninsula was languishing.

Some men answered the call and

volunteered to serve in organized, mustered in units; however, Colonel
Ewell claimed others seemed unwilling to serve.

Just three weeks prior

on 25 Hay, Lee had sent agents to Gloucester Point to help re c ru it.24
Magruder’ s action represented the f ir s t formal m ilita ry training many of
these men received and provided a roster of available manpower.
Magruder’ s concern was obvious in his 16 June le tte r to General Cooper,
I cannot too urgently impress upon the consideration of
the headquarters the immediate necessity of having heavy guns
from Norfolk or elsewhere at this place. The defense of
Richmond is here at Williamsburg and Jamestown, and the men and
guns are necessary to that defense.
As Lee wrestled with Magruder’ s problems, the Peninsula commander
faced more immediate problems bordering on insurrection.

Coppens’ s

Louisiana troops continued th e ir undisciplined approach to army l i f e ,
looting and slaughtering unprotected c a ttle .

At a unit parade on

17 June, Magruder publicly denounced them and promised to shoot every
g u ilty person.26 On 18 June, Coppens’ s subordinates said he had no
capacity for command and requested that Magruder replace him as th eir
colonel.27 At Yorktown, H ill found that the Alabama troops, under
former Governor, now Colonel, John A. Winston, did not want to help
^Magruder’ s action and Letcher’ s reaction are described in F.N.
Boney, John Letcher of V irginia. The Storv of V iro in ia’ s C ivil War
Governor. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1966), 150-51.
24QB, series 1, 2:876-77.
25Ib id ., 931-32.
26Jones, Tigers. 32.
270R, series 1, 2:938.
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unload the ships at the wharf.

Winston likened 1t to slave labor.

In

response, H ill insisted that i f his North Carolina troops could unload
ships, the Alabamians would do likewise or face the consequences of
disobedience of Magruder’ s orders.28
The commanding general’ s departmental organization was enhanced by
the publication of General Orders number 25 on 20 June.

This document

established the organizational structure of the Army of the Peninsula
and prescribed disciplinary procedures needed to command.

A short

review is necessary to appreciate the order.
Magruder in it ia lly established four subordinate commands:

Colonel

D. H. H ill, Yorktown; Colonel T. P. August, Williamsburg; Colonel C. A.
Crump, Gloucester Point; and Colonel J. G. Hodges, Jamestown.

He

ordered each of them to complete th e ir assigned defensive works and
provide progress reports every three days.

Ewell’ s lack of progress on

the Williamsburg defenses caused him to be subordinated to August.
Perhaps in an attempt to m ollify H ill, he was authorized a separate
headquarters at Yorktown.

Commanders were instructed to d r ill the

soldiers three times daily i f they were not at work on fo rtific a tio n s .
Soldiers were ordered to carry two days’ rations constantly.
distribution problem was caused by a shortage of wagons.

This

Wagon usage

was limited to essential food stuffs and supplies; no tents were
permitted on the wagons i f wood was available to build huts.

Finally,

Magruder instructed officers to lim it personal baggage to that which
28RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, 19 June 1861.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

could be carried in carpetbags.29
Shortages continued to surface.

The day a fte r Magruder Issued

General Orders number 25 he authorized H ill to purchase scythes and
other reapers to gather forage.

Although the Peninsula commander did

not have specific authorization from Richmond, he Instructed H ill to
Issue Confederate vouchers In payment for the m aterials.30
Not a ll southern men readily adapted to the requirements of
m ilitary discipline, nor did a ll accept Magruder’ s authority.

Three

examples in two days represent Magruder’ s acceptance of this re a lity and
his f le x ib ilit y in tailo rin g a response.

On 22 June, Magruder dealt

with the case of Captain Welles of the Wythe R ifles, 32d Virginia
Infantry.

Welles refused to report for duty and belligerently boasted

of his "inherent rights."

A fter declaring he would not be treated in an

ungentlemanly manner, he deserted to Richmond.

Magruder recommended

dropping Welles from the roles and appointing a subordinate in his
place.31 Yet on the very same day, Magruder faced a mutiny in Company
F of the 15th Virginia.
Captain William Lloyd reported that on 20 June subordinates had
circulated a petition to deprive him of his command.
refusal to march under Lloyd’ s orders.

The result was

Lloyd was unable to find a

senior o ffic e r to support him and he subsequently relinquished command
to a subordinate.

Magruder’ s response was prompt and decisive.

He

ordered Lieutenant Colonel William Stewart of the 15th Virginia to take
^OR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 144-45.
30RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, 21 June 1861.
31Ibid.
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troops from the Georgia ranks i f necessary, disarm the mutinous company
and bring them back under guard.

He then harshly c ritic iz e d Stewart for

fa llin g to take prompt action to maintain order.
Stewart to send aguard to Richmond to return four

He also ordered
deserters to camp.

Magruder insisted on court-martials for a l l . 32
Finally, Magruder decided to assuage Lieutenant Colonel Ben Ewell
who had been superseded in command at Williamsburg by his General Orders
number 25.

Progress on the defensive lin e in front of

unsatisfactory.

Williamsburgwas

The position was regarded byboth Lee and Magruder as a

c ritic a l defensive point.
had been demoted.

Ewell had failed and as he correctly believed

Magruder ta c tfu lly explained to Ewell that he had

placed him on special duty to complete the defenses of Williamsburg.

He

also told Ewell that he was to be the colonel of the 32d Virginia,
Peninsula Guards who were soon to be formed. Magruder declared to
Ewell, "Of your competency, I never entertained a doubt."33 Magruder
then authorized Ewell to urge requisitions forward using Magruder’ s
name.34 Magruder’ s tactful handling of Ewell earned him a loyal
subordinate.35
The enlisted men had great confidence in th e ir commander.

Despite

the disciplinary problems just described, common soldiers praised
32War Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 11-13.
33Ib id ., 13-14.
“ Ibid.
35Ewell wrote a lengthy and warm memorial to Magruder some years
a fte r the war. There was no hint of criticism . Benjamin Stoddard
Ewell, "Reminiscences of John Magruder," AMs, Ewell Papers, Special
Collections, Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg.
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Magruder in correspondence home.

Private James Williams of the Richmond

Howitzers wrote his Aunt Mary on 24 June,
Captain Brown’ s and Stanard’ s companies went down from here
to Bethel Church yesterday week. After staying there a day or
two with a small force of infantry, the enemy were advancing on
them In large numbers trying to cut them o ff from Yorktown and
surround them, but old [McGruder] was too keen for them and
ordered his force back to Yorktown.
Williams continued,
This place [Yorktown] is very strongly fo rtifie d and we are
receiving reinforcements from R everyday. I myself do wish
they would attack us right now . . . a l l the fo rtific a tio n s are
about finished and I understand that [McGruder] has received
orders from headquarters not to carry his forces to Bethel
again, but to hold theni where they are and to defend this place
to the last extremity.
Magruder’ s influence and command presence resulted in a successful
m ilitia muster and nearly 1,000 men were mobilized.

To minimize the new

troops’ disaffection, Magruder used most of them to defend advanced
positions near th e ir homes by the Poquoson River at Harrod’ s M ill and
Young’ s M ill.37
Although Magruder was expanding his picket, he chose to remain
beyond the view of the Yankees for the time being.
been to act on the defensive.

Lee’ s orders had

At this stage with insufficient manpower

and underdeveloped defensive positions, Magruder did not want to provoke
another large scale Union expedition.

On 26 June, he advised Major John

Bell Hood of his intention to fo rtify Harrod’ s M ill and Young’ s M ill
when he received sufficient digging spades.
36[ ] Represents apparent word.
24 June 1861, Williams Papers.

He told Hood not to

Williams, Yorktown, to Aunt Mary,

370R, series 1, 2:957-58.
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overexpose his troops or lose his a r tille r y because he had no plans to
attack Hampton.38
Magruder appreciated Hood but believed he needed someone more
experienced to lead his cavalry.

So he sought a cavalry appointment for

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Johnston from Alabama.

The appointment was

soon made, but Johnston did not Immediately command the cavalry.39
Despite Magruder’ s efforts the Williamsburg defensive positions
s t i l l were not progressing.

Both Lee and Magruder recognized the

u t ilit y of a defensive lin e across the three or four mile neck of the
Peninsula between College and Queen’ s Creek.

The shorter lin e would be

easier to defend with Magruder’ s small force of less than 10,000.
Magruder hoped that by relieving Ewell of administrative command of
Williamsburg, he could devote fu ll attention to the earthworks.

Ewell,

the college professor, was unable to work together with his engineer,
Captain Alfred Rives; thus Magruder was forced to make another change.
General Orders number 33 dated 27 June ordered Georgia Colonel Lafayette
McLaws to assume command at Williamsburg and "See that the defenses in
that neighborhood are prosecuted with vigor."40 Magruder also tasked
McLaws to supervise proficiency training on a r tille r y .

Magruder

“ QE, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 147-48.
39R£ 109, chapter 8, volume 236, 27 June 1861.
40A frequent criticism of Magruder is that he wanted or attempted
to do a ll his s ta ff work alone. Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:XXXIV.
However, he personally invited men to join his s ta ff as volunteers. The
absence of other experienced army officers may have compelled him to
stay active in all aspects of his command. The m ilitary inclinations of
many cavalier officers were less than disciplined. Magruder, H ill, and
other commanders were forced to insist that these officers liv e in camp
and fie ld conditions. OR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 149-50.
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challenged the lax attitude of fie ld grade officers by demanding they
liv e with th e ir troops Instead of 1n private homes.41
McLaws’ s f ir s t le tte r from the Peninsula to his wife on 2 July
provided Insight Into the types of problems Magruder had been trying to
solve,
Hy duties here are exceedingly onerous as my command 1s
never more than three regiments and a ll kinds of troops,
Irregular and organized . . . [the headquarters of the Tenth
Georgia are 1n an] Immense redoubt now 1n the course of
erection under my control. . . . The Virginia Regt [regiment]
here are very sociable, cleaver gentlemen and [frequently] go
to th e ir camp and enjoy society. A good many have Invited me
to th e ir houses, but I have no time to think of going.
Magruder realized that the Federals had many offensive options and that
the v ia b ility of his defense was based on reducing those options.
McLaws’ s In it ia l assessment agreed with his commander’ s; there was no
way to prevent the Federals from landing between Yorktown and
Williamsburg.

McLaws exclaimed,

Parties of the enemy are constantly making in roads around
Newport News and from Hampton stealing Negroes and a ll kinds of
property and committing so many depredations that the
inhabitants have fled leaving th e ir houses and field s and le f t
a ll th e ir worldly goods behind.
As July arrived Magruder encountered further medical and
organizational problems.

The weather and terrain were hostile.

One

soldier exclaimed, "This is the hottest place I ever saw, we are right
down in the sand and there is not a shade tree on the place, the water
41Ibid.
42[ ] Represents apparent word. Lafayette McLaws, Williamsburg, to
his wife, 2 July 1861, LS in Lafayette McLaws Papers in the Southern
Historical Collection of the Manuscripts Department, University of North
Carolina, Chapel H ill, North Carolina.
4JIbid.
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1s also very mean.”44 Another soldier said, *The country reminds me of
the descriptions I have read of the jungles of India.

The Yankees w ill

have a day here crawling through the swamps.”45 McLaws described the
dramatic Impact of communicative diseases on country boys writing his
wife on one occasion that he was going to the hospital to v is it "over
200 sick with measles, diarrhea, e tc .* and on another that *The measles
and mumps are prevalent to be sure but they are of a very mild type and
men [to lerate] them and walk about from morning to night without caring
an iota for th e ir very disagreeable appearance or thought of risk to
th e ir health."46
Magruder was a proactive commander.

Private Henry C. Carter of the

Richmond Howitzers writing from Denbigh to his brother William claimed,
General Magruder has his headquarters at th is place, he is
constantly riding day and night sending out scouts and videttes
i f the [Yankees] can catch him napping, they w ill have to be
smarter than I give them credit for being.
Part of the reason Magruder was so active was because of the slow
adjustments of his officers and soldiers to m ilita ry discipline.
Despite Magruder’ s repeated and specific orders concerning
soldiers’

laboring on the earthworks, subordinate commanderscontinued

to bypass him and attempted to appeal to General Lee.

Colonel Hodges’ s

^James P. Williams, Yorktown, to Aunt Mary, 24 June 1861, Williams
Papers.
45Henry Carter, Denbigh, to William Carter, 3 July 1861, Carter
Family Papers.
46[ ] Represents apparent word. McLaws, Williamsburg, to his wife,
8 July 1861 and 18 July 1861, McLaws Papers.
47[ ] Represents apparent word. Henry Carter, Denbigh, to William
Carter, 3 July 1861, Carter Family Papers.
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14th Virginia was suffering te rrib ly in the Jamestown swamps and he
petitioned Lee to provide Negroes to work In the ditches.

Fortunately,

Lee sustained Magruder as he would 1n future correspondence.48 Lee
referred the issue back to Magruder with an indorsement recommending the
use of Negroes, whenever possible, but reminding him of his
responsibility for completing the earthworks.49
As Magruder was clearly in control, his orders are informative.

The

twenty general orders issued 1n July reflected his view of the proper
discipline of army l i f e .

General Orders number 35 prohibited officers

from skipping court-martial duty and General Orders number 36 forbid
officers and soldiers from revealing the details of m ilita ry a ffa irs to
newspaper reporters.

The la te r order was so effective that articles

from and about the Department of the Peninsula rarely appeared in
Richmond newspapers a fte r July 1861.50
Before July 1861, o ffic ia ls in Richmond were inclined to respond
d ire c tly to inquiries from fie ld commanders and th e ir subordinates. In
July, Lee successfully attempted to impose discipline on subordinate
o fficers. He referred correspondence which bypassed Magruder back to
him without taking action, thus he strengthened Magruder’ s command
presence.
49R£ 109, chapter 8, vol. 236, 2 July 1861.
50Operations security was a constant problem throughout the war.
The security of operations was frequently compromised by ambitious
reporters who lived with the army and file d stories under pseudonyms.
Lee frequently complained of the negative impact on operations. In
General Orders No. 36, Magruder ordered his men not to speculate on
operations to reporters. The following example illu s tra te s the problem.
A 29 June 1861 a rtic le by "Howitzer" in the Richmond Examiner said, "The
colonel in command here [Magruder] made a requisition this morning for
two detachments of howitzers to proceed as early as practicable down the
Hampton Roads at a given point...The other w ill be stationed at the
junction of Hampton and Warwick Roads." The Virginia Gazette in
Williamsburg was either forced to or voluntarily ceased operations until
a fte r the Yankees took over the town. Magruder’ s censorship seemed to
be very effective.
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Magruder acknowledged the Increasing Impact of illness on his
overtasked force and established a new hospital at Bigler’ s M ill on the
south bank of the York River.

He insisted on assigning Negro women as

nurses and cooks since male Negroes were working on the trenches.

The

Department Medical Director received guidelines in General Orders number
45.

Magruder acted to further lim it o fficer abuses of rank by

forbidding wooden floors 1n officers quarters until the enlisted
quarters were completed.51
General Orders numbers 41, 44, and 48 granted commanders greater
latitude to ease the movement of supplies, personnel and projects.

In

General Orders number 41, Magruder lifte d the ban on soldiers on the
wharves.

He apparently believed the prospect of rotting food and

materials in the hot July sun represented a greater waste than the
threat of pilferage.

General Orders number 44 delegated commanders the

authority to grant passes and number 48 authorized members of the
cavalry to pull fatigue details whenever they were in camp.
The dichotomy of democracy and m ilitary discipline began to
surface.

In June, two of the colonels of the Louisiana regiments

resigned.52 General Orders number 49 announced the election of Colonel
51A11 the General Orders of the Department of the Peninsula are
located in R£ 109, chapter 2, vol. 229. This specific citation was
General Order number 39, 7 July 1861. All future references to general
orders w ill c ite , General Orders number __ , date [ i f known].
52The Louisiana officers were in constant turmoil. Previously
Coppens’ subordinates had requested he be replaced. Colonel Louis
DeRussy, 2d LA, discovered his brother was stationed at Fort Monroe.
Rather than risk fighting him, he resigned and ended up on Leonidas
Polk’ s s ta ff out West. Colonel Marigny resigned when he perceived
favoritism in Richmond. Later, Colonel Valerie Sulakowski of the 14th
LA resigned Feb 62 when Howell Cobb was appointed a general before him.
Jones, Tigers. 42.
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William Mallory Levy as the new commander of the 2d Louisiana.

Levy

received 23 of 38 votes cast.53 Conversely, on 18 July, General Orders
numbers 50 and 51 reported the results of two court-martials.

For

desertion Magruder approved a sentence of hard labor with a ball and
chain for the duration of war, suspended to two months, and a drumming
out of the service.

Sleeping on post resulted 1n 14 days solitary

confinement on bread and water.

Magruder turned down asentence

of

dismissal from the service 1n the 15th V irg in ia’ s mutiny t r ia l as "too
lig h t."

In general, Magruder exhorted officers to tre a t problems that

undermined the discipline of the army with the gravity they deserved,
despite any personal revulsion they f e l t . 54
The last Magruder order in July concerned sanitation.
instructed commanders to le t men bathe and cleanup.

He

Soldiers were

forbidden to excrete body wastes anywhere other than latrines and he
recommended commanders establish latrin e details.

Later to assist in

decomposition of fecal material, Magruder ordered the use of lime from
oyster shells.55
Magruder strove to detect any Federal troop movements and
discourage them.

This was not a d iffic u lt task in lig h t of the recent

Federal fiasco at Big Bethel.

Union movements were small and tentative

with the major objective of encouraging Negro defection to Hampton where
53General Orders number 49, 19 July 1861.
54General Orders numbers 50 and 51, 18 July 1861.
55General Orders number 54, 29 July 1861.
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they could be used to support Butler’ s labor requirements.56 The
infrequent Union forays seemed to make them quarry lik e a fox in a
southern hunt.
One of the units seeking glory was Dreux’ s Louisiana Battalion led
by a brash young o ffic e r, Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Dreux.

Dreux

had accompanied Magruder on an unsuccessful reconnaissance on
28-29 June.

The mission revealed more Instances of Yankee pillaging and

resulted in a sternly worded le tte r from Magruder to Union Colonel
Phelps commanding at Newport News.57 Dreux seemed to take this as a
personal challenge and he sought an opportunity to strike a blow for
Southern honor.
The match that l i t the powder keg was a rowdy 4 July barbecue
celebration at Dreux’ s camp.

The v is it of Magruder, who stayed only a

short while, and McLaws combined with the bravado of p a trio tic speeches
led the apparently liquor impaired Dreux to decide to ambush the
Yankees’ daily patrol.
Dreux, accompanied by approximately 125 men, a piece of the
Fort Monroe offered a safe haven for slaves wishing to escape
bondage. As the slaves le f t the Confederate workforce, they joined the
Union workforce. Both sides took actions to encourage/counter this
situation. Confederate cavalry patrols swept the countryside and sent
recaptured slaves back under escort to Williamsburg and Yorktown. In
Matthews County slaves were picked up by Union landing parties. Slaves
also cast themselves a d rift in boats. Navy Captain 0. S. Glisson
reported, on 18 July 1861, that he picked up nine slaves who were a d rift
in the Rappahannock River. Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles,
authorized them to be employed rather than returned to slavery. ORN.
series 1, 6:8-10. By July 1861, Butler encouraged slaves to seek refuge
in the fo r t. This increased the Negro population to 900 of which about
72 percent were employable. The figure grew to 1,500 by March 1862.
These defecting slaves brought not only labor but m ilita ry intelligence.
Tinsley Spraggins, 160-197.
57QB, series 1, 2:960-61.
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Richmond Howitzer a r tille r y and some cavalry, moved toward Newport News.
Just a fte r dawn on 5 July, Dreux, frustrated by the enemy's fa ilu re to
appear, led a scout of five men forward.

In the restricted v is ib ility

cavalry Captain William Col11ns lined up his men and prepared to charge.
Sporadic f ir e broke out from the rear stampeding the s t i l l Umbered
howitzer and the cavalry.

Within five minutes the a ff a ir was over, but

Dreux and one other man were k ille d ; they were the only casualties of
the unlucky adventure.

Magruder tersely demanded reports from the

concerned parties and reported to Richmond that Dreux had exceeded his
orders.58
Despite Dreux’ s misadventure, Magruder worked with an energy that
revealed a dedicated understanding of his purpose.

On 5 July, he

Instructed the b r illia n t Captain J. Thompson Brown59 to take charge of
the a r tille r y and entrench I t as he saw f i t with a caution to complete
the works without delay as the spades were required elsewhere by 10:00
58The ac tiv itie s at the barbecue are covered by McLaws le tte r to
his w ife, 8 July 1861, McLaws Papers, and Jones, Tigers. 45-48.
Numerous reports exist in OR, series 1, 2:188-92. Magruder’ s o ffic ia l
report is in QR, series 1, 2:964-67. A Union newspaper account, New
York World, appeared in Frank Moore, The Rebellion Record, vol. 2, (New
York: G. P. Putnam, 1862; rep rint, New York: Arno, 1977), Document
70 1/2, 251. Hereafter referred to as RR59Captain J. Thompson Brown was a well connected 26 year old
University of Virginia graduate. He in it ia lly commanded a company of
the Richmond Howitzers and was involved in the 7 May exchange of fire
with the Union vessel Yankee at Gloucester Point. He was entrusted with
a lo t of responsibility and would eventually rise to the rank of colonel
in charge of Longstreet’ s a r tille r y reserve. He was k ille d at the
Battle of the Wilderness. Robert Krick, Lee’ s Colonels (Dayton:
Morningside Press, 1979), 62.
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A.M. on 6 July.60
Douglas S. Freeman c ritic ize d Magruder fo r his voluminous
le tte rs .61 On closer examination they were fu ll of well developed
strategic Insight that seemed to meet Lee’ s original tasking for
information.

The level of detail reveals Magruder was often seeking

approval to reach beyond or change his guidance from Richmond.
Magruder carried his point.

Often

The best example of this was his 7 July

1861 le tte r to the Adjutant General 1n Richmond, Colonel George Deas.
The le tte r is lengthy but i t e ffic ie n tly addressed fiv e issues:

The

Dreux skirmish; Negro intelligence reports; the situation at
Williamsburg and Yorktown, with a recommendation to build new batteries
that would protect Grove Landing; the movement of heavy guns at
Yorktown, to re fle c t his perceived p rio rity to cover the land
approaches; and the establishment of forward defensive points along the
Poquoson River.

He concluded by advising of his plans to survey the

progress of defensive works at Gloucester Point and Williamsburg.
On 9 July, Magruder finished his survey and reported Gloucester
Point would be weak against land assault and that the Williamsburg
works, o riginally misengineered, were progressing.

Magruder then

pressed for a decision on a new battery at Mulberry Point and closed
with an apology for increasing the demands on an overtaxed Richmond.
Lee accepted Magruder’ s reports and provided the materials and
authorization needed to implement the recommendations for Gloucester
“ John Magruder to J. Thompson Brown, 5 July 1861, ALS in J.
Thompson Brown Papers, Eleanor S. Brockenbrough Library, Museum of the
Confederacy, Richmond.
61Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:16.
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Point and Williamsburg.

Although four days la te r, Lee refused to allow

Magruder to relocate guns from Jamestown Island to an advanced work
protecting Grove Landing; Magruder argued his point to Richmond.
Eventually, he satisfied Lee’ s concerns and was permitted to proceed as
he desired.62
I t 1s easy to be c ritic a l of Magruder’ s maverick actions. Issues
such as slave Impressment and m ilItta muster appeared to have exceeded
his command authority.

Although he showed l i t t l e patience with

bureaucracy, he would eventually coordinate his a c tiv itie s with the
appropriate p o litic a l and m ilita ry structure.

Several events in July

are illu s tra tiv e .
On 24 July, one month afte r calling up Letcher’ s m111t1a, Magruder
formally advised Letcher of his action and asked for approval.

Yet, 1n

the time before he contacted Letcher, Magruder forced the mil1t1a to
assemble three times a week and stationed them near th e ir homes.

By a ll

measures these men had been impressed into Confederate service.63
Simultaneously Magruder took on the government’ s commissary and
financiers.

Earlier in the month, Magruder had issued specific

The following references taken as a group illu s tra te a point.
Magruder, as so many other commanders, specifically reported a c tiv ity in
his department. However, Magruder was close enough to Richmond to
occasionally v is it or be visited. Lee made trips to the Peninsula to
review the progress of the works. Conversely as Magruder became better
acquainted with his command, he discovered nuances which he f e lt
compelled to pursue. The most marked example was the development of
works at Spratley’ s Farm to support naval efforts on the newly in itiated
works at Mulberry Island. Magruder was aware of the possibility of
flanking maneuvers and he sought to counter them. The sources cited are
representative of the strategic debate between Lee and Magruder. OR,
series 1, 2:964-67, 970-71, 975, 977-79, QR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2,
185-86.
“ OB, series 1, 2:988.
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instructions governing the procurement, Issuance, and storage of food
stu ffs.

He was particularly concerned with Richmond’ s In a b ility to

establish a predictable supply lin e .

Colonel Lucius Northrup,

Confederate Commissary General, heard of Magruder’ s orders and on
18 July forbid Captain J. H. Hope, the commissary representative in
Williamsburg, from obeying them.

Magruder was furious and within a day

wrote a scathing personal attack on Northrup and the distribution
system.

He rationalized the need for his action on the impending

malnutrition of his army.

He advised Cooper of interim actions he had

taken to become s e lf-s u ffic ie n t, including the le ttin g of contracts with
price fix in g .

Magruder’ s ju s tific a tio n was on target when he advised

that:
1.

the enemy would not get the c a ttle and corn;

2.

he now had an emergency food source;

3.

the to tal cost was cheaper than Richmond could get thegoods;

4.

the people in the region profited from governmentmoney;

5.

the ground wheat would provide food for the horses.

and

Magruder closed by warning of the consequences i f Cooper did not sustain
him.64
In another instance, Magruder browbeat the venerable Edmund Ruffin
into paying for contracts Magruder had le t without prior authority.

An

inadequate land transport system forced Magruder to rely on commercial
shipping.

The few boats that routinely supported him were insufficient

for his needs so he impressed schooners.

In asking Ruffin to support

him, he warned that a commander in the fie ld must be permitted the
wWar Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 21-23.
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latitu d e to make contractual obligations to support his force or he
would be hampered 1n the execution of his duties.65 Although
bureaucrats may not have gone out of th eir way to support him a fte r he
had usurped th e ir authority, direct logical appeals usually convinced
people In Richmond that Magruder should be sustained.
Magruder enhanced his reputation as a compassionate provider by his
actions concerning the welfare of the slaves.

After establishing the

hospital at B igler’ s M111, he sought to employ Negro women to do
hospital duty.

Unfortunately, he lacked sufficient funds to pay them so

he decided to use the hospital’ s general operations and maintenance
funds.66 A few weeks la te r, he implored Richmond for funds to pay the
free Negroes, "Many of them are free Negroes, who have families who must
starve i f they are not paid, and to a ll I promised prompt payment."67
Magruder’ s frustration with Richmond was understandable when
Colonel Oeas advised that he was unable to provide Magruder with a copy
of army regulations.

Deas told Magruder there were not any [copies of

the] regulations.68 This confession helped explain Magruder’ s
unilateral actions in the Department of the Peninsula.
Chaotic conditions continued to hamper Magruder’ s effectiveness.
Petty bickering seemed to consume some of Magruder’ s key subordinates.
Now Colonel Ewell and his engineer engaged in charges and countercharges
over the shortfalls of the Williamsburg defensive lin e .

Although McLaws

65Ib id ., 21.
“ RG 109, chapter 8, vol. 236, 24 July 1861.
670R, series 1, 4:573.
“ RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 236, 15 July 1861.
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was now In charge of the defenses, Ewell wrote to Lee and claimed that
engineer A. L. Rives was responsible for the poor site selection.

A

short Investigation by Chief Engineer, Andrew Talcott, sustained Rives
In his response that Ewell as the commander of the lin e for the past six
weeks should have corrected the deficiencies. Rives noted optim istically
that since Magruder had temporarily relocated his headquarters to
Williamsburg, he expected the works to progress rap id ly.69 Seventeen
days la te r on 30 July, McLaws reported to his wife,
Our coast 1s well guarded so that any advance would be
immediately reported and our fo rtificatio n s are fast assuming
proportions that w ill make them exceedingly formidable. The
main work here called Fort Magruder is fast approaching
completion and on the le f t and right redoubts of formidable
strength are either already finished or w ill be within a
week.
Despite apparent progress there were setbacks.

Following a severe

storm on 24 July, McLaws reported heavy water damage to earthworks and
pools of water everywhere.

Fields of f ir e had to be cleared and some

work had to be redone, McLaws stated
[ I was] obliged to have and go o ff about a mile to put a
working party with axes to cutting down a grove of trees that
obstructed our fie ld of f ir e from one of the batteries and to
entangle a ravine that led up to within a few hundred yards of
our redoubts. . . . [ I ] took a ride along our le f t flank to
examine into the work on our mill dam we are building over
again in order to raise the water over a part of the country
where we have to fear the approach of the enemy. Found the dam
nearly completed but the water does not raise as much as I want
i t . 71
The soldiers continued to suffer profoundly.

The unsanitary

69QS, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 174-75.
^McLaws to his wife, 30 July 1861, McLaws Papers.
71McLaws to his children, 25 July 1861, McLaws Papers.
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conditions, exposure and cramped livin g quarters caused disease and
Illn ess.

Some of the Illnesses were mumps, measles, typhoid, dysentery,

malaria, pneumonia and occasionally consumption [tuberculosis].

The

effects were dramatic; the 7th Louisiana reported 645 of 920 111,
Coppens’ s Louisiana Battalion 500 of 600, at Gloucester Point 1,250 of
1,500 and the 5th North Carolina 960 of 1,150.

Typhoid at Jamestown

forced evacuation of the Island.72 William Corson of the 3rd Virginia
cavalry wrote, "We cannot remain long 1n one place now on account of the
flie s which collect In such myriads at the camp as almost to eat our
horses a liv e .*73 James Williams reported a local remedy to cure
diarrhea,

*1 try to eat as l i t t l e and as lig h t food as I can and am

drinking Bakers B itters, two bottles of which I wrote to Uncle George
for, and a bottle of blackberry brandy."74
As commander, Magruder took several steps to relieve the
suffering.

F irst he dispersed sick troops to private homes in counties

from West Point, to Gloucester and Williamsburg.

He established an

ambulatory system to get troops back to th e ir units when they were again
healthy.

He also made impassioned pleas to Richmond for medicines lik e

quinine.

He scoured newspapers and sent his surgeons to Richmond with

^The misery endured by the soldiers was beyond comprehension, and
anyone who wrote of or from the Peninsula mentioned i t . Steamy hot
conditions, hard manual labor, stagnant water, mosquitoes, flie s ,
inadequate sanitation, inadequate medicine, and exposure a ll contributed
to the epidemic spread of diseases. Physically exhausted men livin g in
close quarters spread disease as rapidly as the pests did. Typical
references are OR, series 1, 4:569-73; OR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2,
246; Montague, 6; Jones, Tiaers. 25.
^William Clark Corson, Mv Dear Jennie, ed., Blake W. Corson
(Richmond: Dietz Press, 1982), 28-29.
74Williams, Yorktown, to his sister, 31 July 1861, Williams Papers.
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clipped ads and Instructions to purchase whatever was available, whether
1t was 10,000 ounces in New Orleans or 100 ounces 1n Richmond.75
Spot shortages of clothing le f t the troubled 15th V irginia 1n an
awful state.

Over 100 men were barefoot, others needed blankets,

overcoats and underclothes.

Colonel Robert Johnston, acting Inspector

General, wrote Magruder and advised him that he had sent one o ffic e r
from each company to Richmond to purchase anything which was available.
As Confederate authorities might not be able to meet a ll the
requirements, Johnston advised the officers to execute private contracts
with c iv ilia n merchants.76
Despite these shortages the men made the best of the situation.
Some soldiers reported great success in foraging; Corson reported to his
beloved Jennie, "Our boys amuse themselves at leisure hours bathing and
fishing.

A foraging party goes out nearly everyday and brings in a load

of watermelons and roasting ears.

We can buy plenty of nice fish and

vegetables."77 On another occasion, Corson advised that Confederate
pickets had k ille d a "Yankee steer," and that camp wagons had
vegetables, butter, milk, eggs, chickens, shoats, watermelons, sweet
potatoes, and fresh fis h .

Fixed prices, such as eggs 9 cents a dozen,

butter 25 cents per pound, chickens 9 cents each, and watermelons 10
cents each prevented price gouging.

Corson noted that a ll anxiously

awaited the start of the oyster season.78 Generous food parcels from
^QR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 246.
76War Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 37-38.
^Corson, 29.
^ Ib id ., 33-35.
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home helped keep s p irits high.

James Williams told his sister, "The

boys get frie d chicken 1n boxes right often.*79
The free s p irits of the soldiers corresponded to the disciplinary
problems that continued into August.
lack of leadership.

H ill c ritic ize d his officers for a

He carped that while soldiers seemed to realize the

need for entrenchments, officers did not.

He promised to arrest any

o ffic e r who was caught seeking personal comfort while the troops were
working.80 Magruder continued to have problems with subordinates.

He

reprimanded Colonel Hodges of the 14th Virginia fo r sending him a report
via an ignorant s ta ffe r who could not answer questions.

Magruder told

Hodges to put his messages in w ritin g .81
Magruder’ s men continued to wreck havoc.
into lawlessness.

Foraging deteriorated

During a short twelve hour deployment to Jamestown

Island, the 10th Louisiana k ille d and ate a ll the livestock except two
horses.82 Colonel McLaws told his wife of an instance where a
homeowner caught some Louisiana Zouaves stealing boards from his house.
The owner asked what unit they were in, one soldier g lib ly replied, "Ve
belongs to the f i r s t Georgy.
accent the owner replied.

Nonsense, Georgians do not have that

Vera well shrugged the soldier, bon jour and

the soldiers ran away."83 Near West Point, Lieutenant Colonel Tomlin
^Williams, Yorktown, to his sister, 31 July 1861, Williams Papers.
m D. H. H ill to the officers of his command, Cary Letterbook, 30
July 1861.

81War Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 39-40.
“ Jones, Tigers. 31.
“ McLaws to his wife, 18 August 1861, McLaws Papers.
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sent twenty-two members of the Barhamsville Greys and four Taylor Greys,
both of Tomlin’ s Battalion, to Yorktown to face charges of
insubordination.84
In the midst of these problems, Magruder expressed his concern to
the troops in General Orders number 57.

He said the recent moves of the

army provided temptations to the troops, and unfortunately a small
number had committed depredations such as looting homes stealing corn
and poultry.

The entire army was shamed by these actions and he hoped

everyone would work to stop i t .

Sentinels were to be posted at private

homes, and he exhorted a ll officers and men to bring the culprits to
summary ju s tic e .85
Magruder trie d on many occasions to bait Butler into a battle
beyond the range of Fortress Monroe’ s guns, but the Union forces showed
no inclination to accept the challenge.

Theprimarytheater was

Northern Virginia and after the rebels’victory

at ManassasButler

contracted his lines and burned a part of Hampton.
On 2 August, Butler confided to Washington that he feared a rebel
attack was imminent; indeed on 3 August Magruder departed the
Williamsburg, Yorktown area with 4,400 troops and made camp at Bethel.
On 6 August, Union cavalry reported Magruder in force at Whitney’ s Farm
near the New Market Bridge just 2 1/2 miles from Hampton.86 Private
Williams reported to his Aunt Mary,
“ Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Tomlin, West Point, to General Magruder,
Yorktown, 13 August 1851, Tomlin’ s Battalion Letterbook, Eleanor S.
Brockenbrough Library, Museum of the Confederacy, Richmond.
85QR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 222-23.
“ OR, series 1, 4:567-68.
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We started at daybreak, marched by Hampton, halted within
two miles of Newport News, drew our army up In lin e of battle
and just dared the cowardly rascals out of th e ir den . . .
There we were with only about h alf our whole army down here In
a great big fie ld right between Fortress Monroe and Newport
News with no fo rtific a tio n or masked batteries.
The next day Magruder demonstrated near Newport News.

Williams

reported,
We had about three hundred cavalry and the whole number
galloped round right under the guns at Newport News daring them
out, without even being fired a t. We stayed there about two
hours waiting for the enemy to advance, and then went around
and drew up the lin e again on the outskirts of Hampton, but the
cowards had actually le f t the place although strongly fo rtifie d
and retired to the fortress.
Magruder commented,
This [demonstration] was kept up the entire day but no
attack was made, and with the exception of occasionally a
horseman seen at a distance speeding away as i f to carry
information to Old Point or Newport News none of them were
v is ib le .89
At this point while meeting at Major George Wray’ s house on Back
River Road, he received a copy of The Tribune, a northern newspaper.

It

contained a le tte r from Butler to the Secretary of War in which he
declared an intention to colonize Negroes for the winter in the deserted
homes in Hampton.

Magruder was furious.

Since Hampton was in range of

Fort Monroe’ s guns, he could not hold the c ity i f he captured i t . So he
decided to destroy the town instead of le ttin g the Federals use i t .
Magruder assigned the mission to the Old Dominion Dragoons, who were
from Hampton, the Mecklenburg Cavalry, the Warwick Beauregards and the
87Williams, Bethel Church, to Aunt Mary, 9 August 1861, Williams
Papers.
“ Ibid.
89QB, series 1, 4:570.
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York Rangers.

The 14th Virginia provided the covering force.90

The evening of 7 August, Captain Jefferson C. Phillips led the
force across a reb u ilt New Market bridge into Hampton to St. John’ s
Church.

P hillips sent Lieutenant George Booker Jones to inform the few

remaining citizens that the town was about to be burned.

Twenty men

were stationed at Hampton bridge to prevent Federal interference and
each company was given a quadrant of the town to torch.
Just a fte r midnight the flames began to crackle and Phillips
reported, "Flames were seen bursting from the buildings on a ll sides
t i l l i t appeared the town was one mass of flames from one end to the
other."91 Robert Hudgins, a member of P h illip s ’ company recalled, "As
the smoke and flames ascended to heaven.

I was reminded of the ancient

sacrifices on the a lta r to many deities and I thought of how our l i t t l e
town was being made sacrifice to the grim God of war."92 Williams
recounted,
About one o’ clock, i t was the grandest sight I ever beheld,
though I could hardly drive back the tears when I looked round
at the officers and privates right there on the ground who had
been born and raised in the place and were now seeing the very
homes of th e ir childhood, the very houses which had so long
sheltered and protected them burnt to the around. To them the
scene must have been heartrending indeed.
P h illip s ’ s men reassembled at the church and le f t with an elderly
90Colonel J. C. P h illip s, "How I Destroyed the Town of Hampton in
[1862]," Daily Press, date unknown, Hampton Fine Arts Society, Hampton.
91Ibid.
92Robert S. Hudgins, "Burning of Hampton During the War Between the
States August 1861," TMs, p. 32, Hampton Fine Arts Society, Hampton.
93Williams, Bethel Church, to Aunt Mary, 9 August 1861, Williams
Papers.
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resident via the Sawyer Swamp road to Colonel Mallory’ s Farm.

Most of

the town was destroyed.
Butler in his report alleged the residents got only 15 minutes
notice and that he had to care fo r "The old and infirm , who by this
wanton act of destruction are now le f t houseless and homeless."9*
Butler ju s tifie d not defending the town by not wishing to be a part of
this "heathenish outrage."

He admitted that a few of his troops had

been gu ilty of minimal looting "less than a hundred dollars and a ll
[stolen] property has been stored in the seminary."95 Butler evaded
answering the Negro question that provoked Magruder’ s action by denying
that he intended to winter Federal troops in Hampton.

While no mention

was made of Magruder’ s action in o ffic ia l Richmond, he apparently
pleased his troops and embarrassed the Yankees and Butler again.
By the end of August Magruder had made great progress unifying his
command.

Lee had cooperated fu lly and Magruder repaid him with a

cogent, integrated defense that bottled up the Federal force at the tip
of the Peninsula.

Magruder had so mastered the byroads and water

passages of the lower Peninsula that he was able to provide his
subordinates with detailed warnings of possible traps.

He disposed his

forces so that most positions supported each other and every navigable
waterway was defended.

A rtille ry batteries, r i f l e pits and breastworks

dotted the landscape along the Newport News and Hampton roads.

After

Hampton was burned Williams wrote from Bethel,
I think old [McGruder] intends fortifyin g this place and
W0R, series 1, 4:567-58.
" ib id .
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make 1t a strong point to f a ll back upon 1n case he should be
able to provoke an attack from the enemy 1n any of these
expeditions through the country and 1t Is probable we w ill stay
here until the works are finished.
Although only a private, Williams understood his commander.

The very

same day, 9 August, Magruder wrote Richmond and explained that his
movements had been designed to distract the Federal government.97
Magruder was suspicious of a ll possible Yankee moves; perhaps his
own m ilitary Intu itio n told him that an enemy which made regular aerial
reconnaissances and received regular intelligence reports from defecting
Negroes had to know of his weak force and Incomplete fo rtific a tio n s .

To

prepare fo r a Federal movement against his lines which he considered
inevitable, the commanding general refused to allow his troops to become
complacent.

McLaws’ s 18 July le tte r to his wife ty p ifie s Magruder’ s

proactive posture,
I was awakened at three o’ clock by a dispatch from Magruder
to move the Second Louisiana at once without breakfast to a
point seven miles away. Also sent two six pounders with them.
Also moved two other cannon to another of his works four miles
away. All took until eight th ir ty .98
McLaws praised Magruder in saying,
Every commanding o ffice r has been put on a le rt by the
alertness of the commanding general. I t is meant that he has
taken a ll possible precautions to prevent the enemy from
landing at any place on the coast or approaching from any
w[ ] Represents apparent word. Williams, Bethel Church, to Aunt
Mary, 9 August 1861, Williams Papers.
97QB, series 1, 4:570.
Magruder was proactive in orienting troops to th e ir possible
fie ld of combat. He frequently ordered troops be taken to th e ir
entrenchments to orient them to the route of march and the
strengths/weaknesses of the position. This citation reflects the
practical application of Magruder’ s philosophy. McLaws to wife, 18 July
1861, McLaws Papers.
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direction without being Informed beforehand 1n sufficient time
to make the best possible use of his means of defense.
But clearly HcLaws expressed the thoughts of a ll when he said,
The enemy have been extraordinarily quiet and no doubt are
In contemplation of some grand movement . . . However, I am 1n
rapid preparation for his coming and 1f allowed another week
w ill be in a very strong position.
Magruder clearly articulated Colonel Johnston’ s role as the cavalry
eyes of his shield.

Johnston was tasked to repress marauding parties of

the enemy, sweep the lower Peninsula of Negroes, return them to work and
destroy Yankee outposts.

As time permitted Magruder told him to

strengthen the works at Bethel, Young’ s M ill and Harrod’ s M i ll.101
Magruder was severely undermanned for the amount of work which
needed to be done.

While soldiers did admirable work, Magruder depended

on agents to comb the countryside and provide him large numbers of
Negroes.

While the slaves constituted a security ris k , they did free

the soldiers for the multiple d r ills they needed to learn the a rt of
soldiering.
Magruder sought as many workers as he could get.

Proclamations

tasked counties to release as many as half, but usually a third of th eir
total black male population.
at Gloucester Point.

A typical call was sent to Colonel Crump

Crump was told to direct citizens in Gloucester,

Middlesex and Matthews counties to turn out 50 percent of a ll male
slaves.

Agents were instructed to hire or impress the free blacks.

was 50 cents per day plus rations.

Pay

To appreciate the scope of

" ib id .
100Ibid.
101QB, series 1, 2:990-92.
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Magruder’ s expectations he told Crump that a sim ilar call netted 800
Negroes at Williamsburg.

Magruder suggested that 600 Negroes could make

Gloucester Point Impregnable in ten days by deeping ditches, thickening
parapets and constructing traverses.102
A ctivities lik e these were bound to cause hard feelings between
Magruder and the slave owners.

A le tte r on 26 August from former

President John Tyler and H ill Carter, Robert E. Lee’ s cousin, followed
up a personal interview with Secretary of War, Leroy Walker.

They

reported disaffection with Magruder’ s 15 July call to Charles City and
New Kent County for 50 percent of th e ir slaves to work on breastworks in
Williamsburg.

Since the call Interfered with the wheat harvesting, they

questioned Magruder’ s legal authority to requisition the Negroes.
Walker quickly affirmed Magruder’ s authority to call the slaves out, but
noted he expected Magruder to issue property receipts.103 Magruder
did as he was told and in September his impressments were fu lly
sanctioned.

Magruder’ s only restriction was not to impress

Indians.104
Magruder’ s great work on land was being matched along the state’ s
102Ib id ., 1007.
103The issue of slave impressment was controversial throughout the
war. The issues frequently boiled down the requisitioning agents’
in a b ility to guarantee the safe return of the slave property on demand,
and the interference impressment had on the operation of the owner’ s
business. Tyler’ s and Carter’ s letters did not appear to originate from
a lack of patriotism. OR, series 1, 4:636; OR, series 1, 51:252. Two
a rticles provide more insight into this vexing problem, Harrison A.
Trexler, "The Opposition of Planters to the Employment of Slaves as
Laborers by the Confederacy," Mississippi Valiev Historical Review 27
(Sep 1940): 211, and Bernard Nelson, "Confederate Slave Impressment
Legislation, 1861-1865," Journal of Negro History 31 (Oct 1946): 392.
104OR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 306.
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rivers.

Although Magruder did not correspond frequently with the naval

officers commanding the James River and York River, he was aware of
th e ir a c tiv itie s and he frequently requested th eir support, usually
through Richmond.

In mid-June at Magruder’ s request, Lee directed the

steamer Teaser to support the batteries at Jamestown and Grove Wharf and
not venture beyond the range of the Jamestown cannons.105 Lee also
asked naval officers to fa c ilita te getting naval ordinance to Magruder
to cover land approaches.106
Magruder was an a r t ille r is t and he understood the complexities of
the big naval guns.

Colonel George W. Randolph, his chief a r t ille r is t ,

managed the placement and transfer of the big guns.

Magruder sought but

never received an adequate training cadery or sufficient manpower to
service the guns he had.107
Apart from requesting untested a r tille r is ts who were training in
Richmond, Magruder embarked on a vigorous program of cross-training.
Infantry companies were detailed to learn about servicing a r tille r y
pieces.

Some units were told to s p lit th e ir d r ills between infantry and

a r tille r y .

In addition to the army a r tille r is ts naval gunners helped

train the soldiers.108
105QRU, series 1, 5:808-9; QR, series 1, 2:935-36.
106ORN, series 1, 5:808-9.
107Magruder and Randolph made several requests to secure any type
of instructor cadery. In the absence of any support from Richmond, men
such as Randolph, a former naval o ffic e r, J. Thompson Brown, and naval
Lieutenant Catesby Jones frequently crisscrossed the Peninsula to
provide on-the-job training. War Department, Confederate Correspondence
and Orders. 11, 29, 34; Williams, Yorktown, to sister, 31 July 1861,
Williams Papers.
108OR, series 1, 4:634-35.
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Hagruder did not control the ac tiv itie s of the Navy, but he was
heavily dependent on them.

Their roles were complementary; both sought

to prevent the Yankees’ from reaching Richmond.

Naval schemes to close

the rivers served the dual purpose of covering Magruder’ s flanks.
Consequently, Magruder began to show great Interest 1n encouraging the
Navy to take actions which would be compatible with his plans.
The York River did not penetrate completely to Richmond and i t was
in it ia lly protected at several points, the most prominent being the
Yorktown/Gloucester Point defensive complex.

The James River on the

other hand was wide, long and i t passed Richmond.

Efforts to constrict

the James River would force Union vessels to cross narrow channels under
the f ir e of Magruder’ s guns at Mulberry Island and Jamestown.

The Fort

Boykins battery on the south side of the riv e r would help steer Union
vessels into the trap.
In early July, chief engineer Andrew Talcott tasked naval
Lieutenant P. R. Page to develop a hydrographic chart and recommend
areas of the James River for obstruction.

Just over a week la te r on

10 July, Lee assigned Captain George Hollins the command of the James
River defenses with a task to close the Swash Channel and, i f suitable,
develop a Mulberry Island s ite .109 Magruder completely concurred and
he pressed Lee for a decision.110 Once the Mulberry Island battery
was approved Magruder worked hard to support i t .

Magruder sought to

make his right flank on the James secure by closing the mouth of the
109ORN. series 1, 5:811; Andrew Talcott, Richmond, to Lieutenant P.
R. Carter, 1 July 1851, Andrew Talcott Papers.
110OR, series 1, 2:970-71.
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Warwick River, while Talcott and Hollins trie d to close the Swash
Channel.111 Eventually, the Navy completely supported Magruder’ s plan
on the James.
Magruder’ s meddling disturbed Captain William C. Whittle commander
of the York River defenses.

Magruder had established control of the

land forces on either side of the York.
placement of a ll ordinance.

He also presumed to control the

When he removed two 14 Inch guns from

W hittle’ s battery at Gloucester Point and relocated them to his land
battery at Yorktown, Whittle exploded.

Whittle tersely asked Captain D.

N. Ingraham in Richmond for Magruder’ s authority, closing with a
declaration that i f Magruder could move weapons without consulting
W hittle then W hittle’ s authority was fa ls e !112 The guns were not
returned.
Magruder appreciated the Navy’ s need for support and he
provided manpower as he could.

In mid-August, Magruder advised Captain

Thomas J. Peyton commanding Peyton’ s Battery in Yorktown, that a r tille r y
companies supporting the naval batteries would answer to the naval
o ffic e r commanding the battery.

They were subject to naval d r ill and

fatigue duty on fo rtific a tio n s ; but retained the rig h t to d r ill as an
a r tille r y company on th e ir own tim e.113
As August began to wain Magruder spread his authority further.
Reports of undisciplined m ilitia and Yankee raids fo r Negroes in
1110R, series 1, 4:634; ORN, series 1, 6:717; Andrew Talcott,
Richmond, to T. M. R. Talcott, 26 August 1861, 3 September 1861, Andrew
Talcott Papers.
1120RN, series 1, 5:812.
1130R, series 1, 4:634-35.
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Fig. 5. Map of Lower Peninsula from " C iv il War times Illu s tr a te d "
Magazine, Feb 79, page 8.
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Matthews County north of the York brought a request for help from
concerned citizens.

Magruder sought from Richmond and received command

of Gloucester, Middlesex, and Matthews counties.

He Immediately ordered

Colonel Crump to extend his authority to the P1ank1tank River In
Matthews County and to take command of the m ilitia there.

After a site

survey, Crump was ordered to provide Magruder with recommendations for
fo rtific a tio n s to protect his l e f t flan k.114
As Crump wrestled with his new responsibilities, Magruder
contemplated forward basing near Bethel.

Because of his pathetic

shortage of wagons, he lobbied Northrup for forward commissaries stocked
with 20 days rations of pork, bacon, flour, beans, peas, ric e , coffee,
sugar, candles, soap, salt and whiskey for 6,000 men.

Three days la te r,

Magruder amended his request to 60,000 rations at both Warwick Court
House and Harrod’ s M ill, 100,000 at Yorktown and 50,000 at Williamsburg.
He added the requirement for 60,000 more rations every five days, 50,000
going to Yorktown and 10,000 to Williamsburg.115 The reason for a ll
this a c tiv ity was a suspected Yankee advance.

On 26 August, McLaws

wrote,
There is a rumor that the enemy have landed about 300
horses at Fortress Monroe and i t is believed that i t is th e ir
intention to attempt forays along the coast, stealing Negroes,
and chickens, k illin g c a ttle , and burning houses as seems to be
th e ir practice now whenever an opportunity offers.
One day la te r, Magruder reported that a naval expedition was afloat at
114Ib id ., 634, 636, 649.
11sIb id ., 635.
116McLaws to his wife, 26 August 1861, McLaws Papers.
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Fort Monroe.117
Despite the demanding pace of the summer, Magruder was unaware that
he was fighting his greatest enemy sight unseen.

Even as ugly rumors

spread about Magruder’ s drunkeness, a llie s were rallying support in
Richmond as September arrived.

1170RN. series 1, 6:717.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM
The end of the summer inaugurated a lengthy period that was devoid
of m ilita ry action.

The new federal general-in-chief, George McClellan,

had no thoughts of testing the Confederacy via the Peninsula and with
the main Confederate army behind entrenchments in northern Virg inia,
President Lincoln seemed to favor action there.

This s h ift in emphasis

created d iffic u ltie s fo r Magruder.
In the absence of m ilita ry a c tiv ity , Magruder and his diminutive
force moved to the back rank of Richmond’ s p rio ritie s .

General Lee le f t

his advisory position in Richmond to assume command in western Virginia
and la te r South Carolina.

When he le f t Magruder lost a supportive a lly .

Lee understood the complexities of the Peninsula and when he departed,
myopic national leadership lost sight of Magruder’ s needs.

Magruder had

been in the spotlight, but the success at Manassas focused attention on
others.
Although Magruder was not receiving the supplies he needed, he was
highly visib le within Richmond’ s "o ffic ia l c irc le ."

Social cliques were

a fact in the Confederate Capitol and various regions maintained
considerable p o litic a l power bases.

Magruder ran afoul of Governor

Letcher, a resident of Lexington, over the m ilitia issue.

He also

crossed swords with the powerful gentry of the Tidewater region over
slave impressments.

In Richmond he faced vicious rumors concerning his
67
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drinking.

I t seemed Magruder’ s antebellum reputation with old West

Point contemporaries such as Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee may have
carried over.
Magruder.

Surely, D. H. H ill had specific, negative feelings about

Nonetheless, formal society spoke frequently about members of

th e ir clique and Magruder was " fa ir game."
Magruder was from Albemarle, near Charlottesville, and he
circulated in a preeminent social circ le which included George Wythe
Randolph, his chief a r tille r y o ffic e r.

Randolph was an unsuccessful

candidate for the Confederate Congress and a future Secretary of War.
In la te August Randolph, following a v is it to Richmond, wrote Albert T.
Bledsoe, another Charlottesville native and undersecretary in the War
Department,
He [Magruder] is currently represented as being very
dissipated. . . . Upon my own knowledge, Genl Magruder since
his appointment as a Brigadier General, has not used
intoxicating liquors of any sort and has been as rig id a
temperance man as Father Matthew himself.
Randolph encouraged Bledsoe to speak out against any rumors he might
hear concerning Magruder’ s sobriety.

S till rumors persisted and in late

November a member of Magruder’ s medical s ta ff wrote to the editor of the
Richmond Examiner.
Interrogatories put to me have insinuated that he
[Magruder] is generally under the influence of intoxicating
draughts . . . I saw General Magruder at the Battle of Bethel.
I have probably seen him twenty times since at different places
within his command. I have seen him in his headquarters and
partaken of his hospitality when he was unreserved in his
manners and I declare I have never seen him intoxicated.
10R, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 251.
2"Letter to the Editor," The Richmond Examiner. 27 November
1861.
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The author challenged Magruder’ s detractors and questioned th e ir
motives,
I f i t Is a
court martial
at night with
would lik e to
would rejoice

fact that he 1s addicted to this vice, why not
him? Why attack a generous and gallant soldier
the stileto? . . . I am aware of officers who
have his position; I know there are parties who
to have him superseded.

I t is not lik e ly Magruder abstained from alcohol completely, but
evidence suggests he acted responsibly.
point.

Two incidents emphasize the

Lafayette McLaws described a dinner party held for Magruder and

the commanders of McLaws’ s Second Division:

"The dinner was magnificent

and would have graced a New Orleans’ restaurant.

A great many toasts

were given and speeches made 1n reply."4 The other incident described
his participation in a Louisiana Mardi Gras celebration in Williamsburg.
Some of the enlisted men set Magruder up to meet a feminine looking
soldier who was dressed in lady’ s clothes,
The gallant Magruder quickly took the "lady’ s" [Campbell]
hand and began entertaining Campbell with food, drink, and
liv e ly conversation. During this interlude other battalion
members entered the room above Magruder, ripped apart a feather
mattress and shoveled the feathers through cracks in the flo o r.
Magruder was covered with feathers, but the Tigers simply
laughed and yelled that i t was a Louisiana snowstorm.5
Although these incidents imply alcohol might be involved, no one
3Ibid.
4McLaws, Young’ s M ill, to his wife, 7 February 1862, McLaws
Papers.
5Jones, Tigers. 33-34. While this incident certainly
suggests alcohol may have been involved, the event was a festive
one which Magruder was apparently w illing to share with the
enlisted personnel. On another occasion, cited in chapter 2 (see
note 58), McLaws was unable to catch up with Magruder, who made an
appearance at a barbecue banquet but continued on to examine his
defensive works. McLaws to his wife, 8 July 1861, McLaws Papers.
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documented any consumption or excess on Magruder’ s part.
The longer the Yankees Ignored the Peninsula, the more Magruder’ s
p rio rity fo r supplies and manpower decreased.

The period from September

1861 until February 1862 severely tested the morale and discipline of
the department.

Magruder refused to compromise with flagging s p irits

who were unwilling to endure the months of tedium.

As early as

September, some officers 1n the 3d Virginia Cavalry contemplated
drafting a petition to spend the winter at home.

In compensation, they

proposed to extend th e ir enlistment by three months the following
summer.6
Clearly, Magruder faced a formidable challenge.
the f ir s t order.

Discipline was of

Over 50 court-martials were reported and Magruder

sought to c la rify the status of prisoners held at Yorktown.7 The rigid
camp schedule of 10th Louisiana regiment shows how he ran his
department,
Reveille at 5:00 A.M., ro ll c a ll, then we cook our
breakfast which of course we are supposed to eat. Half past
eight, guard mounting, which is equal to a small parade as i t
each day consists of forty men, one lieutenant, one sergeant,
and three corporals. At 9:00 A.M. company d r ill until 10:00
A.M., a fte r which we are free until 12:00 P.M. when we have
dinner c a ll, a fte r which comes what is called fatigue duty
which means spades, and when there is no digging to be done, we
have to clean up quarters. After which we are again free until
6:00 P.M. Then dress parade and dismiss to cook our supper,
eat, lo a f, and spin yarns t i l l 9:00 P.M. when tattoo beats and
a ll are sent to bed lik e a parcel of school boys.8
Richard H. Watkins to his home, 26 September 1861 and
2 October 1861, TD in Watkins Papers, Virginia Historical Society,
Richmond.
7General Orders numbers 70, 72, 73, 78, and 79; War
Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 57.
8Jones, Tigers. 22.
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Freeman c ritic iz e d Hagruder for attempting to do a ll s ta ff work
himself.9 Basic army management was s t i l l foreign to many of
Magruder’ s o fficers.

In General Orders number 71, Magruder emphasized

the necessity of forwarding a ll communications into and out of the
department through department headquarters.
be reissued.

This order la te r needed to

On another occasion, he chastised Colonel Levy for

abandoning 4,000 rounds of ammunition and entrenching tools when he
relocated his camp.10
As Commanding O fficer Magruder faced an endless multitude of tasks.
The existing slave labor force was inadequate to meet the manual labor
requirements.

He used a ll his resources to uncover sufficient labor;

soldiers did double duty as ditch diggers.
the black man.

The primary labor source was

The commander employed c iv ilia n agents to contact civic

leaders in counties within and beyond his command.

After the Secretary

of War overruled John Tyler’ s challenge,11 Magruder embarked on an
aggressive recruitment campaign that lasted the duration of his command.
He constantly called for tools and slaves.

On 2 September, he asked

Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:XXXIV. There are many
instances when Magruder could have reasonably expected officers to
execute th e ir assigned tasks, but re a lity was d iffe re n t. One
September le tte r was particularly illu s tra tiv e , Magruder wrote to
his engineer, a Captain Myers at Hardin’ s B luff. He expressed
concern that work was not starting on Mulberry Island defenses
until afte r 9:00 A.M. Magruder insisted i t start at sunrise.
Unfortunately, Myers was commuting from the southside of the James
River. Magruder told Myers that he should stay in accommodations
near Mulberry Island. RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder to
Myers, 2 September 1861.
10General Orders number 71; RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227,
Magruder to Colonel Levy, 7 September 1861.
110R, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 252.
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Confederate Quartermaster Abraham C. Heyers for 500 digging spades.12
These supplies were supplemented, sometimes reluctantly, by local
farmers.13 Slaves that had been Impressed usually had to bring tools
from th e ir farm.
Magruder’ s relentless pursuit of the black labor force created
disciplinary and security problems.
escape to Union lines.

Many slaves used the opportunity to

This forced Magruder to place armed guards in

the slave camps, remove slaves from details that provided temptations to
escape and establish cavalry details to sweep the countryside for
runaways.14 Fear of runaways increased owners’ reluctance to release
slaves for army service.

When the Confederate government temporarily

withdrew lia b ilit y for slave property resistance to impressment
increased.15 Deterrent measures for slaves included "a whip and f if t y
lashes."16
Magruder knew that the slave owners in York County, James City
County and others within his jurisdiction would complain about regular
levies for slaves.

Such actions would impact various plantation

a c tiv itie s and crop harvests.
the maximum extent possible.

So he sought to employ free Negroes to
He offered 50 cents per day plus meals.

Later he in itia te d a scheme to hire free Negroes and slaves for 100
1ZR£ 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder to Colonel A. C.
Meyers,
2 September 1861.
13Ib id ., 23 September 1861.
u General Orders number 79.
1S0R, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 458.
16(RG) 109, chapter 2, vol. 68, Special Orders number 698, 25
March 1862.
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dollars per year; monthly rates varied from 10 dollars to 40 dollars per
month.17
When these labor bids fa ile d , Magruder was forced to impress the
number needed.

A. T. Bledsoe, Assistant Secretary of War, wrote "Your

course in impressing labor for work upon fo rtific a tio n s in cases of
absolute necessity and for a f a ir price is fu lly approved."18 Magruder
followed by reaching out to King William, King and Queen, Gloucester,
Mathews, Surry, Lancaster, Sussex, Chesterfield, Dinwittie and
Petersburg.

Whenever individual owners refused to support him, he sent

dragoons to guarantee slave owners’ "support" for Negro musters.
Assembly points were usually Yorktown, Williamsburg or Gloucester Point.
Slaves were examined and unhealthy candidates returned to th eir
masters.19 Suitable workers were retained to complete specific tasks
or were kept for a period of time and returned to th e ir masters.20
17Magruder worked a number of schemes to raise sufficient
Negro workers. A sample proclamation was "Workers needed—send
them with spades, shovels, picks, hoes, axes. Pay is f i f t y cents
per day and food. Will pay free Negroes and masters of slaves the
same rate. Send to the nearest wharf and thence via
Williamsburg." OB, series 1, 4:654. Magruder believed direct
hire of Negroes would work better and in December 1861, and
January 1862 he sought approximately 600 employees. When the
direct hire schemes failed to produce sufficient laborers, he
fin a lly received authority to again impress slaves. OB, series 1,
4:715-16; QB» series 1, vol. 51, part 2 , 472-73.

18QB, series 1, 4:654; OB, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 310.
19There is plentiful documentation of this point. The
following citations are representative. E£ 109. chapter 2, vol.
227, 29 October 1861; OB, series 1, 4:654.
20B£ 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder to I . M. St. John,
25 November 1861. Later Magruder was compelled to convince
Richmond that the impressed slaves were being properly treated;
OB, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 475.
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Magruder's aggressiveness earned him several rebukes from Richmond.
Indians claimed an exemption from the work force and Governor Letcher
supported them.

He advised Magruder that the Indians would volunteer to

work on boats, i f s o lic ited .21 Unfortunately many Indians were unable
to produce proof of race and Magruder impressed them as colored labor.
On another occasion, Secretary of War, Judah Benjamin, denied Magruder’ s
request to d raft 500 slaves to work on the defensive works.

Benjamin

cited both th e ir responsibility to produce food and the low probability
of attack in Magruder’ s fro n t.22 P olitical meddling got so bad
Magruder ordered the release of Negroes belonging to Turner Curtis and
the Chief Justice of King William County.23
Secretary Benjamin earned Magruder’ s lasting distain when he
ordered him to rescind an order impressing slaves from Chesterfield.
Despite an impassioned plea and a documented shortfall of nearly 600
hands, Benjamin told Magruder he was wrong to cross d is tr ic t boundaries.
Benjamin sharply admonished Magruder to, "Confine the exercise of your
power of impressment to the geographical lim its of your own command."24
Undaunted, Magruder unsuccessfully solicited Richmond’ s authority to
impress 600 Negroes from Mecklenburg, Lunenburg and Brunswick counties.
21QR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 306.
220R, series 1, 4:697.
a R£ 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder to St. John, 16 November
1861.
24An obviously b itte r Magruder on sick leave before
Days campaign, openly c ritic ize d Judah
Benjamin.
Jones wrote on 23 Jun 1862, "He is too
open
in
late Secretary of War." Jones, Diary.
135. This
document other clashes between Benjamin and Magruder.
citatio n herein is OR, series 1, 9:33-34, 36.

the Seven
Rebel war
clerk
his censures of the
chapter w ill
The
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He argued slave owners would prefer Impressment with government
l ia b ilit y to direct hire schemes.25 One week la te r, Colonel Ewell
advised his friend Professor Joynes, working 1n the War Department,that
while 1,500 Negroes could finish the fo rtific a tio n s in 6 weeks; work was
at a standstill because of Richmond’ s intransigence.26 A week after
Ewell’ s le tte r , Richmond authorized Magruder to impress slaves at ten
dollars per month to complete the Peninsula defenses.27
Clearly Magruder did not make any p o litic a l friends over the slave
impressment issue.

Additionally, he began to alienate some of his

p o litic a lly connected subordinates.

He curtly advised the former

governor of Alabama, now colonel of the 8th Alabama, John Winston, to
stop whining about being displaced from his camp.

He advised Colonel T.

R. R. Cobb of the in flu en tial Georgia clique that Georgians could be
detailed as carpenters or any other task that needed to be done.28
Just as Magruder was unburdened by the reassignment of D. H. H ill
on 24 September, he inherited other problems.

The Cobb brothers would

be good fighters, but they were p o litic a lly in flu e n tia l.

Howell was

president of the Confederate Congress and he frequently clashed with
Magruder, who did not believe Cobb could do justice to his command and
direct the legislature. Although
250R, series 1, vol.

he in it ia lly supported Magruder,

51, part 2, 456-57.

26QB, series 1, 9:42-43.
270R, series 1, vol.

51, part 2, 472-73.

28War Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 61-62.
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Howell Cobb la te r cane to believe Magruder was an alarm ist.29
Lafayette McLaws of Georgia te s tifie d to th e ir Influence when he wrote,
The Cobbs are coming over to the Peninsula and I suppose
th e ir worships must be provided for before the claims of any
others can be considered. Thomas R. R. Cobb with his Legion
has already arrived and reports say that Howell 1s to follow
and w ill come as a Brigadier General. I do not wish to be
under any p o litic ian .
Although the Cobbs did exert Influence Magruder’ s team had been
previously established.

McLaws’ s loyalty resulted in his promotion to

Brigadier General with a divisional command,
I am Indebted to General Magruder particularly for the
honorable position I am now occupying. To his favor alone, I
owe the fortune of being in command a ll the time since my
a rriv a l.
Magruder also solicited authority to reorganize his a r tille r y into two
regiments under a brigade with his friend, Randolph, in command as a
brigadier.

Magruder asked Letcher to intervene on Randolph’ s behalf

with President Davis.32 Although some people considered this appeal to
be blatantly p o litic a l, Randolph’ s considerable experience in naval
H ill was reassigned to command in North Carolina on 24
September 1861. The North Carolina, "Bethel Regiment" were six
month volunteers and would leave within six weeks. Magruder and
H ill exchanged curt correspondence before H ill departed. War
Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 44-45, 48; RG
109, vol. 2, chapter 227, Magruder to H ill, 17 September 1861; OR,
series 1, 4:656; John Eddins Simpson, Howell Cobb. The Politics of
Ambition (Chicago: Adams Press, 1973), 153-54.
30McLaws, Young’ s Farm, to his wife, 29 September 1861, McLaws
Papers.
31Ib id . Previous McLaws correspondence revealed his
unbridled ambition for promotion to general o ffic e r. In late
July, Magruder promised McLaws a promotion. Magruder was true to
his word and he actively solicited/procured McLaws’ commission.
32War Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 48-49.
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weaponry allowed him to make repeated and specific recommendations for
employment of Magruder’ s a r t ille r y .33
By early October Magruder decided to reorganize his forces Into
brigades.

General Orders number 89 created eight brigades under the

commands of McLaws, Hunt, August, Colquitt, Winston, McKinney,
Sulakowski and Ewell.

Command posts were established at Young’ s M ill,

Harrod’ s M ill, Land’ s End, Ship’ s Point, Mulberry Point, Spratley’ s
Farm, Lee’ s M ill, Williamsburg and Yorktown.

A cavalry outpost was

created at Bethel, under Colonel Robert Johnston.34 When the
reorganization did not produce promotions for many colonels, now Major
General Magruder,35 superseded General Orders number 89 with General
Orders number 105.

The F irst Division was headquartered at Yorktown

under Brigadier General Gabriel Rains and the Second Division at Young’ s
M ill under Brigadier General McLaws.

This organization remained in

effect for the duration of the Department of the Peninsula’ s l i f e . 36
^Randolph was not a p o litical ornament. Although he did not
particularly care for fie ld service, having expressed his feelings
to J. Thompson Brown, he was active in the management of heavy
ordinance. He frequently sought permission to relocate heavy
a r tille r y when he thought i t was misused. Magruder relied on
Randolph and obviously preferred his company. Randolph was
rewarded with a brigadier general’ s wreath and command of the
Suffolk expedition in March 1862. Soon a fte r, he became the
Secretary of War. Biographical information is contained in Ezra
Warner, Generals in Gray. (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1959), 252-53.
^QR, series 1, 4:668-70.
35Magruder was promoted to Major General 7 October 1861.
“ SB, series 1, 4:697-98.
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Magruder’ s conflicts with Richmond continued and at times were
acidic.

In early July, Magruder identified a problem with the pine

construction of the naval gun carriages.

After seeking details about

the d u rab ility of the carriages he solicited replacements, "[They] w ill
not stand ten discharges of the gun.*37 When replacement carriages
were not immediately sent, he badgered the Secretary of the Navy,
Stephen Mallory.

Responding on behalf of Mallory, George Minor,

Director of the Bureau of Ordinance and Hydrography, advised Magruder
that he would get replacements a fte r other requisitions were f ille d .
Magruder was outraged and sharply endorsed the le tte r to President Davis
with a request that Davis determine the p rio ritie s .38
By 25 October Magruder was again at Richmond’ s throat.

He bluntly

complained to General Cooper that three of his agents had been unable to
draw $179,000 to pay his troops.
was "inexcusable."

He noted the lack of pay since 30June

He continued by saying his "cannons are drawn by

miserable horses and the carts by miserable mules,"39 100 a r tille r y
horses and harnesses were needed immediately.

Magruder continued by

alleging the fric tio n primers from the Ordinance Department for the guns
were worthless and his transportation shortage remained acute.

He

37The seizure of unmounted naval guns was a windfall for the
Confederacy, but Richmond was immediately pressured to provide the
mounts. Use of soft pine wood lim ited the size of the charge
which could be used in the guns. The recoil would demolish the
gun mounts. Magruder invested two months in the problem and he
fin a lly , in frustration, elevated the problem to President Davis.
The audit t r a il of correspondence was OR, series 1, 2:1008-9; OR,
series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 209; OR, series 1, 4:646-47; Ib id .,
653; QR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 306-7; QR, series 1, 4:656.
“ 0B, series 1, 4:656.
39Ib id ., 691.
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completed his c irc u it of blame by noting his need fo r reinforcements,
blasting the procurement system and expressing contempt for Richmond’ s
policy that required him to get his own forage, while agents from
Richmond worked his d is tric t fo r other commands.

He concluded by

saying, "I was w illin g to submit to these things at the commencement
after a reasonable time, but further neglect 1s crim inal."40
When Magruder experienced troubles with his telegraph lin e to
Richmond he asked William Morris, President of the Telegraph Company, to
act sw iftly to repair 1t.

A week la te r a fte r Morris had not fixed the

lin e , he asked General Cooper to force Morris to cooperate.

Eventually,

Magruder hired a man to ride constantly along the telegraph route and
report its status.41
Magruder also f e lt compelled to remotivate Captain Hope at
Williamsburg.

Northrop’ s previous orders to Hope to disobey Magruder

had been overridden and Magruder continued to coerce Hope’ s support.

A

requisition for 100 beeves and other rations for Cockletown was
accompanied by a threat of s tr ic t disciplinary action i f Hope did not
execute Magruder’ s orders.42 In the absence of m ilita ry action,
Magruder’ s demands seemed presumptuous and made few friends.

His

"mailed fis t" handling of hapless and harried bureaucrats most lik e ly
fed the rumors of his drinking problem.
40Ibid.
41R£5 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder to William Morris,
Richmond, 9 November 1861; Ib id ., Magruder to Captain Archer, West
Point, 16 November 1861; OR, series 1, 4:701.
42RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder, Bethel, to
Quartermaster Hudgins, Williamsburg, 11 November 1861.
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Despite the problems with Richmond, Magruder continued to work on a
river defense scheme.

The James River defenses Improved with the

strengthening of Fort Boykins and fo rtific a tio n of Mulberry Island.
Magruder believed the riv er would be effectively closed I f Yankee
vessels could be forced to pass the fir e of the forts.
Once the navy commenced actions to close the Swash Channel of the
James River, Magruder lobbied Richmond to authorize the use of 25 stone
vessels to simultaneously close the mouth of the Warwick River.

During

a v is it to Richmond on 1 September, Magruder advised President Davis of
his plans concerning Mulberry Island.

He further advised Davis that

both Jamestown and Gloucester Point were vulnerable to land assault.

To

counteract the sh o rtfall, he proposed to build strong earthworks that
when properly manned would protect the riv e r batteries.43
As the engineers and navy moved to sink more boats and drive
pilings into the riv e r, Magruder revealed his James River strategy.

On

7 September at Magruder’ s request, Captain Tucker moved the James River
Squadron consisting of the Patrick Henry. Jamestown and Teaser to a
point near Mulberry Island.44 Almost simultaneously, Colonel Hodges,
14th Virginia on Mulberry Island, received detailed instructions to
43QB, series 1, 4:644-45.
wThe James River Squadron was established to protect the
James River from ascent by Union vessels. None of the three were
legitimate ships of war, the Jamestown and Patrick Henrv were
seized at the start of the war. The Teaser was purchased. The
commanders were Patrick Henrv [flagship], Commander J. R. Tucker,
Jamestown. Lieutenant J. N. Barney, and Teaser. Lieutenant J. H.
Rochelle. The Patrick Henrv had 10 guns, 1 10", 1 64 pounder, 6
8", and 2 32 pounders. The other two vessels had two small guns
each. Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, vol. 2
(Washington: GPO, 1963), 538, 555, 573.
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defend 1t.

Hodges was told to keep McLaws Informed and not get Isolated

by an enemy movement.

He comforted Hodges by advising him that 2,500

men would be stationed 1n supporting distance at both Warwick Courthouse
and Cockletown.

Magruder then ordered Colonel Henry Forno, Fifth

Louisiana, to support Hodges from the v ic in ity of Denbigh Church.45
Now that the ground and naval forces were positioned on the James
River, Magruder bombarded Richmond with determined requests fo r stone
boats and rations.

He also requested an allocation of

four

canal boats

to use as quarters for the Mulberry Island troops.46
While the James River defenses rig h tfu lly attracted attention
because of the implications for Norfolk and Richmond, the York River was
potentially more troublesome.

Consequently, Magruder attacked the

problem of its defense with equal enthusiasm.
The York River, unlike the James River, was deep in its main
channel and was not as lik e ly to develop shoals or sandbars.
design, i t had a forward choke point.

By natural

The distance between Yorktown and

Gloucester Point across the York was barely three-quarters of a mile and
was easily within range of Magruder’ s armament.

Elevated terrain

rendered well placed batteries nearly immune to counterbattery fir e .
Assaulting vessels faced the unenviable prospect of hostile f ir e from
two or more positions.

Yet, i f either Yorktown or Gloucester Point were

captured the task would not be as daunting.

The terminus of the York

450R, series 1, 4:640-41, 646; ORN, series 1, 6:712, 715-17,
723-24; Andrew Talcott, Richmond, to T.M.R. Talcott, 3 September
1861, Andrew Talcott Papers.
^ a r Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 6061.
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River was West Point [Eltham] described by Janes Williams:
The riv e r and everything together was the p rettiest sight I
ever beheld. As you approach West Point, the Mattaponl cones
down on your l e f t and on the rig ht the Panunkey and just at the
end of the railroad, they both unite and form the York River,
the p re ttie s t and grandest looking thing I ever saw.
The Pamunkey River led to the v ic in ity of Richmond, but since i t was not
navigable by deep water vessels, a railroad ran from Richmond to the
wharf.
Magruder had previously seen his Department extended into Matthews
County on the middle Peninsula, but with in sufficient manpower to cover
even the Peninsula lines, he sought the most economical means of
defending Gloucester Point.

Sufficient guns were placed 1n the seaside

batteries but a r tille r y companies did not have enough manpower to defend
the overland approaches.

Early in September, Magruder advised General

Cooper that Colonel Crump had enough guns, but he needed fiv e companies
of a r t ille r is t s .
without manpower.

In addition, Colonel Randolph in Yorktown had 21 guns
The only three companies available, Peyton’ s,

Bouton’ s, and DeGournay’ s were assigned to the naval batteries.
Randolph was particularly concerned about the a r tille r y serving redoubts
four and five between the main Yorktown lin e and the Warwick River.

If

those positions were captured, the Union forces would be within 800
yards of the main Yorktown works.

Normally 10 men served one gun, but

because of the high percentage of illness Randolph sought 15 per gun.48
In less than a week, Crump’ s needs were satisfied by the addition
47James P. Williams, Gloucester Point, to his sister, 8 May
1861, Williams Papers.
^OR, series 1, 4:638-40.
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of units from Richmond and Staunton.

Magruder was advised that five

regiments were being sent to him and that four companies of a r tille r y
were being detached from Colonel Ewell’ s command to be replaced by
m ilit ia .49
To prevent Yankee operations on the rivers, trib u taries and creeks
in front of Yorktown, Magruder instructed Randolph to place three 32
pounders on barbette carriages at Ship’ s Point between the Poquoson
River and Cheesman’ s Creek.

Magruder believed this forward position

could delay any Yankee movement long enough to permit relocation of some
cannons from the riv e r batteries; thus, he told Randolph to delay his
work on the approaches to Yorktown until a Yankee movement was
confirmed.50 He then instructed Colonel Mallory o f the m ilitia at
Ship’ s Point to report a ll enemy movements.51
Now that Magruder had his flank positions in order, he devoted
himself to extending his sensors beyond Gloucester toward Matthews
County.

The Rappahannock River had proven to be a profitable pickup

point for Federal vessels seeking Negro refugees.52 Magruder was
unable to spare any manpower from his main works so he again looked to
mobilize the county m ilitia .
This time Magruder did not receive enthusiastic support.

The

colonel of 21st Virginia m ilitia in Gloucester County, Werner Jones,
490R. series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 287-90.
50War Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 51;
QR, series 1, 4:652-53.
51RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder to Colonel Mallory,
Ships Point, 12 October 1861.
5z0RN. series 1, 6:8-10.
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told Colonel Crump that he did not believe he was subject to Magruder’ s
authority and that he would disband the m ilitia instead of allowing them
to be conscripted.
Magruder attempted to keep the m ilitia from melting away.

He

immediately wrote to Jones and promised to relay Jones’ s concerns to
Richmond, but Magruder also appealed to Jones’ s ego and patriotism.

He

said the best contribution of the m ilitia was its willingness to defend
th eir county and th eir fa m ilia rity with the features of the area.

He

pleaded with Jones not to discharge the m ilitia over a difference of
opinion and closed with a request for Jones’ s valuable insights should
he choose to resign his commission.53
Less than two days la te r, Lee advised that Governor Letcher had
confirmed Magruder’ s authority over Jor.es.54 Two weeks la te r Magruder
successfully pursued Letcher’ s permission to organize and enroll the
m ilit ia .55 Unfortunately, Crump did not use Magruder’ s authority and
when questioned a month la te r on the status of the m ilitia , admitted
that they had not yet been formed into a regiment.56
Now that Magruder had established control on the York River and its
surrounding areas, he determined i t was safe to build a wharf at
Gloucester Point.

He also advised Colonel Valerie Sulakowski at Ship’ s

Point of his impending reinforcement by Colonel Tomlin’ s 53d Virginia
530R, series 1, 4:652.
54R£ 109, chapter 8, vol. 236, Lee to Magruder, 21 September
1861.
550R, series 1, 4:675.
56RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, T. J. Page [Magruder] to
Colonel Crump, Gloucester Point, 8 November 1861.
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infantry and ordered hint to defend his position to the la s t man.57 I t
seemed certain that a 9 September Richmond Examiner a rtic le had been
accurate when i t reported, "The whole of the York River has riverside
batteries . . . you w ill never hear of Magruder’ s capitulation
there."58
Magruder worked hard to maintain a veil of secrecy over his
operations.
troublesome.

Refugee c iv ilia n s and local residents were particularly
Fishermen and oystermen moved into and through the shallow

waters to make th e ir liv in g .

Their daily a c tiv itie s enabled them to

track the progress of various rebel projects.

Refugees desiring to go

north were often granted passes to proceed to the Union lines via Fort
Monroe.

Spies with forged passes also sought passage between the lines.

Yet, Magruder and his commanders achieved reasonable success.
Circulars identified specific persons for arrest and provosts kept
busy escorting prisoners to Richmond under charges.

Magruder encouraged

Richmond to send emigrants via Kentucky or other routes north.

He

instructed Tomlin at West Point to prevent people from proceeding on the
57Ib id ., Magruder to Captain Page, CSN, 12 October 1861;
Magruder to Colonel Sulakowski, Ship’ s Point, 22 October 1861.
58Although this citation is early in Magruder’ s command, i t
is useful in two ways; f i r s t , i t reflects the manifestation of
Magruder’ s industrious pursuit of the challenge of fo rtific a tio n s .
Early in his command, he promised to build fo rtific a tio n s which
could be held until supporting troops could reach his position.
The second point is the level of expectation which was building
throughout the south [and north as w e ll]. Magruder was ready for
a Union assault, the navy was ready, his men were ready, and the
public was ready. When Union challenges failed to m aterialize,
Magruder saw a marked deterioration in his command morale.
Unknown author, reprint of a Louisiana newspaper, Richmond
Examiner. 9 September 1861. Navy Captain Whittle reported a fu ll
complement of armament under his command at Gloucester Point, West
Point, and Yorktown. 0RN» series 1, 6:734-45.
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Logan.
vessels.

Some people refused to be denied and were Intercepted on private
In order to cut down on these Incidents, Magruder at numerous

times directed the Impoundment of a ll private vessels.59 On the whole,
Magruder’ s efforts were successful as no Union movements were attempted
and many slaves were Intercepted and returned to camp.

General Orders

number 114 praised the vigilance of the cavalry for the "entire security
within which we have been able so fa r, to prosecute our works of
defense."60
Progress had a price and the 54 year old Magruder would pay I t for
the duration of his tenure as commander.

McLaws commented, "General

Magruder was over to my camp today and gave me a long ta lk .

He appears

worn and sick, Indeed he has a great many things to try him and many
arrangements to deal with and contend against."61 Special Orders
number 516, signed by Magruder, provided e x p lic it Instructions
concerning the conduct of men on picket duty.

Some soldiers were

59Magruder advised Colonel Hodges of the 14th Virginia to
arrest a man named White who was enroute to Newport News and had
information about a Confederate steamer. War Department,
Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 42. Magruder arrested a
seaman Clark trying to escape down the York River with his family
and detained him at Gloucester Point. Another 10-12 people
presented passes authorized by Richmond authorities. War
Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 46. A Frances
Dennis was arrested three times. Magruder recommended his
confinement. RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder to Cooper,
7 November 1861. McLaws questioned the lo y a lity of local
residents several times. McLaws to wife, 23 December 1861, McLaws
Papers. This vigilance was not relaxed as shown by a 6 March 1862
tasking to arrest suspicious characters and place them in close
confinement at Gloucester Point. RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 67.
“ General Orders number 114, 24 November 1861.
61McLaws, Youngs M ill, W illie , 18 October 1861, McLaws Papers.
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sleeping on duty and others deserting th eir posts for the seductions of
private homes and pretty g ir ls .

Management of sentinels needed

standardization to maintain the security of the department.62
Lee reported to Letcher 1n June 1861 on the state of Virginia
defenses and praised the responsiveness of citizen soldiers who were
awakened from the slumber of peacetime pursuits.

For Magruder and other

commanders, the transition of recruits to soldier l i f e was a continuous
challenge.

When not foraging to re c tify shortfalls In government

provisions, Magruder was seeking the right people to help manage the
various a c tiv itie s .

Several men volunteered to serve with Magruder with

no formal rank and Magruder sought commissions for them.

Yet, Richmond

was slow to respond and some volunteers were tested to the lim its of
th e ir gentlemanly respectability.
One group that was particularly abused were the engineers.

In late

November, Magruder b itte rly complained that they were not getting rank
equal to th e ir responsibilities and that some could not even get a
commission.

One man had been lost to Confederate service, because the

commission would have made him junior to two subordinates.

Magruder

viewed the situation with deep concern.63
Magruder’ s professional demeanor was matched by compassion for his
subordinates.

A number of the a c tivities that he pursued improved the

“ Special Orders number 516 in Cary Letterbook, 18 November
1861.
“ Men such as Joseph L. Brent and George Noland among others
came to Magruder as c iv ilia n s. He did his best for them, but when
Richmond failed to commission Noland, he le f t his post and had to
be enticed back. Noland was eventually commissioned. The
background can be followed in RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227,
6 November 1861 and 25 November 1861.
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quality l i f e fo r his soldiers.

In it ia lly , morale was very good.

McLaws

reported, "The Louisiana regiment Is 1n Williamsburg giving parties,
singing, and serenading."64 Corson wrote Jennie, "We get plenty of
oysters to eat with fresh beef and baker’ s bread fresh.

Some of the

boys brought a big lo t of chickens."65 On another occasion Corson
wrote,
I have a delightful time on the bay fishing. The la s t time
I was there, I went out in a canoe about a h alf a mile and
caught a fine string of fis h .
Henry Carter wrote to his brother,
We had a regular old breakdown dance, our captain performs
splendidly on the banjo and one of the men on the v io lin . We
have the best band on the Peninsula.
Captain Richard Watkins of the Third Virginia Cavalry wrote,
Saw the Pecoson fslcl riv e r, an arm of the sea quite broad.
Saw lots of fis h , schools and schools of them . . . Many offers
for dinner with men and officers serving fish , oysters,
chickens, potatoes, tomatoes, corn, and peas in abundance.
Yet, there was cause for discontent.
parties and relaxation.

Soldier l i f e was not a ll

In October, after a "pitiless rainstorm,"

Carter informed his brother,
By the middle of the night water was three or four inches
in my tent, and to complete our discomfort the tent gave way
and caught us in a trap. . . . The ground was so saturated the
“ McLaws, Young’ s M ill, to W illie , 18 October 1861, McLaws
Papers.
65Corson, 50-51.
“ ib id ., 38-39.
67Carter, Deep Creek, to brother, William, 30 November 1861,
Carter Family Papers.
“ Watkins, to his family, 23 September 1861, Watkins Family
Papers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

pegs would not hold and the tent f e ll several more tin e s .69
As correspondence accumulated from lonesome homes many soldiers
sought furloughs.

Magruder believing himself 1n Imminent

dangerof

Yankee attack made

a morale crushing decision that would

erode his

support; he decided to cancel a ll furloughs u n til at least January.
The soldiers did not see things the same way Magruder did and
comments were freely offered from Magruder’ s Division commanders down
through the lowest private.

Corson wrote:

I expect to come home soon but General Magruder has Issues
that no one shall leave the Peninsula on furloughs t i l l the
f ir s t of January. Our boys are well and amuse themselves
squirrel hunting, playing cards, marbles, pitching quoits, etc.
He have big Brunswick stews very often.
Watkins added:
Captain Thornton was denied a two day furlough by
Magruder on the death of his brother—may indicate a
forthcoming b attle.

General

Carter reflected the discontent in the ranks:
[It s being debated i f ] this high sounding order re a lly
means anything or is intended to stop the increasing demand for
furloughs. . . . I f this kind of program is persisted in, i t
w ill throw a damper on the volunteer service for the next
twelve months.
Even general officers were not exempted, McLaws advised his wife:
I have never been anywhere i t rains so much . . . The
General s t i l l places great confidence in me and I try to
69Carter, Deep Creek, to brother William, 4 October 1861,
Carter Family Papers.
70Corson, 47-48.
71Watkins, to his family,
Papers.

15 October 1861, Watkins Family

^Carter, Deep Creek, to his brother, William, 16 October
1861, Carter Family Papers.
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deserve 1t . . . I asked General Hagruder for a leave . . .
he said no, he would give no leaves to anyone now.

and

Seven weeks la te r on 11 December, Carter commented:
I cannot think we are on the eve of an important battle but
the General thinks so and that is enough to k ill the furlough
system dead as a hammer.
Even General McLaws began to sour on Magruder:
I confess that the idea of going to see you a ll a short
leave 1s repugnant to me In the extreme, when I may be recalled
at any moment by the vanity of a commanding o ffic e r who 1s a
sensationalist because he 1s constantly afraid he w ill be
forgotten unless by startlin g paragraphs he keeps himself 1n
front of the country. . . . I f I can get away, I w ill ask to be
put gp duty in Georgia as the Peninsula is not a place to long
fo r.
The somewhat jaded opinions just expressed may have resulted from
boredom and impatience with an enemy who for its own reasons refused the
joust.

Magruder had met the original challenge and b u ilt a labyrinth in

which one admiring subordinate proudly wrote, "Every road is being
fo rtifie d and before long the Peninsula w ill be one masked battery."76
Howell Cobb wrote Secretary of State, R. M. T. Hunter,
You may rest assured that there should be reinforcements
sent here . . . I have conversed fu lly and freely with General
Magruder . . . You could not have a better man here. Rely
fu lly upon his judgment.
Although Magruder was unyielding on the furlough issue, he worked
McLaws, Youngs M ill, to his wife, 23 October 1861, McLaws
Papers.
74Carter, Deep Creek, to his brother, William, 11 December
1861, Carter Family Papers.
^McLaws, Youngs M ill, to wife, 20 December 1861, McLaws Papers.
76Carter, Deep Creek, to his brother, William, 4 October
1861, Carter Family Papers.
"fiB, series 1, 4:685.
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hard to support his troops.

In October, he requested Postmaster Regan

establish a new post office at Young’ s M111.

He sought to consolidate

as many hospitals as possible at Williamsburg to assure a fu ll range of
supplies were available In sufficient quantities.

Supply depots were

fu lly stocked and he urged quartermasters to keep rations coming.
Forage wagons ventured Into the countryside and returned with provisions
for the animals and he sought permission to sell excess beeves to
c iv ilia n s .

Commanders were Instructed to build huts for the troops

without delay.

When 1t was rumored that the men were suffering from

exposure at the forward outposts, he dispatched a brlckmason to make the
necessary repairs.78
By October 1861, Hagruder and his men had accomplished herculean
tasks.

A framework for defense had been crafted; a ll i t lacked was an

enemy.

I t was that very deficiency which chipped away at Hagruder’ s

command and c re d ib ility .

After countless hours in the saddle surveying,

directing and planning defenses, Magruder knew every nuance of his
scheme.

The multiple scenarios that could unfold caused Magruder to

move his forces from place to place.

These marches helped condition his

officers and men for the upcoming rigors of campaigns.

Unfortunately,

a ll was for naught.
Magruder received regular intelligence of possible Yankee
^Less than a month la te r, General Orders number 113
authorized the establishment of company morale funds to purchase
various necessities and niceties. General Orders number 114
moderated the furlough policy but Union activities in early
December prevented widespread implementation of a furlough system.
Review of RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, provides a regular diet of
"people" actions. The examples cited here are between midSeptember and mid-November.
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movements.

Deserters reported plans to move with large numbers of

troops by land and or sea against Yorktown.

Hagruder d u tifu lly reported

them In accordance with General Orders number 95.

On 7 October,

Hagruder advised the new Secretary of War Judah Benjamin of the
following Yankee plans which were provided by deserters.
1.

The Yankees w ill attack Yorktown by water and 1f unsuccessful

by land and water.
2.

Reinforcements of 30,000 are coming, 5,000 having already

arrived.
3.

Seventy brass fie ld pieces were at Fort Honroe.

4.

Yankees at Newport News had been told they w ill winter in

Yorktown.
5.

General Wool told his troops they w ill march on Yorktown.

6.

Yankees are being ferried each night to Camp Butler at Newport

News.
Of course in the face of the upcoming engagement, the commanding
general did not hesitate to l i s t several items which he needed to
successfully defend his position.79 Simultaneously, Hagruder in
General Orders number 96 advised his troops that an attack was imminent,
"Let us, therefore, stand ready to welcome these strangers to hospitable
graves."80 He also announced the infamous furlough policy.
Subordinates received detailed instructions in correspondence that
clearly showed a skittish commander.81 Eleven days la te r on 22 October
^OR, series 1, 4:672-73.
“ OE, series 1, 4:677.
81Ib id ., 678-79.
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his troops were s t i l l on war footing and Magruder Issued a circular
praising the victory at B all’ s B lu ff and exhorting his troops saying,
"There 1s the enemy, destroy him."82 Unfortunately, nothing happened
and Richmond advised him that no reinforcements were coming.83 One
soldier commented, "Something has got ole Magruder stirred up, probably
whiskey.*84
The fa ilu re of Union forces to advance a fte r Magruder’ s repeated
warnings severely hurt his c re d ib ility with Richmond, his commanders and
his men.

When Magruder resumed his panicky calls 1n early December,

Benjamin responded on 9 December with another ta r t reply, " I t 1s not
believed that any such force as represented by you can possibly be
within the enemy lin e . . . but are glad to find you are vig ilan t and
hopeful."85 McLaws wrote his wife,
Of course we are on the a le rt and General Magruder favors
us with stampedes very generally, but we have become so much
accustomed to his cry of wolf that i t w ill be very d iff ic u lt to
arouse us from our apathy even when the enemy does come. I
have more to fear from that than from anything else.
Soldiers in the ranks commented as w ell, Carter confided in his brother
that,
General Magruder is in daily expectation of a general
b attle on the Peninsula. I don’ t know what reason he has for
“ Og, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 353.
“ QB, series 1, 4:687-88.
“ Watkins,
Papers.

to his family,

25 October 1861, Watkins Family

85QB, series 1, 4:706.
“ McLaws, Youngs M ill, to his wife, 4 January 1862, McLaws
Papers.
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supposing that there w ill be an advance of the enemy.87
Williams complained that,
Old Hcgruder fs ic l expected the attack within that time,
but no advance was made by enemy. . . . We are stationed on the
outposts a ll the time and are continually being pulled and
hauled about from one place to another.
and William Corson wrote Jennie that,
Gen Hagruder certainly expects a fig h t. He is constantly
in the saddle inspecting the batteries. I believe the old
fellow is scared out of his wits.
Hagruder was not responding irra tio n a lly .
intelligence from his forward outposts.

He reacted to direct

On 4 December, Colonel Johnston

with the cavalry reported nine Yankee ships passing up the bay.90 Hany
people from generals to common soldier agreed with Hagruder’ s
preparations.

From Young’ s H ill on 8 December, HcLaws wrote his wife,

1 believe that within the next two days or twenty at the
furthest, the enemy w ill put further th e ir greatest strength,
but whenever i t is done, i t w ill be done very cautiously and
with great preponderance of strength.
William Corson confided to Jennie,
I found here considerable excitement in consequence of an
appearance of a large Federal fle e t in the mouth of the York
River. Active preparations were being made for a warm
reception and everything assumed the a ir of hurry and
87Carter, Lands End, to his brother, William, 11 December
1861, Carter Family Papers.
“ James Williams, Broken Bridge, to his Aunt Mary,
27 December 1861, Williams Papers.
89Corson, 54-55.
^QE, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 404-5.
91McLaws, Youngs M ill, to his wife, 8 December 1861, McLaws
Papers.
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confusion.92
Hagruder Ignored Benjamin’ s rebuff regarding Imminent danger and
continued to prepare for the expected attack, "the commanding general
w ill station himself 1n the midst of his troops, and having the greatest
confidence 1n th e ir gallantry, congratulates them on th e ir approaching
triumph."95
When the attack did not come the men could scarcely confine th eir
disappointment.
interlude.

The f ir s t Christmas of the war provided a welcomed

Private Williams wrote his Aunt Mary, "You never saw men eat

lik e we did in your l i f e , I declare I liked to have k ille d myself.*94
Corson described his holiday,
I have had quite a merry time during the la s t ten days.
The excitement, warlike, prevailing when I got back entirely
subsided about the evening of the twenty-fourth and Christmas
was duly celebrated in the different encampments. Eggnog was
the order of the day . . . We danced a ll night and went home
with the g irls in the morning.
But frustration crept into Corson’ s missive,
The enemy thinking Hagruder and a ll hands were tig h t, I
suppose, sent up a scouting party a few days ago and set fir e
to Bethel Church. . . . I think Hagruder is greatly to blame
for taking his forces from Bethel as one regiment could easily
whip 5,000 of the enemy there.96
Corson was not alone in commenting; others expressed combinations
of frustration and wishful thinking.

When Carter’ s company was ordered

92Corson, 52-53.
^QB, series 1, 4:712-13.
94Williams, Broken Bridge, to his Aunt Mary, 27 December
1861, Williams Papers.
^Corson, 56-57.
96Ibid.
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to march from comfortable quarters in Yorktown to fie ld conditions he
noted the mood, "Magruder is consequently d-md to fearful extent."97
In Watkins company i t was rumored, "General Magruder with War Department
approval w ill send men home fo r the balance of winter for lack of horse
forage and to recruit for the regiment generally."98
The forces Magruder feared were the in itia l assembly of General
Ambrose Burnside’ s force that would ultimately assault the North
Carolina Outer Banks.

Magruder’ s proximity to Fortress Monroe demanded

a higher state of readiness than may have been required elsewhere;
however, the absence of a m ilitary confrontation discredited Magruder
further.

Unfortunately, the positive actions Magruder took to offset

Benjamin’ s refusal to reinforce him placed him in d iffic u lty with
President Davis.
On 24 December, Magruder issued a circular advising of the
impending Union threat and tasking a ll m ilitia units to muster in and
report th e ir numbers of Colonel Ewell.

Internal documents in Richmond

questioned Magruder’ s authority and Davis ordered him to cancel the
order.99 Although Burnside’ s fle e t was reported to be 150 to 200
sails, about 50 vessels; Benjamin refused to believe Magruder would be
attacked.100 On 10 January, Magruder wrote a le tte r to Davis
97Carter, Deep Creek, to his brother William, 16 December
1861, Carter Family Papers.
^ a t k i ns, to his family, 28 December 1861, Watkins Family
Papers.
"flB, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 430-31.
1oo0RN. series 1, 6:753-54. Benjamin was c ritic ize d for
fa ilin g to take positive actions to prevent the capture of Roanoke
Island. The resulting furor may have led to Benjamin’ s departure
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explaining his actions and requesting a delay In discussions of his
e ffo rts u ntil he could provide a fu ll report.101 With Lee assigned to
South Carolina, Magruder was clearly at the nadir of his command.
Benjamin challenged his c re d ib ility by refusing to provide either
reinforcements or slave labor.
Magruder responded on 1 February with a lucid, cogent document that
most lik e ly saved his command.

In 1t he described his 'grand strategy."

He said that from the beginning he had a riv e r baseddefense and since
the possible points of contact were so extensive, heneeded both fixed
and mobile batteries.

The weakness of his force andlack of preparation

demanded he mask his effo rts; thus, he established Bethel ashis forward
outpost.

A fter securing Bethel, he decided the Warwick River line

anchored on Mulberry Island and Yorktown was the best true lin e of
defense since the original position at Jamestown would permit a landing
below i t and the encirclement of Yorktown.
manual labor was required.

Unfortunately, tremendous

I f Magruder could keep the Yankees beyond

Bethel, he could work without restriction; however, the more Magruder
learned about the lower Peninsula, the more he concluded a point defense
for the Poquoson and Back Rivers was required.

Because of logistical

problems, Magruder had established forward supply points to allow
himself to operate forward and defend forward.

Blocking the entrance to

the Warwick River protected his advanced positions.

Magruder thus had

three lines of defense, a forward position anchored on Young’ s M ill and
from the War Department. After Benjamin’ s resignation, Magruder’ s
sponsor, George Randolph, was named Secretary of War.
101OR, series 1, 4:720.
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Harrod’ s H ill; a second lin e beyond the Warwick River between Mulberry
Island and Yorktown; and a fin a l lin e before Williamsburg anchored on
Fort Hagruder.
Magruder concluded his explanatory remarks by describing the work
which remained to be done and commenting on Burnside’ s expedition.
Hagruder concluded that Burnside’ s movement was a diversion, while
McClellan moved via the Rappahannock River.

Hagruder suggested

Theopholls Holmes from Fredrlcksburg and he could attack McClellan’ s
flank or rear and i f pursued retreat to Gloucester Point drawing
McClellan into a siege.

Conversely, i f Suffolk was Burnside’ s ultimate

destination, then Magruder could cross the James River to support
Norfolk.

The success of either plan was contingent on completion of the

fo rtific a tio n s ; hence, the need for Negroes, and sufficient manpower,
hence, the muster of m ilit ia .102 The end of January found Magruder
with 14,801 men and 125 pieces of a r t ille r y .103 Within weeks, the
great Yankee spring campaign began to unfold and Magruder faced his
toughest challenge.
102QR, series 1, 9:38-42.
103Ib id ., 36-37.
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CHAPTER 4
CENTER STAGE
I t Is Impossible to portray the transition from antebellum
attitudes to a war mentality.

Southerners expected the results to be

quick, bloodless and decisive.

Since no one expected the war to last

longer than one b attle, the cream of Southern society flocked to the
ranks for service of up to 12 months or the duration of the war—
whichever was shorter.

There were certainly no illusions le f t when the

in it ia l terms of enlistment began to expire in March and April 1862.

A

string of Confederate reverses in the West, both Fort Henry and Fort
Donaldson in Tennessee, began to create the f ir s t shadows of uncertainty
for rebel arms.

However, nothing prepared them for the shock that

accompanied the loss of Roanoke Island and subsequent Federal operations
in the North Carolina coastal area.
Burnside’ s expedition assembled at Fort Monroe and a fte r creating
great consternation in Tidewater sailed out of Chesapeake Bay on
11 January.

When the fle e t reappeared o ff Hatteras Island and moved

into the Pamlico Sound between 13 and 25 January, the Carolinians were
unable to offer effective resistance.

On 8 February, Burnside quickly

defeated former Virginia Governor, General Henry Wise’ s small force
capturing 2,500.

Since Wise had asked for and been denied adequate

reinforcements, Secretary Benjamin was further embroiled in a
controversy that would lead to his resignation before the end of March.
99

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1

100
The strategic implications of Burnside’ s success completely skewed
Magruder’ s defensive scheme and Impacted every decision Richmond made
until McClellan moved against Magruder’ s lines two months la te r.
O fficia ls in Richmond logically concluded Burnside’ s maneuver was
undertaken to provide a southern approach to Norfolk.

Burnside’ s

subsequent advance to New Bern and Washington positioned him to move
towards Suffolk.

When the move was executed, Norfolk would be isolated

and ripe for capture.
Loss of Norfolk and the shipyard would severely damage the
Confederacy’ s warfighting capability.

The construction of the

revolutionary ironclad C.S.S. Virginia rMerrimackl and a sister ship
C.S.S. Richmond was a poorly kept secret.

Although these ships’

capabilities were unknown, o ffic ia ls hoped they might break the blockade
and open southern ports for European commerce.

The potential rewards of

this technology ju s tifie d a ll decisions relating to Norfolk.
Early in February intelligence reached Richmond that confirmed both
Richmond’ s and Magruder’ s fears.

Edward Moore, a p ilo t on the James

River, wrote Secretary of the Navy, Stephen Mallory, advising of a
conversation with a Yankee friend.

Moore reported that his friend said

the attack at Roanoke Island was preparatory for a subsequent
attack on Jamestown Island.

The move would have the dual purpose of

flushing the rebels out of both Norfolk and Yorktown.1
Confederate o ffic ia ls in Richmond logically reacted to meet the
Burnside threat by dispatching troops to North Carolina and the v ic in ity
10RN. series 1, 6:767. Normally, correspondence which says, "a
reliab le source" is by nature unreliable. However, this intelligence so
paralleled what Richmond expected that i t may have been credited.
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of Suffolk.

In doing so, Hagruder lost his f le x ib ilit y to operate on

any lim ited offensive basis.
The Merrimack was commissioned on 17 February 1862 but she, lik e
her sister ships, was plagued by a shortage of gunpowder.

Anxious

o ffic ia ls suggested that she come out at night and ram the Federals’
wooden vessels.

For whatever reasons, she was prudently kept unemployed

in the Elizabeth River.

Subsequent experiences with her deep draught

and lim ited maneuverability validated this decision.2
On 25 February, Special Orders number 45 alerted Magruder to
prepare troops for deployment to counter Burnside’ s threat to Suffolk.3
The rapidity of this decision superseded previous plans to which
Magruder had responded e a rlie r in the day.

In those plans, Richmond

suggested Magruder move against Newport News in coordination with the
emergence of the Merrimack.

Magruder noted the exceptionally poor

condition of the roads and the paucity of his force.

He concluded by

suggesting that since Newport News had been reinforced, i t might be
prudent to pull back to his secondary line on the Warwick River.4
Magruder’ s force remained re la tiv e ly static throughout February.
While reports showed an increase of about 800 men to 15,664, they were
2Ib id ., 771-80.
30R, series 1, 9:44-45.
40R, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 479-80. There was general
knowledge of the proposed action against Newport News and Magruder
certainly knew of the options. Corson noted on 18 February 1862 that
"General Magruder is in Richmond on business," Corson, 65-66. Henry
Carter wrote, "We w ill certainly make a move in the direction of Newport
News . . . everything forces me to the conclusion that we w ill attack
Newport News and that we w ill be aided in the attack by the Merrimac.
Patrick Henry, and Thomas Jefferson." Henry Carter, Deep Creek, to his
brother, William, 25 February 1862, Carter Family Papers.
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dispersed at 19 locations and over h alf, 7,837, were at the
Yorktown/Gloucester Point complex and Wynne’ s or Young’ s M111.5
Richmond o ffic ia ls did not share Magruder’ s concerns.

Magruder’ s

old friend, George Wythe Randolph was appointed Brigadier General and
placed in command of forces that were to be assembled at Suffolk.
Magruder warned Richmond o ffic ia ls that intelligence reports indicated a
Yankee move against him.

Consequently, Magruder requested the

deployment of the Merrimack to a point above Newport News to close the
James and the Warwick Rivers.6
Benjamin’ s response was d irect.

Despite a personal plea from the

anxious commander, Benjamin curtly replied, on 25 February, "We do not
believe you are in the slightest danger of an attack at present, either
in front or by being outflanked by naval forces . . . Suffolk is the aim
of the enemy."7 In the wake of this latest disagreement i t seems
remarkable that Magruder did not offer to resign.

Magruder’ s

convictions would not permit him to leave in the face of the enemy.
The pace of a c tiv ity quickened during the f ir s t week of March.
Burnside’ s movement against the North Carolina mainland seemed to
confirm a pending move towards Suffolk.

Although Magruder complied with

orders to prepare a large number of his troops for deployment, on
4 March he attempted to stay the execution of the order by writing to
General Cooper.

He detailed the implications for his command and

reminded him of his in a b ility to cooperate with the Merrimack or act
50R, series 1, 9:49.
6Ib id ., 50.
7Ib id ., 52-53.
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offensively.

Magruder noted that the deployment of 5,000 troops to

Suffolk would leave him with barely 4,000 troops to cover the twelve
mile Warwick River lin e , exclusive of the Yorktown/Gloucester Point
garrisons.

He advised that he might have to withdraw to Williamsburg.8

Although disappointed, Magruder did not retreat from his defensive
engineering effo rts.

He Immediately sought to compensate fo r his

pending manpower loss by so licitin g the recruitment of 1,000 m ilitia
which he offered to arm.

In response, Benjamin promised to send him a

combat regiment In lieu of the m ilit ia .9 At the same time, Benjamin
advised General Huger in Norfolk that he would send 5,000 of Magruder’ s
men and 2,000 North Carolinians to Suffolk when Burnside moved.10 On
6 March, Magruder conceded the In e v ita b ility of the deployment and while
cautioning that he would now be a s tric tly defensive force, promised to
8Ib1d., 51.
9QB, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 484-85. I t is important to
understand the diversity of tasks Magruder faced. He was attempting to
construct a bastion out of the swampy morass of the Peninsula. Every
cubic foot of earth which had to be moved was done by slaves and
soldiers. He was not digging ditches; these were fo rtific a tio n s of
considerable presence. He was responsible for managing a variable
workforce impressed from many sources. Operations in Gloucester and
Matthews counties were woefully inadequate due to insufficient manpower.
The Navy was commencing shipbuilding operations on the York River at
Glass Island, and Magruder was requisitioned to provide manpower for
those operations. Some of Magruder’ s troops volunteered for service
upon the C.S.S. Virginia and many were detailed to serve the naval
ordinance mounted along the rivers. The open h o s tility between Benjamin
and Magruder frustrated the la te r’ s efforts to articu late a Union
strategy that turned out to be precisely what McClellan had been
planning since January. Information on naval efforts at Glass Island
are detailed in RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 69, in multiple correspondence
between mid-February and late March.
100R, series 1, 9:56.
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obey orders.11 On 7 Harch, T. R. R. Cobb’ s Legion embarked from Kings
M ill Wharf fo r Suffolk via City Point and the Petersburg ra ilro a d .12
Hagruder must have been frustrated by the contradictory signals he
was receiving from Richmond.

He was fin a lly getting Negro labor in

adequate numbers to prosecute the numerous tasks s t i l l remaining;
however, Richmond o ffic ia ls repeatedly told him that he did not face any
threat.

S t ill Magruder continued to attack his departmental problems

with an evangelical fervor.
attention.

No detail was too insignificant to merit

A quick summary of administrative actions provided evidence

documenting Magruder’ s personal involvement.

In January, Magruder

withheld approval of a Major Ned Richtor’ s leave application until he
could submit his monthly reports correctly and on time; commanders were
chastised to report soldiers’ d is a b ilitie s on the proper forms;
suspicious deaths were investigated and death certificates issued;
reports of survey for lost or damaged equipment were ordered; s tric t
controls were placed on the importation of liquor; hospital staffing
practices were challenged; and discipline meted when appropriate.

There

were fo rty -s ix court martials in February, including two that tried
o ffic e rs .13
Tasks with direct m ilitary implications were pressing the commander
and he ordered his Provost Marshall in Yorktown, Stafford Cook, to use
a ll the Negroes between Yorktown and the Poquoson River to fix the main
" ib id ., 57.
12R£ 109, chapter 2, vol. 69, 7 March 1862.
13Ib id ., 4, 9, 13 January; 16, 22, 23, 27 February 1862; General
Orders numbers 143, 146, 150, and 153.
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road.

William Smith and Thomas Whitaker received sim ilar orders for the

roads around Williamsburg.14 Work continued on the earthworks at Lee’ s
M ill and Minor’ s farm.15
The net result of Magruder’ s Industry can been seen from a candid
assessment from Union General J. K. F. Mansfield 1n command at Fort
Butler, Newport News.

He reported that the rebels had 14 large

columblad naval guns at Gloucester Point; 3 separate batteries of
columblads on the water at Yorktown; 2 masked batteries of Dahlgren
guns, two miles below Yorktown; 10 columblads at Ship’ s Point; and on
the land side of Yorktown 10 other guns.

Mansfield further reported the

rebels had cotton and ta r on the wharves to use aboard fir e ships.16
This report undoubtedly influenced General McClellan’ s planning for the
upcoming campaign and perhaps persuaded him of the need for siege
ordinance as a backup plan.
The emergence of the Merrimack and the subsequent confrontations
between her, her consorts and the Federal fle e t polarized both Union and
Confederate planning.

On the Union’ s side, the Navy devoted herself

without exception to the containment and neutralization of the
Merrimack.

This perverted McClellan’ s plans for a combined land and sea

action to reduce and bypass Yorktown.

The few gunboats Admiral Louis

Goldsborough eventually provided were tim idly managed and of no use to
McClellan.
In Confederate circles, the limitations of the Merrimack were
14Ib id ., 24 February 1862.
15Ib id ., 28 February 1862.
160RN. series 1, 6:666-68.
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obvious; she was slow, had bad engines, and was confined to the deep
waters of the central channels of Hampton Roads.

She had been damaged

In the struggle with the Monitor and had lost her ram prow and sprung a
forward leak.

Confederate o ffic ia ls also realized that she drafted over

20 feet and could not ascend the James River.

While she returned to

drydock, engineers doubled th e ir efforts to modify and flo a t her sister
ship, C.S.S. Richmond.
As the threat on the lower Peninsula grew, General Lee returned to
Richmond on 13 March as President Davis’ s advisor.

Magruder reassessed

his capability to manage the Peninsula and realized that c iv il authority
had lost control and for the f i r s t time determined that martial law was
necessary to suppress lawlessness and punish murderers, thieves and
bootleggers.

General Huger had received sim ilar authority on

6 March.17 Davis agreed and authorized the declaration In the counties
of Elizabeth City, York, Warwick, Gloucester and Mathews.

Through

administrative oversight, James City County was omitted and when
Magruder requested that county be added to the l i s t , he received
approval with yet another stinging barb, " It is a matter of regret that
any want of p a rticu larity in specifying, what was required should now
render a change necessary."18
Despite the rebuke, Magruder was fu lly cognizant of the enemy’ s
17QB> series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 497.
18Ib id ., 502, 505, 518. Martial law provided Magruder the a b ility
to suspend normal c iv il lib e rtie s . The m ilitary was now the law. A
m ilitary police force was established, s t ills for spirituous liquors
were ordered destroyed, sale of liquor was controlled, Habeas Corpus was
suspended, and confinement of civilians for up to one month at hard
labor was authorized.
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p o ssib ilities.

He told Cooper that he did not believe the Yankees would

assault Norfolk d ire c tly .

He believed they would move up the James

River and cut Norfolk o ff by attacking the weaker defenses at Hardin’ s
B luff and Mulberry Island.

To prevent th is , Magruder requested the

redeployment of the Patrick Henrv. Jamestown and Teaser from Norfolk.19
Other authorities also perceived the threat and made
recommendations.

The Confederacy’ s chief engineer, Alfred Rives

concluded that the Monitor rendered the existing water batteries
ineffective and that Yorktown and Gloucester Point batteries should be
reengineered to elevate them above the trajectory of the Monitor’ s
guns.

Conversely, a ll riv e r batteries were deemed capable of

demolishing wooden ships, an opinion that was shared by Yankee ship
captains supporting McClellan.

Rives advised Magruder that he believed

the Confederates’ water communication with Richmond would be disrupted
i f the Monitor operated on the York River.

Confederate counterforce

options included development of armor piercing shells, water
obstructions, and torpedoes.20
Magruder responded by increasing the readiness of his reduced
department.

General Orders number 159, issued on 13 March, instructed

his commanders to be aggressive,
When any body of our troops, large or small meets with any
body of the enemy’ s troops, however large, the commanding
o ffice r of the troops w ill cause the enemy to be immediately
attacked, and the men w ill attack at once and furiously.21
19qr, series 1, 9:13-14;

ORN. series 1, 7::754.

20q s , series 1, 9:62-64; QB, series 1, vol.. 51, part 2, 499-501
21or, series 1, 9:65.
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Later the sane day, he advised Colonel Alfred Cunnings counandlng
his advance guard to hold Young’ s M ill without bringing on a fig h t.

He

also revealed for the f ir s t time his plans fo r tactical deception, "I am
maneuvering to give the enemy the idea that we are in great force. . . .
I have ordered a r t ille r y and other troops there [Bethel] to show that we
are in great strength.1,22
The next day Magruder gave Lee his departmental perspective.

Once

again the logic of his argument does him cred it, regardless of the
philosophic disagreement which appeared in Lee’ s response.

Magruder

said that while he was reduced to a defensive posture by the deployment
of 5,000 soldiers to Suffolk, he had been actively demonstrating in the
enemy's presence to discourage movements against him.

He remarked that

his Warwick River lin e was too long for his reduced force and with the
m ilitia picked over he would lik e his men returned from Suffolk.

He

also noted the pending expiration of the volunteers’ in it ia l tour of
service in April and suggested guidelines to prevent chaos when the
units reenlisted.23 Lee immediately suggested Magruder shorten his
defensive lines by building additional dams to flood the lands
surrounding the Warwick River.24 He said the threat to Suffolk was
s t i l l too real to return Magruder’ s detachment.25 On 18 March, Lee
told Magruder that there was no evidence McClellan would move on the
22J. B. Magruder, B a rtle tt’ s to Colonel Cummings, Young’ s M ill,
13 March 1862, ALS in John B. Magruder Papers, Eleanor S. Brockenbrough
Library, Museum of the Confederacy, Richmond.
^OR, series 1, 9:65-67.
24Ib id ., 68.
25Ib id ., 70-71.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Peninsula and he encouraged Magruder to "maneuver as to deceive and
thwart him."26 The next day, 19 March, Magruder directed Colonel
Johnston, chief of his cavalry, and Brigadier General McLaws to show
themselves prominently.27 This Increased a c tiv ity helped convince
McClellan that Magruder was stronger than he really was.
Uncomfortable politicians pressed the Davis administration for
reports on the security arrangements of Richmond.

Engineer Alfred Rives

provided President Davis with a satisfactory report that lauded the
effectiveness of Magruder’ s efforts to advance the James River defensive
line from Jamestown to Mulberry Island.

Davis’ s report to Congress

said,
The next position above [the mouth of the James River]
defended by the work at Hardy’ s [Hardin’ s] Bluff and Mulberry
Island possesses great importance from being the right flank of
Magruder’ s chosen defensive line . . . The guns at Jamestown
Island w ill probably be removed to the position [Mulberry] just
referred to as soon as i t is fu lly prepared for them.
Magruder was s t i l l uncomfortable with his arrangements and he again
pressed Lee with a new strategy.

Magruder was convinced the Monitor

would move up the shallow northern bank of the James River with 20,000
troops landing behind Randolph in Suffolk.

He suggested the James River

be completely blocked at Jamestown and the Merrimack be deployed near
Fort Monroe.

Under such an arrangement Magruder believed he could

defend Williamsburg, Jamestown, and Yorktown.29 Unfortunately before
“ C lifford Dowdey and Louis Manarin, eds., The Wartime Papers of R.
E. Lee (New York: Bramhall House, 1961), 132.
27B£ 109, chapter 2, vol. 68.

Special Orders numbers 688 and 691.

280RN. series 2, 2:170.
^OR, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 386-88.
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Ill
any action could be Implemented, McClellan began to move his force
towards Fort Monroe.
Magruder recoiled when the presence of Helntzelman’ s I I I Corps
became known at Fortress Monroe.

Except for the 10th Georgia regiment

and some 500 cavalry, a ll Magruder’ s troops retreated Immediately to the
Warwick River lin e .

He advised Lee that his advanced lin e was s t i l l the

best lin e of defense and with 30,000 he could both defend his position
and capture the Yankee garrison at Newport News.

He implored Lee for a

timely decision,
I f heavy reinforcements are sent here, I would lik e to know
at once, that I may throw up fo rtific a tio n s at points which, i f
we should not want them ourselves, i t is extremely important
that the enemy should not hold, such as from Langhorne’ s M ill
to Bethel, and from Young’ s to Harwood’ s M ill, which are almost
en tire ly impregnable i f held by a sufficient number of troops
but en tirely untenable unless so manned.
Magruder’ s alacrity demonstrated his awareness of the enemy.
Updates concerning Yankee reinforcements were reported accurately.
Hospitals were expanded and extra surgeons designated to detect
skulkers.31 Special Orders number 697 sealed o ff water transport and
restricted transport movements at Gloucester Point and Yorktown to those
“ ib id ., 389-91. Magruder was earnest in his plea, a number of
sources w ill be cited la te r, but the testimony of one Yankee is
appropriate here, "As we came out the woods at one point, we could see a
deserted rebel fo rt in the middle of a swamp to the right of the road.
I t was b u ilt square and in a substantial manner with barracks inside of
i t , a ditch nine feet deep a ll around i t , fille d with water and an
abatis, bushes, and stumps of trees. Near i t was an in fe rio r work
p a rtia lly masked; the place could not have been stormed." Alfred
Davenport, Camp and Field Life of the Fifth New York Volunteer Infantry
(New York: Dick and Fitzgerald, 1879; reprint, Gaithersburg, MD:
Butternut Press, 1984), 163.
31RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 69, Magruder to B. S. Ewell, 24 March 1862.
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personally authorized by Magruder.32
Magruder’ s task was made easier by the exceptionally d if f ic u lt
te rra in .

Corson observed, "The mud around our quarters is knee deep and

is very offensive."33 General McLaws wrote,
This country is so much cut up by these areas of the sea
and inland riv ers, with th eir accompanying marshes and boggy
water trib u ta ries , that i t is impossible to move through except
along the main roads. Thus, i t is impossible to make use of a
large force and the tremendous odds against us cannot be as
formidable as elsewhere.
Regardless, Magruder would soon need help for his l i t t l e army of
11,000 and on 25 March he advised his friend Secretary George Randolph,
that a council of war determined that 10,000 additional troops were
needed to make his lin e tenable.

He wrote,

He yield the best lin e for Richmond and that i f the
Peninsula is lo s t, Norfolkmust necessarily f a ll and the
Virginia must be captured.
Lee responded by asking General Joseph E. Johnston, whose army was
pulling back from Manassas, i f he could reinforce the Peninsula.36
While awaiting an answer, Lee told Magruder to prepare for the worst
case, a withdrawal behind the Chickahominy River, i f McClellan were to
pass his position by the riv e r.

Lee also refused to commit to the

defense of the Peninsula until he was sure of McClellan’ s intentions,
I t w ill no doubt be the policy of the enemy to disguise his
intention by threatening one point while preparing to attack
32RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 68.

S.O. 697.

33Corson, 71.
^McLaws, Curtis Farm, to his wife, 31 March 1862, McLaws Papers.
350R, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 395.
“ ib id ., 397.
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the other . . . use every means in your power to obtain
Information on this point.
Hagruder Increased his vigilance by dispatching Captain Jefferson
C. Phillips and twenty of the Old Dominion Dragoons to Ship’ s Point on
the Poquoson River.

He Instructed commanders to remove resources to

previously prepared bombproofs and develop retreat routes.

He

Instructed engineers to build a m ilitary road to expedite troop
movements between points on the Warwick River lin e .

All troops were to

keep three days cooked rations.38 Yet he also Instructed his men to
maintain th e ir front "as i t 1s very important for us for the enemy to
suppose that Harwood H ills 1s occupied.”39 Magruder’ s General Orders
number 168 advised the army that 1t would fight on the Warwick River
lin e .

Infantry were reminded to support the a r t ille r y , and troops were

exhorted to be prepared to move whenever necessary.40
Although Lee was not yet ready to commit to the Peninsula; Hagruder
was prepared.

Lafayette McLaws, in command of 13 regiments, summarized

Magruder’ s considerable accomplishments,
This Peninsula presents a very unfavorable fie ld for the
operations of a large force, i t is bounded as you know on one
side by the York River and the other by the James River . . .
Yorktown is very completely fo rtifie d , to resist both an attack
by land and by water. . . . [Mulberry Point] Battery is
protected by land attack by a heavy work around an elevated
point a h alf mile distant. When everything is completed, the
place w ill be stronger than Yorktown. . . . We have dammed up
that riv e r [Warwick River] at various points so that most of
the country is flooded from a point under the guns at Yorktown
37Dowdey, 137.
“ RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 68, Special Orders numbers 700 and 702.
39Ib id ., Magruder to Colonel Winston, 27 March 1862.
40QR, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 410-11.
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to the head of the tidewater of James River, so that when the
works defending the dams are completed our direct front w ill be
re ally strong. . . . Our lin e of defense w ill run from Yorktown
down Warwick River with Its dams to Lee’ s M ill, thence across
to S k iff Creek. Our troops being concentrated behind that line
any part can reinforce any other.
The next two weeks marked the apogee of Magruder’ s m ilitary career.
Lee was completely convinced that McClellan would attack Norfolk despite
evidence to the contrary.*2 William Corson on picket duty at Young’ s
M ill wrote, "The enemy have been more annoying than ever, running 1n our
pickets nearly every day . . . our regiment evacuates and reoccuples
this place upon an average, about three times a week."43 Magruder’ s
cavalry reported the enemy in force near Bethel.44 Magruder asked
Commodore Josiah T attn all, Commander of the Merrimack, to attack troop
transports near the James River and i f successful, maneuver to the York
River and attack there as w ell.

He had previously c ritic ize d the delay

in returning the Merrimack to action and provoked an angry defensive
response from Sydney Lee, commanding the Gosport Naval Shipyard.
Magruder appealed to T attn all, "We have a country to save and no time
for individual duels."45
Magruder was convinced of his vulnerability and he appealed
directly to Randolph to bring both Johnston and Huger to the Peninsula.
He insisted that McClellan would win i f he were allowed to join up with
41McLaws, Curtis Farm, to his wife, 31 March 1862, McLaws Papers.
42QB, series 1, 9:455.
43Corson, 73-74.
^RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 275, Colonel Johnston to Magruder, 2 April
1862.
450RN. series 1, 7:755.
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other forces in front of Richmond.46
When McClellan moved on 4 A p ril, he believed he could bypass
Yorktown and move rapidly towards Richmond, however, Magruder was as
prepared as McClellan was misinformed.

A fter encountering unexpected

sporadic f ir e from a Confederate redoubt of unknown strength at Lee's
M111, Union General Erasamus Keyes was discouraged and he abandoned his
march to the Halfway House between Yorktown and Williamsburg.
Magruder’ s security was so tig h t that Federal engineers had been unable
to determine the true course of the Warwick River or the Confederates’
lin e .47
Once McClellan moved, Lee was under intense pressure to help
Magruder.

Until the help arrived, the Commander of the Peninsula was

equal to the challenge and he acted to deceive McClellan and his
intelligence chief, Allan Pinkerton.
the illusions created.

Of many commentaries, four typify

Jubal Early wrote,

The assuming and maintaining of the lin e by Magruder with
his small force in the face of such overwhelming odds [seven to
one] was one of the boldest exploits ever performed by a
m ilitary commander, and he had so maneuvered his troops by
displaying them rapidly at d ifferent points as to produce the
impression on his opponent that he had a large army.
An English v is ito r, Colonel Arthur Freemantle spoke with Magruder la te r
^QR, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 422.
47General McClellan claimed the map provided him, which was
prepared by Engineer Cram, misled him. In fact, the famous map did not
accurately portray the course of the Warwick River. Consequently,
McClellan’ s plans to seize a point across the rebels’ lin e of retreat
were impractical and the resistance McClellan encountered forced him to
recoil and reevaluate his offensive strategy.
^Jubal Early, War Memoirs (Bloomington:
1960), 59.

Indiana University Press,
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and described Magruder*s a rtis try ,
Officers shouted conmands to imaginary units, a few carts
were paraded past openings to simulate a long wagon tra in ,
soldiers marched continuously.
Colonel Jesse Gove of the 22d Massachusetts noted "A large body of
infantry was observed in th e ir works apparently at evening parade, th e ir
band playing D ixie."50 On McClellan’ s own s ta ff the French Prince de
Jo in ville wrote,
General McClellan . . . deceived by appearances did . . .
not dare to thrust his sword through the slight curtain which
his able adversary had spread before his vision.
Although Magruder succeeded in checking McClellan’ s early advance,
because of previous shortfalls in the labor force, he had a lo t of work
yet to finish on the earthworks.
proved correct.

I t was ironic that his predictions had

With lim ited resources and very l i t t l e government

support, he crafted the lower Peninsula into a defensible G ibraltar.
had te rtia ry defensive lines and multiple plans.

He

Now that McClellan and

his army were at hand, he was fin a lly able to get the support he needed
to turn dreams into tangible contingencies.

Soldiers poured into his

ranks, nearly 20,000 in the f ir s t week.52 An 8 April appeal from
Magruder to General Lee asked for 1,000 or more Negro workers to
construct earthworks along his possible lin e of re tre a t.53 Magruder’ s
49Arthur J. L. Freemantle, The Freemantle Diarv. ed. Walter Lord
(Boston: L it t le , Brown, and Company, 1954), 258-59.
50OR, series 1, vol. 11, part 1, 297.
51Richard Wheeler, Sword Over Richmond. An Eyewitness History of
McClellan’ s Peninsula Campaign (New York: Fairfax Press, 1986), 119.
520R, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 436.
53Ibid, 430-431.
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appeal to the local citizenry, that "without the most lib eral assistance
In axes, spades, and hands to work, we cannot hope to succeed"54
received generous support.
Unfortunately, Magruder was soon going to lose his command.
General Joseph E. Johnston was commander of the primary Confederate army
in V irg in ia.55 During nearly eight months as he fronted McClellan,
Johnston created schemes of grand strategy but took no combat action
other than to withdraw from his positions near Centerville, Virginia, to
a lin e behind the Rappahannock River.
On 25 March, when Lee asked Johnston i f he could help Magruder or
Huger, Johnston had balked.

He believed the best way to handle

McClellan and get him o ff the Peninsula was to attack countervalue
targets 1n the North.

Lee believed the destruction of the Union army

should be th e ir objective and Johnston was ordered to Richmond.

Part of

Johnston’ s army under D. H. H ill continued on to Yorktown and was soon
established in Magruder’ s lin e on 11 A pril.
H ill was not what Magruder needed.

H ill reported something

en tirely d ifferen t than what McClellan saw,
The defenses [Warwick Line] were of the weakest character
and the radical mistake had been made of leaving the dense
timber standing almost within a stones throw of the redoubts
. . . . Yorktown it s e lf was surrounded by the most defective
system of fo rtific a tio n s . The magazines were of the flim siest
54Ib id ., 437.
55Johnston was one the senior generals in the South, but he proved
to be vain and petty. When President Davis named fu ll generals,
Johnston was made subordinate to Robert E. Lee and others. Since
Johnston had been second ranking o fficer in the old army and Lee was a
Colonel, Johnston f e lt slighted. He protested in a vigorous and mean
manner. President Davis was so infuriated that he dressed Johnston down
in a very curt le tte r which did not start "My Dear General."
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character and the gun which enfiladed one face would give a
reverse fir e on another. Heavy details were kept at work day
and night to remedy the defects.
Unfortunately for Magruder, Johnston was en route and he was senior
to Magruder.

War Department Special Orders number 6, dated 12 April

1862, ended the l i f e of Hagruder’ s department.

Johnston visited the

Peninsula on 12 April and he did not lik e what he saw.

After a one day

survey, Johnston returned to advise President Davis that the entire area
was unsuited for "offensive operations."

While he conceded the Warwick

River line would be strong against a frontal assault, Johnston believed
i t could

be easily turned on either

H ill continued his

tirade and wrote

riv e r.

From Yorktown on13A pril,

to Randolph,

I
find this place to ta lly unprepared for a siege. . . .
There can be no doubt that he 1s
bringing up heavy siege guns
. . . The lig h t guns in redoubts numbers four and five w ill be
knocked out in h alf hour.
As Magruder’ s command staggered toward its termination, the
interaction necessary to hold the Peninsula continued.

After two weeks

of debate in which Lee and others considered sending the Merrimack to
the York River to relieve Yorktown, Commodore Tattnall advised Secretary
Mallory that while the York River passage appeared impractical,
I shall act with proper prudence for with the Virginia at
the mouth of the James River, the enemy’ s operations in that
direction may be checked which w ill aid the plans of General
Magruder as I understand them.
Magruder was s t i l l working hard and staffer Joseph L. Brent
recorded the progress of defensive works,
56QB, series 1, vol. 11, part 1, 601.
570R, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 439.
580RN. series 1, 7:223.
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Up the slopes of the bank, the engineers dug small ditches
above and below the dams throwing out the earth to serve as
breastworks on the riv er side and at the dams were thrown up
large earthworks for a r t ille r y .59
At the same time on 14 A p ril, 1n Richmond, Johnston and his lieutenants
Gustavus Smith and James Longstreet were arguing against a move to the
Peninsula.

Unfortunately, Magruder was not Invited to the conference.

Why? One can only speculate that he was not part of the Confederacy’ s
primary fighting team; therefore, he was excluded from inner circles.
While Lee and Randolph specified the strategic implications of
Magruder’ s lines, only Magruder could provide the detailed knowledge of
the defensive character of the country.

Magruder’ s exclusion was

another slap and a judgmental error.
Smith detailed the specifics of the Richmond meeting in his
Confederate War Papers.

Johnston and Smith agreed the Peninsula would

confine the movements of th eir army, a fact which McClellan had already
discovered.

At Johnston’ s behest, Smith proposed a defensive force be

assembled in front of Richmond, drawing a ll the available troops from
the coastal defenses in Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina.
Smith argued that Magruder and Huger had sufficient forces for a defense
of the lower Peninsula.
Richmond.

I f they were bypassed they would f a ll back to

Smith continued with Johnston’ s preferred strategy—an

invasion of the North.

Such a move would disrupt Union morale and cause

the Lincoln administration to recall McClellan from the Peninsula.
Both Secretary Randolph and General Lee disagreed with Johnston’ s
strategy.

The maintenance of the Gosport shipyard was indispensable to

59Joseph L. Brent, Memoirs of the War Between the States (New
Orleans: Fontana Printing Co., 1940), 101.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

r

120
Confederate strategy.

Any disruption In production, no matter how

temporary, would hamper the Confederacy’ s plans.

Temporary Union

possession of the Gosport would result In unacceptable damage to the
Infrastructure of the shipyard.

Lee continued by denying Johnston’ s

proposal to withdraw troops from other states.

He believed such action

would cripple morale by permitting Federal occupation of Confederate
te rrito ry at l i t t l e cost.60 The 14 April meeting lasted well into the
evening and afte r hearing a ll the arguments President Davis overruled
Johnston and ordered him to defend Magruder’ s lin e .

While Johnston le f t

the meeting secretly pledged to his own agenda,61 the Government’ s
strategic concerns were clearly expressed 1n a le tte r Randolph wrote to
D. H. H ill on 25 A p ril,
I f the Peninsula were merely at stake, we should not
hesitate to evacuate i t . . . .B u t Norfolk would go, almost our
entire Navy would be lo st, an Immense amount of material would
be captured and we should gain no better position nearer to
Richmond for the defense of the c ity . There is much that can’ t
be trusted to paper and I must request you destroy th is.
The actions Randolph referred to were the completion of the C.S.S.
Richmond and a series of gunboats which, with the Merrimack, would
master Hampton Roads and break the blockade.

Workers at Gosport were

working day and night to complete her.63 Johnston must have been told
“ Gustavus Smith, Confederate War Papers (New York:
Printers, 1884), 42-44.

Crawford

61General Johnston bluntly stated he was able to accept the results
of the meeting because of his conviction that circumstances would compel
adoption of his strategy la te r. Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of
M ilita ry Operations (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1874), 116.
“ OR, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 464.
“ ORN. series 1, vol. 7, 772-774, 779-80, 783-84.
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this when he went to Richmond.
Randolph la te r te s tifie d to the Confederate Congress about
Magruder’ s splendid preparations,
By availing himself of the Warwick River, a small stream
which runs through a low, marshy country from near Yorktown to
the James River, General Magruder constructed an entrenched
lin e across the [13 mile] Peninsula, and with equal s k ill and
In tre p id ity had thus fa r successfully checked every attempt to
break I t , though the enemy was vastly superior 1n numbers to
the troops under his command. . . . As a second lin e of
defense, a system of detached works had been constructed by
General Magruder near Williamsburg, about twelve miles 1n rear
of the f i r s t lin e , where the width of the Peninsula available
fo r the passage of troops was only three or four miles. The
advantage thus secured to our forces, i f they should be
compelled to re trea t, w ill be readily appreciated.
I t was readily apparent from the commencement of Johnston’ s
command that he did not intend to defend Magruder’ s lin e .
the Peninsula only long enough to create an audit t r a i l .

He stayed on
On 22 April

Johnston wrote to Lee,
Labor enough has been expended here to make a very strong
position, but i t h«is been wretchedly misapplied by the young
engineer o fficers.
Not everyone shared Johnston’ s views.

18th Virginia Captain Henry T.

Owens wrote his wife, "Magruder is a capital general and has made the
strongest defenses here I ever saw."66
After Johnston arrived, s ta ff cooperation seemed to breakdown.
Magruder was placed in command of the right wing, the largest in the
army, but he could not get D. H. H ill to agree to swap some fie ld
“ Smith, Confederate War Papers. 52-53.
650E, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 455.
“ Captain H. T. Owens to Harriet Owens, 24 April 1862, ALS in Henry
T. Owens Papers, Archives, Virginia State Library, Richmond.
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a r tille r y that he had le f t at Yorktown.67
Johnston apparently did not seek Magruder’ s opinion as former
commander; consequently, he was le f t the embarrassing option of
communicating his Insights by mall.

On 24 April Magruder

encouragedthe

commanding general to draw the Federals Into a controlled advancewhich
could be attacked.68 Johnston’ s plan was entirely differen t and on
30 A pril, he repeated his 14 April plan In a le tte r to Lee,
We must, therefore, change our course, take the offensive,
collect a ll the troops we have 1n the east and cross the
Potomac with them, while Beauregard, with a ll we have In the
west, invades Ohio. Our troops have always wished for
the
offensive, and so does the country.
When Johnston le f t the Warwick River lin e on 3 May, he le f t a
frustrated and embittered group of Peninsula veterans.

In the 32d

Virginia, a lo cally recruited regiment, about 80 men deserted.70 Terry
Jones noted in Lee’ s Tigers that the Tigers were so well entrenched that
in one 24 hour period, 11 A p ril, they had taken over 300 shells in camp
at a cost of only three wounded.71 At Wynne’ s M ill James Williams
wrote to his aunt,
We are not allowed to return fir e and i t is the most
provoking thing in the world. We so strongly fo rtifie d that
they can’ t hurt us at a l l , and we haven’ t ammunition enough to
be wasting any, we are reserving our f ir e t i l l they make a
67QB, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 451.
“ ib id ., 462-63.
“ ib id ., 477.
^Jensen, 61-62.
71Jones, Tigers. 57.
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general attack.72
The selge of Yorktown was basically devoid of significant
m ilita ry a c tiv ity .
on 16 A p ril.

The only noteworthy action occurred at Dam #1

Here the Second Brigade of General William French

Smith and five Vermont regiments, 2d, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th,
surprised Colonel Robert McKinney’ s 15th North Carolina.

They

crossed the Warwick River and temporarily held the Confederate
works; however, a counterattack under General Howell Cobb drove
the Federals back and the action ended.

The 3d Vermont suffered

f i f t y percent of the 165 Union casualties and the Confederates
lost 43 k ille d and wounded.73
Magruder did not make the retreat with his command.

He had been

sick and Johnston granted him a furlough to recover his health.

General

D. R. Jones directed the right wing on its retreat.
The subsequent battle of Williamsburg, a rear guard action on
5 May, provided another example of Johnston’ s misuse of the bounteous
resources provided by Magruder.

While Johnston and Davis exchanged

written jabs after the war concerning Johnston’ s mismanagement of the
Peninsula campaign and the battle of Williamsburg,74 two other credible
sources tilte d the scale of blame to Johnston.

Colonel Richard Maury,

^Williams, Wynne’ s M ill to his Aunt Mary, 27 April 1862, Williams
Papers.
^B attle reports are contained in OR, series 1, vol. 11, part 1,
364-380, 415-22.
74Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government
(New York: Appleton and Company, 1881), 2:94. Joseph E. Johnston,
"Manassas to Seven Pines,"in Battles and Leaders of the C ivil War, eds.
Clarence Buel and Robert Johnson, (New York: Century, 1888; reprint,
Secaucus NJ: Blue and Grey Press, nd) 2:205.
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24th V irginia, wrote,
The prudent forethought of General Magruder had fo rtifie d a
lin e just below Williamsburg across the narrow Peninsula . . .
the right and center which Longstreet occupied, but through an
oversight or carelessness the le f t remained open.
I t remained for Maury, Early and the 24th Virginia to reclaim i t from
General Winfield Hancock with a dramatic charge during the Battle of
Williamsburg.

A concurring opinion was inadvertently written

independently by Gustavus Smith, Johnston’ s friend and second in
command,
His [General Magruder’ s] absence at this moment was the
more to be regretted as i t appears that the positions of the
redoubts he had constructed were not a ll known to the
commanding general [Johnston] and some of them being unoccupied
were seized by the enemy and held subsequently to our
disadvantage.
After 30 d if f ic u lt days of seige operations, Magruder wrote a
descriptive and h eartfelt postscript for his department that was
submitted the day of the Yorktown evacuation.

His c re d ib ility was

enhanced by his modest claims which were soon confirmed in enemy
reports.

Magruder noted,

1 had prepared as my real lin e of defense positions in
advance at Harwood’ s and Young’ s M ills. Both flanks of this
lin e were defended by boggy and d iff ic u lt streams and swamps
. . . . The le f t flank was defended by an elaborate
fo rtific a tio n at Ship’ s Point connected by a broken lin e of
redoubts crossing the heads of various creeks . . . In my
opinion, this advanced lin e with its flank defenses might have
been held by twenty thousand. With twenty-five thousand, I did
not believe i t could have been broken.
^Colonel Richard L. Maury, "The Battle of Williamsburg", SHSP.
22 : 111.

76Smith, 53-54.
^RB, 12:483.
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Magruder then wrote about the Warwick lin e ,
The lin e was Incomplete in Its preparations, owing to the
fact that a thousand negro laborers, whom 1 had engaged In
fo rtify in g were taken from me and discharged by superior orders
In December las t and a delay of nine weeks consequently
occurred before I could reorganize the laborers for the
engineers. . . . Every preparation was made In anticipation of
another attack by the enemy. The men slept 1n the trenches
under arms.
Magruder and his immediate s ta ff departed the Army before the
battle at Williamsburg and proceeded via steamer to Westover Plantation.
Magruder was exhausted by the strain of the previous months.79 He did
not believe i t was necessary to evacuate the line in front of
Williamsburg and his engineer Lieutenant Henry T. Douglas reported that
he was very emotional.80
Unfortunately, Magruder’ s convalescent leave was too short.

The

action at Williamsburg stirred his blood and he wrote several letters to
Richmond offering his views on an appropriate strategy.

Unable to

remain inactive, Magruder rejoined his command at Bottom’ s Bridge on
9 May.81
Apparently, Magruder was not respected by Johnston’ s s ta ff so i t is
not surprising that he was not given a combat role in the main
Confederate army.

He appeared to be frozen out of discussions of policy

and despite considerable expertise on the Peninsula was forced to resort
reIbid.
^Brent, 114.
“ H. T. Douglas to Mr. Bryan, 25 February 1909, TLS, Eleanor S.
Brockenbrough Library, Museum of the Confederacy, Richmond.
810R, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 532, 554; OR, series 1, vol. 11,
part 3, 494-95.
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to correspondence to convey Ideas to the commanding general.

The

contrast between Magruder and Johnston helps explain Magruder’ s
d iffic u ltie s .

Both men were 55 years old, as was General Lee, Johnston

had risen to Brigadier General, Lee to Colonel, and Magruder to
Lieutenant Colonel 1n the old army.

General McLaws wrote,

There is a very great contrast between the two commanders,
. . . General Magruder is fond of dress and parade and of
company, conceals nothing and delights to have a crowd about
him to whom he converses freely upon any and a ll subjects. He
never moves from his headquarters without having fiv e or six
aides and a dozen «• more orderlies. . . . can ta lk twenty-four
hours incessantly.
Of Johnston, McLaws claims,
Our commander-in-chief, General Johnston who is a very
quiet, stern man, le ttin g his plans to no one . . . w ill never
speak on o ffic ia l matters but to the person interested,
dislikes to have a crowd about him, never mentions m ilitary
matters when away from his o ffice—often rides o ff alone . . .
Dresses neat, but not pompous—interviews are yes/no with no
detailed discussion of the matter.
When Magruder returned to active command on 9 May, he discovered
his troops had been placed under overall command of Major General
Gustavus Smith, Johnston’ s second-in-command and a personal friend of
Johnston.

Magruder understood that the arrangement was temporary to

f a c ilita te command and control during the retreat; however, sparks flew
when Smith disregarded Magruder’ s advice and told him to lim it his
correspondence to business hours unless a battle was imminent.
Magruder’ s temper flared and he retorted in a le tte r dripping with
sarcasm.

Magruder wrote to Smith that he led his command without regard

“ McLaws to his wife, 25 April 1862, McLaws Papers.
“ ibid.
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for duty hours, but he would comply with Smith's request.84 I t is
ironic that two men with health problems would compare and contrast
command techniques; however, neither seemed to be e ffe c tiv e .85
There is l i t t l e doubt that Magruder had outlived his usefulness in
V irg in ia.

The absorption of his department Into Johnston's command and

Johnston’ s unwillingness to entrust him with combat actions must have
marked him fo r reassignment.
Magruder’ s friend Randolph believed the Confederacy lacked a cogent
Trans-Mississippi policy and he worked hard to s o lic it President Davis’ s
support for a new department.

When General Mansfield Lovell lost the

port of New Orleans in A p ril, a great cry went out fo r competent
leadership.

Richmond d ia ris t, Mary Chesnut, whose husband James was a

government insider wrote, "Magruder is to supersede Lovell, . . .

On our

side, Yankees are unlucky to say the le a s t."86 Clearly, there was no
h o s tility towards Magruder in that declaration and apparently, he was
well regarded.

In fa c t, Magruder received a much greater plum—command

of the newly created Trans-Mississippi Department.87
On 26 May, three days a fte r the orders were given, Lee wrote to
General P. 0. Herbert, commanding in Texas, and advised him of the
formation of the new d is tric t comprised of Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana
W0R, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 528-29.
85Magruder’ s health problems persisted. Two weeks la te r, Smith
suffered a nervous breakdown one day a fte r Johnston’ s wounding at Seven
Pines. This paved the way for Lee’ s elevation to command of the Army of
Northern Virginia.
“ Chesnut, 228.
87QR, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 528-29.
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(west of the Mississippi) and Texas, "Major General Magruder w ill be
assigned to the command as soon as he 1s relieved from his present
position."88 For Johnston, the news was a g i f t , and he relieved
Magruder before the Ink was dry on the orders.

One of Johnston’ s aides,

Major A. P. Mason advised General McLaws that there was no need to send
a copy o f recent orders to Magruder as he had been relieved of command
with the army.89

In the presence of the enemy, Magruder was not w illin g

to leave yet, and he successfully appealed to Randolph to stay the
orders.

Johnston, who had placed McLaws In command, was furious and

refused to take Magruder back.

When Johnston refused to rescind the

orders, Randolph issued Special Orders number 120, reassigning Magruder
to Johnston.90 A few days la te r, the issue lapsed when both Johnston
and Smith le f t the army a fte r the Battle of Seven Pines on 31 May and 1
June.

Johnston was wounded and Smith had a nervous breakdown.

General

Lee followed them In command.
Lee’ s command was lik e a breath of fresh a ir for Magruder.

Lee not

only understood Magruder, but he appreciated the fine job he had done on
the Peninsula.

Magruder did not hesitate to offer his expertise and

insight.91
Lee realized that army reorganization was needed.

The Peninsula

campaign had drawn together every significant Major General in Virginia
“ QB, series 1, 9:713.
^War Department, Rebel Records, "Correspondence of Confederate
General and S taff O fficers," Lafayette McLaws Papers, RG 109, A. P.
Mason to McLaws, 25 May 1852, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^OB, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 551.
’ ’ ib id ., 593.
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and North Carolina.

There was so much need across the Confederacy; he

undoubtedly planned to reassign many of the generals once McClellan was
turned back.
Magruder’ s stock was very high with Lee.

Since Lee had developed

the defensive scheme for the South Carolina coast and had just departed
South Carolina in March, he had a personal stake in her security.

When

General John C. Pemberton lost the confidence of the p o litic a lly
significant South Carolina clique, a replacement was needed.

Governor

Pickens advised President Davis that Generals Huger, Longstreet, or
Magruder would be acceptable.

On 21 June, General Cooper recommended

Magruder for the job; although he had pending orders to the TransMississippi Department, Lee’ s 25 June indorsement to Davis said, "I
hardly see how the removal of Pemberton can be avoided, Magruder is the
best person [better than Longstreet or Huger?] who is available to
relieve him."92
Why was Magruder so respected?

Maybe i t was his complete devotion

to the cause; an 18 June le tte r to McLaws said, "Take command until I
arrive . . . Though quite sick I w ill be on the ground i f anything of
importance takes place."93
920R, series 1, 14:560.
^OR, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 608.
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CHAPTER 5
DEPORTED?
Magruder requested a delay in the execution of his orders to
command the Trans-Mississippi Department from 23 May through 2 July.
One might be surprised i f any general commanding 13,000 men in his home
state facing an enemy force in excess of 100,000 men, 10 miles from his
country’ s capital would volunteer to leave before the current campaign
was over.

I t is a mistake to conclude that Lee "deported" Magruder to

Texas following the "Seven Days" battles.

S t i l l , events that occurred

during the campaign may have expedited Magruder’ s desire to depart Lee’ s
army.
After Johnston and McClellan fought to a standstill at the battle
of Seven Pines on 31 May and 1 June, McClellan settled down to await
reinforcements, specifically Irvin McDowell’ s Corps.

McDowell had been

withheld by Lincoln to provide a covering force for Washington.

With

McClellan in the v ic in ity of Richmond, Lincoln decided on 8 June to
permit McDowell to "cooperate" with him.

This conditional support

required McDowell to maneuver while remaining between Richmond and
Washington.

I f McClellan wanted to use McDowell, he would have to

extend his right flank towards the north near Mechanicsville.

This

maneuver forced McClellan’ s army to straddle the Chickahominy River.
McClellan chose the Corps of his friend Fitz John Porter to make
the linkup.

This divided the Union army with 36,000 men north of the
130
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Chickahominy, over 80,000 men south of the riv e r and l e f t Lee with an
a ttractive target.

At Lee’ s behest, Major General Thomas "Stonewall*

Jackson had engaged in a series of b r illia n t tactical marches and
battles during la te May and early June popularly known as the Valley
Campaign of 1862.

Jackson’ s success preyed on the Lincoln

administration’ s insecurities concerning Washington.

When Jackson

fought at Cross Keys and Port Republic on 9 June, Lincoln ordered
McDowell to regroup in the v ic in ity of Fredericksburg.
McClellan was unaware of the administration’ s decision and he
continued to hold Porter’ s Corps "1n the air" on his right wing awaiting
McDowell.

A fter receiving valuable intelligence from cavalry commander

J. E. B. Stuart, Lee secretly recalled Jackson from the Valley and
determined to mass his army north of the Chickahominy River to strike
Porter.

The planned maneuver would not only destroy 30 percent of

McClellan’ s force, but i t would sever McClellan’ s supply depot at White
House Landing.

Speed was essential since Stuart, by riding around

McClellan’ s army between 12 and 15 June, had alerted McClellan to his
supply lin e ’ s vulnerability.
Lee contemplated McClellan’ s lethargy and deliberately decided to
create an imbalance where the majority of his army would face Porter
north of the Chickahominy River.

Conversely, Lee bet that an entrenched

minority of his troops could delude and defend against nearly 80,000
bluecoats south of the Chickahominy River.

Lee believed that he would

be able to rapidly sh ift forces i f McClellan became active.

The man Lee

selected to hold McClellan’ s attention was Bankhead Magruder.
On 24 June 1862, Lee’ s Chief of S taff, Lieutenant Colonel Robert
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Chilton, sent confidential orders to Magruder to take charge of both
Huger’ s and his own troops for the purpose of maintaining an active
defensive posture to deceive McClellan as to Lee’ s a c tiv itie s .

Magruder

was I n i t ia l ly ordered to attack 1f the opportunity presented It s e lf and
to pursue the Federals i f they withdrew.1
A fter the war a mellow D. H. H ill wrote, "No one ever lived who
could play o ff the Grand Seignior with a more lordly a ir than Prince
John."2 Magruder was more than an actor; he was a professional
soldier.

He immediately consulted with his colleague, General Huger,

and "devised many methods of exhibiting an aggressive strength that
might deceive McClellan."3 Brent reported that Magruder examined his
entire lin e , "He had a restless energy in preparation that provided for
every contingency."4 Magruder and his men did not perceive any slight
against themselves for being excluded from the fighting at
Mechanicsville and Gaines M ill on 26-27 June.

On the contrary, "We a ll

considered i t [th e ir assignment] the post of danger and honor."5
In fa c t, i t was a post of danger and high risk since Magruder and
nis 25,000 men were a ll that stood between McClellan and Richmond.

They

1War Department, Rebel Records, "Correspondence of Confederate
General and S taff Officers," John Bankhead Magruder Papers, Lieutenant
Colonel Robert Chilton to Magruder, 24 June 1862, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
2D. H. H ill, "Lee Attacks North of the Chickahominy," in Battles
and Leaders of the C ivil War, ed. Robert Johnson and Clarence Buel
(rep rin t, Secaucus, NJ: Castle, nd), 2:362.
3Brent, 159.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
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performed splendidly,
Officers shouted commands to Imaginary units, buglers
sounded meaningless calls, wagons rumbled back and forth over
the same screened area to give the Impression of an endless
train , soldiers were marched 1n circles by clearings 1n sight
of the enemy and returned to the same scene again and again,
campfires were b u ilt for non-existent soldiers and sound
effects were u tiliz e d .
Magruder's tactics proved completely effective.

Alexander Webb, a

s ta ff o fficer who would la te r win a general’ s wreath and a Congressional
Medal of Honor at Gettysburg, wrote in a postwar analysis,
While the Battle of Gaines M ill was 1n progress, the
enemy’ s force—25,000 strong under Magruder, by a succession of
feints, advanced along different portions of the Union lin e ,
south of the Chickahominy. Furious outbursts of a r tille r y fir e
and a resort to every device known which could lead to the
b elief that an attack in force was imminent.
McClellan’ s escape from the lines fronting Magruder was the f ir s t of
three incidents cited by c ritic s which led to Magruder’ s "banishment."
In compliance with Lee’ s orders of 24 June, Magruder ordered an active
reconnaissance.

Lafayette McLaws reported,

The troops were under arms by daylight. The lookouts
posted in trees overlooking the enemy’ s camp near the railroad,
reported that the works of the enemy were being strengthened.8
On 29 June, the Yankees had slipped away and Magruder was blamed.
Of course, other stolen marches occurred during the war, most notably
when General Grant shifted his entire army from Lee’ s front at Cold
Harbor in June 1864 to the south side of the James River.

General

6Jeffrey L. Rhoades, Scapegoat General - The Storv of Maior General
Beniamin Huger. C. S. A. (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1985), 69.
Alexander S. Webb, The Peninsula. Campaigns of the C ivil War
Series (Charles Scribner’ s Sons, 1881; reprint, Wilmington, NC:
Broadfoot, 1989), 135.
8RB, 9:340.
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McClellan was running and Lee was trying to slow him, disrupt his
re tre at, and destroy him between the rivers.

After the war when Sir

Fredrick Maurice edited Colonel Charles Marshall’ s diary, he defended
Magruder saying troops are easily drawn out of hidden trenches.9
As Lee plotted to trap McClellan by assigning parallel and
Intersecting lines of march, he ordered Magruder to move ahead and
attack McClellan’ s rear guard.
alleged fa ilu re .

This set the stage fo r Magruder’ s second

The 29 June Battle of Savage’ s Station was bravely but

inconclusively fought.
Magruder’ s force was 13,000 or slig h tly more than h alf the size of
a Union Corps.

Although Magruder had commanded both Huger’ s and his own

troops for the past few days, Huger was marching on a parallel track
with a separate objective.

On Magruder’ s le f t , but north of the

Chickahominy were Jackson’ s troops.
While Jackson was under orders to cross the Chickahominy River and
cooperate with Magruder,

there apparently was no

general order for

battle and Jackson spent a leisurely 29 June, a Sunday, reconstructing a
bridge.

Jackson made no e ffo rt to find anywhere

When queried, he replied

laconically that he had

to ford the river.
more important tasksto

attend to and would be unable to support Magruder.
What Magruder faced at Savage’ s Station was more than a rear guard.
General Edwin V. Sumner led two Corps, with a third in the v ic in ity .
His roughly 40,000 men outnumbered the attacking Magruder over three to

9Sir Fredrick Maurice, ed., An Aide-de-CamD of Lee. Being the
Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall Sometimes Aide-de-CamD. M ilitary
Secretary and Assistant Adjutant General on the S taff of Robert E. Lee.
1862-1865. (Boston: L ittle , Brown, and Company, 1927), 105.
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one.

Rather than ris k an unsupported frontal assault, Magruder sought

and received a temporary diversion of two divisions from Huger’ s
command.

Magruder’ s lead division under the command of D. R. Jones

reported the enemy was in strength in his front and that Jackson was not
coming.10 According to Magruder, this intelligence foiled his plans
because he had hoped to place Jackson and Huger on both of Sumner’ s
flanks.11
When i t became apparent that Magruder would not assault Sumner,
Huger’ s divisions were returned to th e ir lin e of march and Magruder was
l e f t with his original force of 13,000 men.

Magruder did not believe

himself strong enough to launch a coup de main and so he fought a
feeling engagement.

Fearing the consequences i f he were destroyed, he

committed only Generals Kershaw’ s and Semmes’ s brigades.
la te hour, the fig h t was fierc e.

Despite the

Augustus Dickert described i t in

Kershaw’ s brigade history,
The troops bounded to the front with a y ell and made for
the forest in fro n t, while the batteries graped us as we rushed
through the tangled morass. The topography of the country was
such that our a r tille r y could get no position to reply. . . .
Semites and Barksdale put in on our right; Cobb remaining as
10R£ 109, Magruder Papers, General D. R. Jones to Magruder, 29 June
1862.
"Magruder apparently believed that both Huger and Jackson were to
cooperate with him. He did not know what force he faced, but he did not
intend to engage in a frontal assault. Lee hoped that Magruder would
attack furiously enough to slow McClellan’ s retreat and permit Lee’ s
other troops to trap McClellan between the rivers where he could be
destroyed. I f Magruder’ s attack was aggressive enough, Lee believed
McClellan would send reinforcements. Lee obviously did not know that
Sumner, Franklin, and Heintzelman were facing Magruder. A postwar
analysis by Joseph Cullen noted, " It was increasingly apparent that
Lee’ s s ta ff work le f t much to be desired." Joseph P. Cullen, The
Peninsula Campaign of 1862. McClellan and Lee Struggle for Richmond
(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1973), 138-40; BE, 9:358.
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reserve, while the division of D. R. Jones which had been
moving down on the le f t side of the railroad soon became
engaged. The enemy fought with great energy and vigor while
the Confederates pressed them hard. . . . The graplng was
simply dreadful, cutting, and breaking through the trees. 2
The historical perspective of the Battle of Savage’ s Station 1s one
of Confederate fa ilu re .

McClellan continued his precipitous retreat

leaving the station with its supplies and wounded to Magruder’ s troops.
In retrospect, Lee clearly did not plan to fig h t a major engagement at
Savage’ s Station or else he would have developed a b attle plan.

I f he

intended for Magruder to force Sumner back into McClellan’ s retreating
column, i t was an unrealistic expectation.

Magruder could not have

brought sufficient force to bear on Sumner unless he was able to ro ll up
a flank; therefore, Lee’ s implied criticism , not received until the
battle was over, seems to be inappropriate.13
Magruder had been i l l several times during the past few months and
was driving himself to exhaustion.
the past week.

He had f e lt tremendous pressure for

When le f t in charge of the ruse de guerre for Gaines

M ill, he executed b rillia n tly .
and to detect any movements.

He strained himself to remain vig ilan t
He feared not only an undetected retreat,

1ZD. Augustus Dickert, History of Kershaw’ s Brigade with Complete
Roll of Companies. Biographical Sketches. Incidents. Anecdotes, etc.
(Newberry, SC: Elbert H. Hull Co., 1899), 128-29.
13Lee wrote Magruder after the battle, ”1 regret that you have made
so l i t t l e progress today in the pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap
the fru its of our victory, the pursuit should be most vigorous. I must
urge you then again to press on his rear rapidly and steadily." OR,
series 1, vol. 11, part 2, 687. Since Savage’ s Station was Magruder’ s
f i r s t legitimate test of arms, he no doubt perceived this as criticism
and vowed to redouble his effo rts. Considering he could not have
carried the fie ld in Sumner’ s presence, he had done the best he could.
While Sumner did not want to quit the fie ld , he was ordered to and
thousands of Yankee wounded were le f t for prisoners.
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but expected a rapid counterpunch through his unsupported and
undermanned lin e .

Having carried the shadow of Richmond on his back for

a year, he grimly dug 1n his heels to prevent any fa ta l tactical or
strategic erro rs.14
Magruder did not sleep at a ll the night of 28-29 June and no sooner
did he go to bed than "Stonewall" Jackson arrived at his command tent at
3:30 A.M. on 30 June.

Jackson failed to execute his orders to support

Magruder and the opportunity had passed.
White Oak Swamp.

McClellan was now crossing

Lee reacted to the situation and sought to get

Magruder in front of McClellan near Malvern H ill.
Magruder’ s march on 30 June took him to the support of General
Longstreet at Frayser’ s farm but was so long in completion that they
were not engaged.

I t was on this march that Lieutenant Colonel Chilton

and Magruder f ir s t crossed swords over the positioning of his force.
Magruder was concerned that he would be unable to jo in up with General
Holmes, whom he was ordered to support.

Finally, la te in day, Magruder

was ordered into the lin e to relieve Longstreet who had fought at
Frayser’ s farm.15
McClellan had retreated masterfully and found himself under the
protection of Union gunboats near Turkey Bend.

Now he was able to

concentrate a massive a r tille r y park at Malvern H ill, near the Crew
Farm.

Thus fa r, Lee had been frustrated in his efforts to bag and

uMagruder was a student of war and he made several references to
Napoleon’ s victory at A usterlitz. He feared a sim ilar tactic where
McClellan would allow him to overextend himself and then counterattack
his strung out force beating i t in d etail.
15RR, 9:342.
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destroy McClellan.

He was a skilled and aggressive o ffic e r who had

pressed the youthful, Inexperienced McClellan.

Now he made one of the

great judgmental mistakes of his m ilitary career.
McClellan.

He decided to "crush"

This battle was supposedly Magruder’ s third and fatal

fa ilu re .
The attack at Malvern H111 was an utter fiasco.

The attack was

premised on an effective Confederate counter battery f ir e .

Yet, very

l i t t l e a r t ille r y was able to get to the b a ttle fie ld , the chief of
Confederate a r tille r y was not even aware of the plan.16 Coordinated
attacks were to begin with "a y e ll," but officers acted
independently.17
Magruder, worn out, excitable and anxious had a major role in this
his f ir s t fu ll scale b attle.

He got lost marching to the b a t t le f ie ld -

having been ordered to march by the Quaker Road.

He followed the advice

of local guides and took a road that was lo cally known as the Quaker
Road, but was not the one Lee intended.
arrived la te on the fie ld .

Following a countermarch, he

Duplicates of orders and delays in

transmission caused Magruder to receive several orders to attack.

The

urgency fostered by th eir nearly simultaneous arrival generated the i l l fated attack order.18 Magruder, weary to the point of incoherence and
16Jennings C. Wise, The Long Arm of Lee, with an Introduction by
Gary Gallagher (Richmond: Owens Publishing, 1988), 226.
17There are countless versions of the assault at Malvern H ill. One
thing that is certain is that an order to in itia te a b attle with a yell
is an invitation to disaster. There are numerous incidents of acoustic
shadow. However, in this b attle, the problem was getting to the
b a ttle fie ld and in lin e of b attle.
18Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenant. 1:599; OR, series 1, vol. 11, part 2,
670-71.
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111 from medication relating to stomach maladies, appeared Incompetent
and out of control.

Both shortcomings were surely aberrations of his

dynamic, Interactive personality.19 Fortunately nig h tfall ended the
carnage.

When queried by Lee as to why he had attacked the impregnable

Malvern H111, Magruder responded tersely, "In response to your orders
twice repeated."

Lee had no response.20

McClellan’ s pro clivity to continue retreating caused him to abandon
Malvern H ill during the night of 1-2 July.
to conclude the battle was won.

This led Magruder and others

The Seven Days Campaign was over.

Magruder suffered a bad night.

Brent described him on the morning

of 2 July,
General Magruder said there was no change in the situation
and he believed the enemy to be in re tre a t. . . . He looked
badly and he told me he had hardly slept. Some of the veins in
his face seemed swollen and were absolutely purple and he
evidently suffered from the c h illy weather.
Having seen the end of the campaign and perhaps miffed at Lee, Magruder
wrote to Secretary Randolph on 2 July,
I consider the period has arrived when I cannot . . . ask
the longer indulgence of the government in respect to the order
assigning me to the command of the Trans-Mississippi
Department.
19We know of Magruder’ s devotion to duty and have seen his
willingness to o ffer strategic advice. This was the greatest crisis of
his career and he was keyed up for i t . However, the constant strain of
the past fourteen months had exacted a t o ll. Magruder’ s s ta ffe r Brent
adequately documented Magruder’ s illnesses. Magruder was not the only
Confederate leader who suffered with an illn ess. Lee is believed to
have demonstrated the in itia l stages of heart disease in 1863.
20Douglas S. Freeman, R. E. Lee. A Biography. 4 vo ls., (New York:
Scribner’ s Sons, 1934), 2:218.
21Brent, 231.
22QR, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 630.
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In response, Magruder was relieved and ordered to Richmond.
Magruder had been assigned to the command of the Trans-Hississlppl
Department on 23 May.

Anticipating the needs of his new command, he

sought support 1n men and supplies even before the Seven Days battles.
A le tte r of 26 June 1862 to Lee and Davis begged for a commitment of
adequate resources for his department.

He also noted that p o litic a lly

important Missouri General Sterling Price had agreed to serve under
him.23
The Trans-Mississippi region was the fro n tier of the Confederacy.
Although the region had been ignored to this point, Secretary Randolph
had impressed upon President Davis its importance.
the new department and named Magruder to head i t .

Davis had agreed to
Independently,

Confederate leaders in the Trans-M1ssisslppl region contemplated the
same action.

On 9 June 1862, General Van Dorn suggested the

establishment of a separate department with popular Missouri General
Sterling Price in command.24
When Price was told that Magruder was detailed for the command, he
was incensed and in mid-June made a trip to Richmond to confront Davis
in person.

A stormy meeting resulted in Price’ s resignation and Davis’ s

acceptance of i t .

Davis was a politician and egos were salvaged when

Price was offered the second-in-command.25
^QE. series 1, 13:845.
24J. R. Perkins, "Jefferson Davis and General Sterling Price," in
Confederate Veteran Magazine, vol. 19 (reprint, Harrisburg, PA:
National Historical Society, 1989), 473-74.
251bid., Steven E. Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals. The
Failure of Confederate Command in the West (Lawrence: University of
Kansas Press, 1990), 150.
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Although the Seven Days battles had successfully driven McClellan
from the gates of Richmond, the casualties were ghastly.

The army's

proximity to Richmond permitted thousands of versions of the action to
leak Into the c ity .

Everyone had a hero and a v illa in .

Rebel war clerk

Jones recorded, "Magruder is said to have led a division into action at
Malvern H i ll, i t is said contrary to the opinions of other
commanders."26 Sally Putnam wrote, "In this fig h t [Malvern H i l l ] ,
General Magruder was accused of rashness and many declared he was under
the intoxicating influence of ardent s p irits ," 27 and a day or two la te r
Putnam noted, "Public opinion reflected rather severely on General
Magruder and General Huger.

I t was said i f Magruder had been less rash

. . . The Federal army would have never reached the security of th eir
gunboats."28 On 10 July, Mary Chesnut observed, "Public opinion is hot
against Huger and Magruder for McClellan’ s escape."29
S ta ff officers also formed opinions that found th e ir way to prin t.
Howell Cobb’ s biographer noted that one Georgia source, most lik e ly a
newspaper, claimed heavy Georgia casualties were caused by Toombs’ s,
Cobb’ s and Magruder’ s drunken behavior on the b a ttle fie ld .30 Charles
Marshall recorded his disappointment believing the Federal army should
have been destroyed but was not due to a lack of coordinated leadership.
He blamed Magruder who he believed should have known the roads well as
26Jones, Diary. 140.
27Putnam, 148.
28Ib id ., 149.
^Chesnut, 266.
30Simpson, 157-58.
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1t was his department.31 Robert E. Lee’ s daughter Charlotte wrote her
sisters a day afte r a v is it from her father, "Poor McGuder f slcl the
Dept f slcl people say he 1s to be court martlaled fo r being drunk at the
time he ordered the charge [Malvern H i l l ] . " 32
This disappointment was not seriously credited by President Davis
who was more upset over the loss of the shipyard at Norfolk.33
Magruder was oblivious to the gossip and he prepared to depart for his
new command via tra in .

On 11 July before he was to leave, Lieutenant

Colonel Chilton was constructing a le tte r which cast a shadow on his
career.

Chilton understood Lee’ s distress over McClellan’ s escape, as

did Marshall.

Chilton was personally convinced of Magruder’ s

Incompetence and he expressed his concerns In writing to General Cooper,
In Richmond,
The more I have thought upon the subject of Magruder’ s
mission, the more strongly convinced am I of the sad ju stice to
be In flic te d upon the people of the Southwest by sending
someone so u tterly incompetent and deficient as is Magruder
. . . . since matters appear to be progressing successfully
there [Texas], i t is a hazardous operation to send a marplot
there to reduce us to disgrace. . . . D. R. Jones charges him
with something worse than incompetency. . . . General Lee
concurs in my b e lie f of his incompetency, but w ill not act

31Maurice, 96.
32Charlotte Lee, Richmond to her sisters, 19 July 1862, ALS in Lee
Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond.
330n 6 July, Davis wrote his wife, "My great g rie f at the loss of
the Virginia is renewed and redoubled by our want of her now in the
James River. The timber for the completion of the Richmond was burned
at Norfolk and the work on her has thus been greatly delayed. I t is
uncertain when she w ill be finished." Jefferson Davis, Jefferson Davis.
Constitutionalist. His Letters. Papers, and Speeches, ed. Dunbar
Rowland, 10 vols. (Jackson, MS: Department of Archives and History,
1923), 5:291.
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unless d ire ctly asked by the President.34
This scathing attack was Immediately relayed to President Davis who
promptly recalled Magruder to Richmond.35 Upon Magruder’ s return,
Chilton Immediately forwarded to him a copy of his le tte r to Cooper.
Magruder seethed at the charges of an In fe rio r m ilitary o ffic e r and the
m ilitary Inequality may have been the only reason he did not challenge
Chilton to a duel.
Even before Magruder began to assemble his rebuttal, Chilton was
qualifying his comments.

A 20 July le tte r to President Davis c la rifie d

his position; Chilton had sent the le tte r without Lee’ s knowledge
because of Lee’ s caution about expressing opinions Involving others.
Chilton continued, "This opinion of mine 1s not based upon what I have
heard General Lee state but my observation of facts which I knew must be
within the knowledge of General Lee."36 Chilton then postulated 1n his
le tte r to Magruder that "I w ill state General Lee had no knowledge
whatsoever of this le tte r and my Impression with regard to his
concurrence In my views was and is conjectural."37
Magruder’ s pride was hurt by Chilton’ s charges and he refused to
credit them.

A le tte r of 24 July to Davis advised that he was acting

^ la r Department, "Compiled Service Records of Confederate General
and S taff O fficers," Robert Chilton F ile , ££ 109, Robert Chilton to
General Samuel Cooper, Richmond, 11 July 1862. National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
35Davis, 5:294.
^Compiled Service Records, Chilton F ile , Chilton to Jefferson
Davis, Richmond, 20 July 1862.
37Ib id ., Chilton to General Magruder, Richmond, 20 July 1862.
Chilton Records.
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rapidly to secure o ffic ia l reports which he hoped to have the next day.
He asked Davis not to assign anyone else to his command,38 but the
p o litic a l pressures to assign someone to the command were extreme and
Davis superseded Magruder with General Theopholls Holmes.39
Chilton hoped his charges would result 1n a Court of Inquiry, but
neither Magruder nor the President required I t .
cashier Magruder this was his opportunity.

I f Davis had wanted to

Instead he permitted

Magruder to submit his o ffic ia l report 1n response.

Davis’ s postwar

writings tend to discredit any vendetta against Magruder/0
Magruder’ s subordinates ra llie d to his defense.

Personal letters

and o ffic ia l reports from T. R. R. Cobb, Lafayette McLaws and D. R.
Jones confirmed Magruder’ s b e lie fs .41 Although Freeman c riticized
Magruder’ s report as self-serving and fanciful, he did concede that
Magruder had maturely and methodically refuted the allegations.42
Magruder’ s report dated 12 August 1862 was privately published 1n
an e ffo rt to counter vicious rumors surrounding his re c a ll.
comprehensive and credible document.

I t was a

Magruder received fu ll cooperation

mRG 109, Magruder Papers, Magruder to Jefferson Davis, Richmond,
24 July 1862.
39Davis, 5:301.
^Davis heaped lavish praise on Magruder in the Rise and Fall of
the Confederate Government. Specific examples are cited la te r in the
chapter.
41RG 109, Magruder Papers, General T. R. R. Cobb to General
Magruder, Richmond, 23 July 1862.
42Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:608.
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from Lee and Lee’ s subordinates.43 Magruder even presented sworn
a ffid avits and medical reports.**
On 13 August, Magruder formally submitted his report simultaneously
to Davis and Lee.

Magruder asked Davis, i f the report was satisfactory,

to consider restoring him to his command to smother the slander that was
circulating.*5 Lee hurriedly reviewed Magruder’ s report and provided
specific rebuttals.

He did not c ritic iz e Magruder and even offered a

lukewarm endorsement,
General Magruder appears to have greatly exerted himself to
accomplish the duty devolved on him, and I can bear testimony
to the a lac rity he displayed in its execution. He had many
d iffic u ltie s to contend with I know. I regretted at the time
and s t i l l regret that they could not have been more rapidly
overcome. I feel assured, however, that General Magruder
intentionally omitted nothing he could do to ensure success.
Magruder had weathered the storm.
on the Second Manassas Campaign.

The army was away from Richmond

Magruder was now ready to resume a

command position, but the question was where?

Randolph believed a

return to Lee’ s army could be awkward and he recommended that Magruder
become the deputy commander of the Trans-Mississippi, "I think his
energy in conjunction with General Holmes’ s prudence could produce good

*3R£ 109, Magruder Papers, General Magruder, Spottswood Hotel, to
General Lee, in the fie ld , 2 August 1862.
**J. Bankhead Magruder, Report of His Operations on the Peninsula
and of the Battles of Savaae Station and Malvern H ill near Richmond
(Richmond: Charles H. Wynne, 1862), 34.
*5RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 232 1/2, Magruder, Richmond, to Jefferson
Davis, Richmond, 13 August 1862.
“ RE, 9:364.
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res u lts .*47 Davis having fin a lly calmed the Sterling Price beehive,
remarked, ”1 doubt the propriety of disturbing the unity of the TransHi ssisslppl department under existing circumstances."48
Over the next six weeks, Magruder lobbied for the vindication which
reassignment would produce.

The decision process was undoubtedly

delayed by the dramatic moves of the Confederate armies In the fie ld ,
but 1t gave him the opportunity to marshall additional support.

On

5 September, an anonymous le tte r to the Editor of the Richmond Whig made
a strong defense against the slanderous rumors, "Some so base as to
prohibit a gentleman from answering them."49 The le t te r pleaded for
patience,
That report has been made and when submitted w ill, I am
confident, prove a complete refutation . . . I t 1s certainly
rather remarkable that General Magruder’ s Incompetency for
command should only be discovered after more than a year’ s
service in a very important position during which he had won
the f ir s t victory gained over the enemy, had secured the
Confederate capital against attack, and Southeastern Virginia
against invasion . . . and had fin a lly been assigned by the
President who knew his services and appreciated his merits to
an exceedingly responsible and important command in a distant
portion of the Confederacy.
In la te September, Magruder’ s name was included with Lee, Johnston,
Jackson and other general officers in a series of Congressional
resolutions praising the army’ s achievements from the Seven Days

George W. Randolph, War Department, to Jefferson Davis, Richmond,
26 August 1862, ALS in Pritchard Von David Collection, Eugene C. Barker
Texas History Center, University of Texas, Austin.
^ Ib id .
49"Letter to Editor of Whig." Richmond Enquirer. 5 September 1862,
page 1.
50Ibid.
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b attles .51 Thus encouraged, Magruder wrote Davis on 29 September
suggestlrg a separate command in Texas and the New Mexico te rrito rie s
subject to General Holmes overall command.

Magruder pleaded that his

continued In ac tivity after his vindication was a source of personal
embarrassment.52 Two weeks la te r, Magruder was assigned to the command
he requested.53
Magruder thrived In Texas and earned the praise of the country for
his stunning success In recapturing Galveston and the Yankee gunboat
Harriet Lane.

Clerk Jones wrote a fittin g tribute when he recorded,

B rillia n t achievement at Galveston and i t was Magruder’ s
work . . . he has always had a penchant for desperate work. So
we shall expect to hear of more gallant exploits in that
section.
In mid-January, President Davis wrote Magruder a congratulatory le tte r
and wished him continued success in the future.55
Lieutenant Colonel Chilton experienced d iffic u ltie s from Magruder’ s
Congressional supporters.

George Randolph told Magruder in a personal

le tte r of 21 February 1863 that vindication was forthcoming.56 A month
la te r, Chilton was denied promotion to colonel and brigadier general

51*Resolutions of Congress," Richmond Examiner. 20 September 1862.
52Jchn B. Magruder, Richmond, to Jefferson Davis, Executive Office,
29 September 1862, ALS from Samuel Richey Collection of the Southern
Confederacy, the Halter Havighurst Special Collections Library, Miami
University, Oxford, Ohio.
53Jones, Diarv. 194.
54Ib id ., 235.
55Davis, 5:424.
56B£ 109, Magruder Papers, George W. Randolph, Richmond, to General
Magruder, Texas, 21 February 1863.
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because of his "slanders1 against Magruder.

A May 1863 Court of Inquiry

Investigated the propriety and Integrity of Chilton’ s actions 1n writing
to General Cooper.

They refused to permit testimony concerning

Magruder’ s performance at the Seven Days; but, Chilton was exonerated
and no judgment was rendered on his accusations.57
When the war ended, Magruder refused to seek a pardon or parole and
he escaped to the Confederate colony In Carlotta, Mexico.

After serving

the Emperor Maximilian as a Major General, he returned to Texas.

I t was

rumored he returned to his drinking habits and he died alone 1n
February, 1871.58

57Chilton Court of Inquiry, Chilton Records, National Archives.
“ Warner, Generals In Gray. 207-8.
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CHAPTER 6
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT
John Bankhead Magruder served the United States Army for 30 years
before the Civil War.

Perspectives change and the a c tiv itie s of a fun

loving young lieutenant in a peacetime army should not be judged
harshly.

Promotions were slow and many people must have enjoyed the

animated Magruder.
and dynamic.

When the Mexican War came, Magruder was aggressive

The 24 year old lieutenant was now a serious experienced

42 year old graduate of the United States M ilitary Academy.

In

recognition of his performance, he received three promotions and a
series of challenging leadership roles between 1848 and 1861.
When the secession issue was joined, he honorably le f t the United
States Army and accepted a leadership role in his home state.

Magruder

was not only commissioned a fu ll colonel, but he was named to a council
of prominent Virginians to select other qualified citizens for
leadership positions.
John Bankhead Magruder’ s record is clearly presented in postwar
analyses.

His h isto rically negative image as "Prince John" emerged in

Douglas Southall Freeman’ s monumental analysis of southern leadership
R.E. Lee and the companion, but d is tin ctly d ifferen t series Lee’ s
Lieutenants.

Of Magruder, Freeman writes without a citation:

He held that bombardment of the enemy might be infrequent
but that bombardment of the Secretary of War should be
incessant. His early dispatches doubtless were read with
149
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eagerness.
groans.

Soon the sight of one of them was to evoke

I f this was Magruder’ s epitaph, one would conclude he was bombastic
and frivolous, but fortunately the record was rich in contradictory
evidence.

Freeman’ s own meticulous notes le f t 1n the archives of the

Virginia State Library reveal a shallowness of sources that did a
disservice to this prominent son of V irg in ia.
some historians suggested2 nor was he as
proposed.3

Magruder was not inept as

significant as others

Instead, Magruder emerges as an Important secondary leader,

a conscientious man and meticulous soldier.
Current historiography has produced credible effo rts to vindicate
"scapegoats."

Revisionist historians are reducing "demigods" to great

generals and raising underated leaders to levels of public acceptance.
The la te Dr. Thomas Connelly authored Lee. The Marble Man. while Charles
Schackleford recently penned George Wythe Randolph and the Confederate
E lite . William Piston’ s published doctoral dissertation examined James
Lonastreet. Lee’ s Tarnished Lieutenant and Jeffery Rhoades wrote
Scapegoat General. The Storv of Maior General Beniamin Huger. C.S.A..
These works are useful to an understanding of the real war within the
’ Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:16.
2There are numerous instances of casual slanderous commentary
concerning Magruder. Evan Robert Corn; "Daniel Harvey H ill and
the Peninsula, Maryland, and Chickamauga Campaigns," (M. A.
Thesis, University of North Carolina, 1961) 57. Referring to
Savage’ s Station "The clash failed to produce any tactical
results, except for revealing another case in which Macgruder’ s
[sic] ineptness allowed McClellan to break away unscathed."
3Edward A. Pollard, Lee and His Lieutenants (New York: E.B.
Treat and Co., 1867), 847; Eulogy of John B. Magruder delivered by
John B. Cary to Lee Camp #1, Grand Camp of Confederate Veterans,
Department of Virginia, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond.
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C ivil War.

Then, as now, p o litics and social cliques played a

significant role.
Unfortunately for Magruder no fu ll length biography exists.4
Thomas Settles examined Magruder's m ilitary career In his 1972 doctoral
dissertation at Texas Christian University.

Dr. Settles’ s topic was so

broad he was unable to present a detailed analysis of Magruder’ s
principal contribution to the Confederate cause, the early defense of
the V irginia Peninsula.

Settles also misinterpreted some sources and

was unable to uncover others that are now available.

In 1989, Penn

State Professor Gary Gallagher penned a short a rtic le for "Civil War"
that accurately summarized Magruder’ s career through the Seven Days
b attles .5 He only used the O ffic ia l Records and he restated Freeman’ s
and S ettles’ s themes.
"Prince John" has a regal, almost comical a ir reminiscent of
medieval times.

I t certainly does not mix with the martial sounding,

"Stonewall," "My Old War Horse," "The Rock of Chickamauga", or "Fighting
Joe."

Many casual students of the war routinely accept the summary

judgments of lite ra ry legends such as Bruce Catton, Shelby Foote and
Douglas S. Freeman.

These early treatsies provided stereotypes that are

frequently perpetuated in disciples’ books.
This thesis examined Bankhead Magruder in the context of his
4T. R. Hay, Locust Valley, New York, to Virginia Historical
Society, 23 July 1961, TLS in the Virginia Historical Society,
Richmond. Mr. Hay wrote of his intention to publish a manuscript
on Magruder’ s l i f e . However, Settles 1972 dissertation expresses
thanks to Mr. Hay for the data which he shared during interviews.
Mr. Hay apparently never published the book.
5Gary Gallagher, "The Fall of Prince John Magruder," C ivil
War. XIX, 8-15.
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environment.

There was l i t t l e contemporary analysis of the drudgery of

command 1n the quiet Peninsula sector.

This resulted In an

understatement of Magruder’ s contributions In V irginia.

Yet, Magruder

clearly met the terms of his commission.6 Nothing happened 1n the
Federal camp that was not analyzed and reported.
Federal army was not his fa u lt.

The In a c tiv ity of the

To the extent possible, he held the

Yankees at the tip of the Peninsula and prevented adequate Intelligence
from reaching McClellan for his 1862 Peninsula campaign.

As commander

of the Department, he meticulously completed a basic defensive network
and greatly expanded I t to the extent manpower and supplies permitted.
He worked tire le s s ly to train his s ta ff and subordinates.

Accusations

of micromanagement appeared overstated, since subordinates at a ll levels
proved to be Inexperienced 1n m ilitary matters.
Magruder w illin g ly took on the Richmond bureaucracy and forced
support for his command.

While i t appeared he exceeded his authority in

impressing slaves and activating the mi 1111a, he properly viewed them as
resources to accomplish his mission.
Limited m ilitary encounters prevent a fu ll and impartial evaluation
of his m ilitary s k ills .

Magruder was not the only C ivil War general who

bungled his early combat assignments.
and Sherman.

Such a l i s t included Lee, Grant

Subsequent successes in Texas were small in scale and are

not a proper measure of his combat leadership capacity.
Magruder found himself embroiled in controversy, but basically
excluded from strategic decisions.

Men such as Joseph E. Johnston and

George McClellan overshadowed him.

An argument could be made that

6CB, series 1, 2:865.
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Johnston could have been cashiered 'or treason.

I f Davis expected a

fig h t on the lower Peninsula, he certainly erred 1n permitting Johnston
to retain his command.

In consideration of Johnston’ s preferred

strategy to Invade the North and Lee’ s clear understanding of
Confederate goals on the Peninsula, Lee should have received command.
Postwar analyses of contemporaries, combined with reports of
professional soldiers, placed Magruder and his effo rts 1n perspective.
The following are representative of the hundreds of laudatory comments
uncovered 1n the research:

Federal Navy commander John Mlssroon

commenting on the York River batteries, "The works of the enemy are
excessively strong and powerfully armed.

Their cannon are managed and

served with surprising accuracy."7 Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Gustavus Fox te s tifie d to Congress, "Wooden vessels could not have
attacked the batteries with any degree of success.

The forts at

Yorktown were situated too high; were beyond the reach of naval guns."8
Federal engineer Lieutenant Cyrus B. Comstock on the quality of the
Gloucester Point battery, "The finished portion of the work was well and
carefully done. . . .

The strength of the work is nearly the same as

that of the work enclosing Yorktown."9
Magruder boasted of his forward lin e of defense.

Chief Union

engineer General John G. Barnard told Congress, "The works prepared by
the enemy to resist any landing south of Yorktown . . . such as that at
7Webb, 67.
8Congress, Joint Committee, The Joint Committee on the
Conduct of the War, Part I . Army of the Potomac. 37th Congress, 3d
Session, 31 March 1863, 630.
9QR, series 1, vol. 11, part 1, 338.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

154
Ship’ s Point and others near the mouth of Wormley Creek were of
considerable magnitude."10 Major Albert J. Myer, Federal signal
o ffic e r wrote,
Reports were received of reconnaissances made along the
lines 1n front. Earthworks seemed to be found everywhere, and
everywhere bodies of the enemy vig ilan t and of unknown numbers
resisted and threatened assault. . . . To pass from the right
to the le f t of our lines, following the narrow and winding
earth roads and the miles of corduroyed ways through the woods
was a journey of several hours. . . . bearing often upon an
enemy whose lines and forces hidden by other trees and shrubs
were invisible.
The Warwick River lin e was considered the least defensible of the
three, but 1t was also intimidating.

General Erasamus Keyes reported,

"The works at Lee’ s M ill were apparently very strong.

The force of the

enemy was en tirely unknown owing to the d iffic u lty of the approach."12
Barnard summarized the lin e as "far more extensive than may be supposed
. . . every kind of obstruction which the country affords such as
abatis, marsh, inundation, e tc ., was s k illf u lly used.

The lin e was

certainly one of the most extensive known to modern times."13
The most impressive of Magruder’ s works was Yorktown.

McClellan’ s

aide-de-camp wrote,
They are strong but not neat. They might have been taken
by storm with te rrib le loss . . . that immense connected
fo rtific a tio n with its numerous salient angles, on which th e ir
heaviest guns were mounted is at once a beautiful and a
wonderful work. The ditch is deep, but dry, the parapet is
d if f ic u lt to scale . . . Trees which were standing a year ago
have been cut down to give free range to th e ir a r tille r y . Deep
10Committee on Conduct of War, 397.
11Qg, series 1, vol. 11, part 1, 228.
12Committee on Conduct of War, 598.
13£B, 12:558.
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gorges and ravines are inside and about these fo rtific a tio n s .
This natural advantage furnished good cover fo r th e ir troops
against a r t ille r y fir e and rendered the position d iffic u lt to
assault.
Barnard added, " It w ill be seen therefore, that our approaches were
swept by the f ir e of at least forty-nine guns."15
Johnston’ s determination to evacuate the Peninsula, based on the
pending bombardment and a desire to spare the useless loss

of

Confederate l i f e , moved Robert E. Lee’ s m ilitary secretary

A.

L.Longto

astutely comment, "Since Magruder’ s position was never put

to

thetest,

the difference of opinion respecting i t must be reconciled

by

speculative c ritic is m ."16 However, Jefferson Davis praised the work
w riting,
By availing himself of the Warwick River . . . [Magruder]
constructed an entrenched lin e across the Peninsula and with
equal s k ill and in trep id ity had thus far successfully checked
every attempt to break i t . . . . Magruder had constructed
batteries at both places [Yorktown and Gloucester Point] which
by th e ir crossfire presented a formidable obstacle to the
ascent of ordinary vessels.
Union newspaper editor, William Swinton, who wrote a history of the Army
of the Potomac, commented on the Union Chief of A r tille r y ’ s claim that
the Confederate batteries would have been silenced in 12 hours,
This opinion is not ju s tifie d by subsequent experience in
the war, for the rude improvised earthworks of the Confederates
showed an a b ility to sustain an indefinite pounding. General
Johnston’ s evacuation of Yorktown seems to have been prompted

u Ib id ., 5:7.
15Ib id ., 12:558.
16A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee (Secaucus, NJ:
and Grey Press, 1983), 154.

Blue

17Davis, 2:83-84.
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by a lik e exaggeration of the probable effect of a
bombardment.
Elsewhere in his volume, Swlnton concluded a fte r Interviewing Johnston
that,
Had General Johnston 1n place of becoming alarmed at the
preparations against him determined to fig h t 1t out on the lin e
of the Warwick, there 1s; l i t t l e doubt he might have prolonged
the siege in d efin itely.
President Davis in February 1865 drafted a le tte r detailing why he would
not give Johnston another independent command.
fa ile d on numerous occasions.

He said Johnston had

Concerning Yorktown he wrote, "General

Johnston soon announced the position untenable and made another hasty
retreat and with a heavy loss of munitions and armament."20
The last of Magruder’ s defensive works was the Williamsburg line
which Lee had fretted about the previous year.

While Freeman called

Fort Magruder "feeble,"21 E. Porter Alexander and Alexander Webb
disagreed.

Webb wrote,

Fort Magruder stood in his [McClellan] immediate front
commanding the junction of the le f t on Hampton road . . . and
18William Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. A
C ritic al History of Operations in Virginia. Maryland, and
Pennsylvania from the Commencement of the Close of the War. 1861-5
(Secaucus, NJ: Blue and Grey Press, 1983), 107n.
19Ib id ., 111-12. In 1878, Brevet Brigadier General John C.
Palfrey estimated Yorktown might have held out another month. He
speculated on what results might have been occurred had Johnston
decided to hold the position. John C. Palfrey, "The Siege of
Yorktown," in Campaigns in Virginia. 1861-62. Papers read before
the M ilita ry Historical Society of Massachusetts in 1876. 1877.
1878. and 1880. ed. Theodore F. White (Boston: James R. Osgood
and Company, 1881; reprint, Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing,
1989), 151-52.
2O0£, series 1, vol. 47, part 2, 1304-11.
21Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:175.
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the main Yorktown road. . . . To the right and l e f t the smaller
redoubts, twelve 1n a l l , formed an Irregular lin e nearly across
the Peninsula. Resting on creeks and marshes, with a belt of
clearing In th e ir front, they could have proved, 1f properly
manned and supported, a formidable b arrier. The approaches to
the lin e were singularly disadvantageous for the attacking
party.22
I t seems obvious that the Confederacy may have had the capability
to delay and prolong the Union advance In d e fin ite ly .

Johnston’ s ego,

cowardice, or misunderstanding of the Confederacy’ s strategic needs
seemed to be the only reasons Norfolk and Gosport were prematurely lo st.
I t remained fo r President Davis to write a f ittin g epitaph,
Late in 1862, General John B. Magruder, a s k illfu l and
knightly soldier, who had at an e a rlie r period of the year
rendered distinguished service by his defense of the Peninsula
between the James and York Rivers, Virginia was assigned to the
command of the Department of Texas.
What of the controversies involving Magruder 1n the Peninsula
campaign and the Seven Days battles?

Current historiography clearly

leans toward vindicating most of the officers involved; however,
Johnston was indicted by his own writings and those of his
contemporaries.

He is certainly a candidate for a revisionist study and

reduction in stature.

Gustavus Smith does not merit serious

consideration as a commander.
side rather than vice versa.

I t seems he was the thorn in Magruder’ s
Jackson proved he was human and has

received ju s t criticism for his failures at Mechanicsville, Savage’ s
Station and White Oak Swamp.

^Webb, 74-75; E. P. Alexander, "A Sketch of Longstreet’ s
Division," SHSP, 10:40.
^Davis, 2:233.
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Lee was clearly to blame for the debacle at Malvern H111.24 Lee
had a b r illia n t plan, but 1t was fa r too complicated for the terrain or
the experience of his s ta ff.2*
victory.

S t ill Seven Days was a clear strategic

The threat to Richmond was removed and the Union army

leadership so Intimidated that McClellan’ s army was effectively
destroyed.

I t did not reconstitute its e lf for ten weeks, returning to

action only in the Maryland campaign.
The Seven Days battles did not cause Magruder to be "deported11 to
the Trans-M1ss1ss1pp1 Department.

The assignment was a calculated move

of a qualified o ffic e r to support the Secretary of War’ s strategic
vision.

Texas A & M University President, Frank Vandiver, effectively

chal lenged the assumption that the Trans-Mississippi was a dumping
ground for fa ile d officers or that Magruder had been fire d .

He

contended that Magruder adequately demonstrated his competence in Texas
and that he was i l l and exhausted

during the Seven Days campaign.26

Lee is uniformly c riticized by analysts of Malvern H ill.
Webb said, "In truth, there seems to have been few orders issued
on the f i r s t by the rebel general-in-chief," 164. Webb notes Lee
failed to take advice not to attack and was ignorant of the roads
needed to maneuver, 157. E. P. Alexander believes Lee should have
rescinded the orders, E. P. Alexander, M ilita ry Memoirs of a
Confederate (New York: Scribner’ s Sons, 1907), 161-64.
^Cullen’ s criticism is concise, "What was needed even more
than good maps was competent s ta ff work . . . and simple rather
than complicated maneuvers, . . . In this battle Lee’ s strategy
was poor and his tactics unsound."
Cullen, 166, 168.
26The western theaters were often considered a dumping ground
for inept officers. However, many highly regarded officers ended
up there to include Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor. This too may
be an appropriate topic for a more detailed study. Vandiver’ s
arguments are persuasive. Frank E. Vandiver, Rebel Brass. The
Confederate Command System (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1956), 31,
59-64.
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Why did Hagruder request to leave the army the day a fte r Malvern
H111?

Perhaps he was exhausted and fed up with everyone, Including Lee.

Brent noted 1n his memoirs,
[Magruder sent Information to Richmond but was] disbelieved
and disregarded. [However, he] exhibited the greatest care 1n
providing for a ll emergencies and devoted himself to a careful
study how he could strengthen his position. . . . He fu lly
realized that he was defending one of the passes to Richmond
with very Inadequate forces for the purposes.
Magruder went to Texas as an honored man.
he received tributes.

He was not disgraced and

General A. L. Long wrote,

Shortly a fte r the retreat of General McClellan, General
Magruder was appointed to command of the Department of Texas,
which from Its remoteness and extent was of great Importance.
This exhibition of confidence on the part of the Confederate
government furnishes undeniable proof of the high estimation in
which Magruder was held and the able manner in which he
performed his duties shows that his a b ility was correctly
estimated.
0. M. Roberts wrote for Evan’ s volume on Texas fo r Confederate M ilita ry
History.
The new commanding general had acquired fame for the s k ill
with which on the Peninsula of Virginia he checked for weeks
McClellan’ s invading army before miles of entrenchments, armed
in part with Quaker guns.29
Was the sobriquet "Prince John" fair?

Was he a bon vivant?

Lee’ s

Colonel Walter Taylor wrote,
He was a typical soldier, the most picturesque that I ever
saw. I t was a real treat to see General Magruder in fu ll
m ilitary costume. . . . There was in his manner and deportment

27Brent, 100-101.
“ A. L. Long, "Memoir of General John Bankhead Magruder,"
SHSP. 12:110.
^Evans, Confederate M ilitary History. Texas by 0. M.
Roberts, 79.
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a great fascination for those about him.30
Colonel R. G. Lowe of the Louisiana Battalion wrote;
Prince John was equal to any emergency. A soldier by
nature, he had the dash and bearing of a Rupert and a Crichton
combined. . . . Events subsequent to this time so overshadowed
the defense made on the Warwick that Magruder’ s work has been
lost sight of.
English Colonel Freemantle met Magruder in Texas and described a party
thrown at Magruder’ s mess,
Magruder wears a red woolen cap and f i l l s the president’ s
chair with great aptitude. I t was 11:30 P.M. before I could
tear away from this agreeable party.
Magruder, the man and the soldier, was noble and e lit e .

Lowe

wrote, "Prince John knew no such words as re tre a t.*33 Hampton
secessionist, Baker Lee claimed,
[Referring to the Peninsula] I t tru ly required a man not in
the common role of men to suit the situation. Magruder proved
himself to be such a man. . . . With Magruder i t was not a
question of strength in arms but of strength in s k ill, in
audacity, in m ilitary diplomacy. He was equal to i t a ll.
General Dabney Maury, a founder of the Southern Historical society, paid
f i t trib u te when he wrote,
Magruder was so b r illia n t and gallant in social l i f e that
his remarkable talents were not appreciated. Hereceived less
credit fo r his remarkable genius for war than he deserved. I
W a lte r H. Taylor, General Lee. His Campaigns in Virginia
1861-65 with Personal Reminiscences (Norfolk: Nusbaum Book and
News Company, 1906), 51.
31Colonel R. G. Lowe, "Magruder’ s Defense of the Peninsula,"
vol. 8, Confederate Veteran Magazine (rep rin t, Harrisburg, PA:
The National Historical Society, 1988), 108.
32Freemantle, 29.
33Confederate Veteran. 8:105.
^Baker Lee, "Magruder’ s Peninsula Campaign in 1862," 19:63.
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wish I could do justice to a man so b r illia n t, so brave, and so
devoted to Virginia.
I t seems unnecessary to add more words but i t says much about the
nature of the subordinate leaders and men of this great C ivil War.
Colonel Benjamin Ewell was Magruder’ s predecessor 1n command on the
Peninsula; a resident of Williamsburg; President, and savior of postwar
William and Mary; and Joseph E. Johnston’ s Chief o f S ta ff.

Of Magruder

he wrote,
He was a humane, honorable man, above intrigue. A brave,
judicious—although easily excited--and on the whole a
successful soldier.

35Confederate Veteran Magazine. 5:171.
“ Benjamin S. Ewell, "Reminiscences," p. 12.
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